|
on Sports and Economics |
| By: | Moschini, GianCarlo |
| Abstract: | We exploit a major structural change that has occurred in world soccer to study the impact of incentives on outcomes in a strategic setting. A game-theoretic model is developed that captures some essential strategic elements of soccer vis-à-vis the number of points awarded to a win. The observable implications of the model are tested using a large dataset that spans 30 years and 35 countries. The empirical results support the theoretical model and show that the 3-point system has led to a statistically significant increase in the expected number of goals and a decrease in the fractions of drawn matches. |
| Keywords: | Association football, Nash equilibrium, panel data, strategic incentives, supermodularity, tournaments. |
| JEL: | C72 L8 |
| Date: | 2008–06–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:isu:genres:12942&r=spo |