| By: |
Speklé, Roland F.;
Teije G. Smittenaar,Teije G. (Nyenrode Business Universiteit) |
| Abstract: |
We examine the comparative effectiveness of three alternative licensing
systems in professional football. The three systems’ main concern is with the
promulgation of responsible financial behaviour among football clubs. To that
effect, all three systems rely on entry control and ex ante budget approval
rights. However, the three structures also differ, especially with regard to
the way in which they seek to impose ex post budgetary discipline. We analyse
these differences, using Transaction Cost Economics as our basic frame of
reference. Both theoretically and empirically, we demonstrate that the
effectiveness of the licensing arrangements depends on the credibility of the
punitive measures available to the governing body. We also find evidence to
suggest that social ties may partly substitute for formal deterrence and
enforcement. |
| Keywords: |
Licensing, Governance structure effectiveness, Credible threats, Transaction Cost Economics |
| Date: |
2008 |
| URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dgr:nijrep:2008-05&r=spo |