nep-spo New Economics Papers
on Sports and Economics
Issue of 2009‒07‒28
five papers chosen by
Joao Carlos Correia Leitao
Technical University of Lisbon

  1. Management and Program Effectiveness in Belgian Sports Clubs By A. BALDUCK; M. BUELENS; M. MAES
  2. Tit-for-tat Strategies in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Games: Evidence from NCAA Football By Humphreys, Brad; Ruseski, Jane
  3. Sabotage in dynamic tournaments By Oliver Gürtler; Johannes Münster
  4. Team Formation in a Network By Markus Kinateder
  5. Market for Clubs with Congestible Facilities:  Nonlinear-Pricing Equilibria with Entrepreneurial Managers By Hideo Konishi

    Abstract: This study investigated management and program effectiveness using the competing values approach as theoretical framework. The sample consisted of 823 board and sports members of Belgian sports clubs. Two scales were developed. Factor analysis revealed 12 management and 9 program effectiveness dimensions. Reliability scores were acceptable. Results showed that both board and sports members rated the dimension atmosphere at management and program level as the most effective factor in sports clubs. Board members perceived that their sports club was less effective in acquiring board members, coaches and other volunteers. The dimensions atmosphere and acquiring board members and coaches were significant predictors of the overall success score of the club at management level. The dimension satisfaction, competition goal, acquiring sports members, and information and communication were significant predictors at the program effectiveness level. The two-level effectiveness scale can be used as a practical tool to study organizational effectiveness in sports clubs.
    Date: 2009–04
  2. By: Humphreys, Brad (University of Alberta, Department of Economics); Ruseski, Jane (University of Alberta, Department of Economics)
    Abstract: Defection in every period is the dominant strategy Nash equilibrium in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games with complete information. However, in the presence of incomplete information, players may have an incentive to cooperate in some periods, leading to tit-for-tat strategies. We describe the decision to comply with recruiting regulations or cheat made by NCAA Division IA football programs as a finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma game. The game includes incomplete information about the resources devoted to football programs, the recruiting effort made by rival programs, and the behavior of rival programs. We test for evidence that NCAA Division IA football programs follow tit-for-tat strategies in terms of complying with or defecting from NCAA recruiting rules using panel data from NCAA Division IA football over the period 1976-2005. We find anecdotal and empirical evidence that is consistent with tit-for-tat strategies in this setting. The presence of in-conference rivals under NCAA sanctions increases the probability of a team being placed under sanctions.
    Keywords: noncooperative behavior; cartels; NCAA football; tit-for-tat strategies
    JEL: C72 L13 L83
    Date: 2009–07–01
  3. By: Oliver Gürtler (University of Bonn); Johannes Münster (Free University of Berlin)
    Abstract: This paper studies sabotage in a dynamic tournament. Three players compete in two rounds. In the final round, a player who is leading in the race, but not yet beyond the reach of his competitors, gets sabotaged more heavily. As a consequence, if players are at the same position initially, they do not work productively or sabotage at all in the first round. Thus sabotage is not only directly destructive, but also depresses incentives to work productively. If players are heterogeneous ex ante, sabotage activities in the first round may be concentrated against an underdog, contrary to findings from static tournaments. We also discuss the robustness of our results in a less stylized environment.
    Keywords: dynamic tournaments, contests, sabotage, heterogeneity
    Date: 2009–07
  4. By: Markus Kinateder (Universidad de Navarra)
    Abstract: Two project leaders (or entrepreneurs) in a network, which captures social relations, recruit players in a strategic, competitive and time-limited process. Each team has an optimal size depending on the project’s quality. This is a random variable with a commonly known distribution. Only the corresponding project leader observes its realization. Any decision is only observed by the involved agents. The set of pure strategy Sequential Equilibria is characterized by giving an algorithm that selects one equilibrium at a time. An agent’s expected payoff is related to his position in the network, though no centrality measure in the literature captures this relation. A social planner frequently would achieve a higher welfare.
    Keywords: Dynamic Competitive Group Formation, Imperfect Information
    JEL: C72 C73 D85
    Date: 2009–05
  5. By: Hideo Konishi (Boston College)
    Abstract: Scotchmer and Wooders (1987) show that efficient clubs are homogeneous when consumers are divisible in Berglas's (1976) anonymous crowding model. However, if consumers are not divisible or if clubs have multiple facilities with economies of scope, mixed clubs are efficient. In such a model, we consider clubs with multiple membership policies for different types of consumers, and show the existence and efficiency of equilibrium with nonlinear policies. We employ entrepreneurial equilibrium, an equilibrium concept with profit-seeking entrepreneurs. In our model, club managers and members of clubs care only about the members' actions, not their types. The equilibrium is efficient in our adverse selection model due to this "anonymity" of crowding effects. Our theorem can be regarded as showing the existence of a core allocation that satisfies envy-free property in the absence of nonanonymous crowding effects.
    Keywords: club goods, mixed club, efficiency, equilibrium, entrepreneurship, nonlinear contract, envy-free, core
    JEL: D51 D62 H41 H70
    Date: 2009–07–14

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