nep-spo New Economics Papers
on Sports and Economics
Issue of 2009‒02‒28
two papers chosen by
Joao Carlos Correia Leitao
Technical University of Lisbon

  1. The Benefits of Financial Markets: A Case Study of European Football Clubs By Dirk G. Baur and Conor McKeating
  2. Club Networks with Multiple Memberships and Noncooperative Stability By Frank H. Page, Jr., Myrna H. Wooders

  1. By: Dirk G. Baur and Conor McKeating
    Abstract: This study analyses the performance of European football clubs which undergo an initial public offering (IPO). We use a unique time-series and cross-section dataset consisting of domestic and international performance data to develop an event study to investigate the effects of a football club’s on-field performance before and after the IPO. The study follows from the observation that, as financial markets are expected to exhibit a positive influence on the economy as a whole, football clubs who access these markets should benefit as well. However, the conclusions of our study are similar to those in the corporate finance literature, where firms who undertake an IPO find their stock price underperforming similar firms in the medium term. Using our metric, football clubs have a diminished domestic and international performance after the stock market listing.
    Date: 2009–02–16
  2. By: Frank H. Page, Jr., Myrna H. Wooders (Indiana University Bloomington Vanderbilt University)
    Abstract: Modeling club structures as bipartite directed networks, we formulate the problem of club formation as a noncooperative game of network formation and identify conditions on network formation rules and players’ network payoffs sufficient to guarantee that the game has a potential function. Our sufficient conditions on network formation rules require that each player be choose freely and unilaterally those clubs he joins and also his activities within these clubs (subject to his set of feasible actions). We refer to our conditions on rules as noncooperative free mobility. We also require that players’ payoffs be additively separable in player-specific payoffs and externalities (additive separability) and that payoff externalities — a function of club membership, club activities, and crowding — be identical across players (externality homogeneity). We then show that under these conditions, the noncooperative game of club network formation is a potential game over directed club networks and we discuss the implications of this result.
    Date: 2009–02

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