nep-spo New Economics Papers
on Sports and Economics
Issue of 2008‒06‒13
two papers chosen by
Joao Carlos Correia Leitao
University of the Beira Interior

  1. Do College Football Games Pay for Themselves? The Impact of College Football Games on Local Sales Tax Revenue By Dennis Coates; Craig A. Depken, II
  2. Governing the league: opportunism, credible threats and social ties in football competition licensing By Speklé, Roland F.; Teije G. Smittenaar,Teije G.

  1. By: Dennis Coates (Department of Economics, University of Maryland, Baltimore County); Craig A. Depken, II (Belk College of Business, University of North Carolina - Charlotte)
    Abstract: This paper analyzes the net impacts of college football games on the sales tax revenues and taxable sales of four mid-sized cities in Texas. The paper addresses the question in the title, but also asks whether state policy makers might be justified in encouraging schools in their state to play one another based on the local economic impact those games will have. In general, our evidence suggests the answer to that question is no.
    Keywords: tourism, economic impacts, special events
    JEL: L83 H27
    Date: 2008–06
  2. By: Speklé, Roland F.; Teije G. Smittenaar,Teije G. (Nyenrode Business Universiteit)
    Abstract: We examine the comparative effectiveness of three alternative licensing systems in professional football. The three systems’ main concern is with the promulgation of responsible financial behaviour among football clubs. To that effect, all three systems rely on entry control and ex ante budget approval rights. However, the three structures also differ, especially with regard to the way in which they seek to impose ex post budgetary discipline. We analyse these differences, using Transaction Cost Economics as our basic frame of reference. Both theoretically and empirically, we demonstrate that the effectiveness of the licensing arrangements depends on the credibility of the punitive measures available to the governing body. We also find evidence to suggest that social ties may partly substitute for formal deterrence and enforcement.
    Keywords: Licensing, Governance structure effectiveness, Credible threats, Transaction Cost Economics
    Date: 2008

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