| By: |
Stephen Dobson (Division of Economics, Nottingham Business School, Nottingham Trent University, UK);
John Goddard (Bangor Business School, Bangor University, UK) |
| Abstract: |
This article develops a dynamic game-theoretic model of optimizing strategic
behaviour by football teams. Teams choose continuously between defensive and
attacking formations and between a non-violent and a violent playing style.
Starting from the end of the match and working backwards, the teams' optimal
strategies conditional on the current state of the match are determined by
solving a series of two-person non-cooperative subgames. Numerical simulations
are used to explore the sensitivity of strategic behaviour to variations in
the structural parameters. The model is tested empirically, using English
football league data. Teams that are trailing are willing to bear an increased
risk of a player dismissal in order to increase the probability of scoring.
Teams that are leading or level in scores play cautiously. The scoring rates
of teams that are trailing are higher than those of teams that are ahead or
level. Stochastic simulations are used to obtain probabilities for match
results, conditional upon the state of the match at any stage. The article's
main theoretical and empirical results constitute novel, non-experimental
evidence that the strategic behaviour of football teams can be rationalized in
accordance with game-theoretic principles of optimizing strategic behaviour by
agents when payoffs are uncertain and interdependent. |
| Date: |
2008–04–04 |
| URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crt:wpaper:0805&r=spo |