nep-spo New Economics Papers
on Sports and Economics
Issue of 2007‒11‒03
seven papers chosen by
Joao Carlos Correia Leitao
University of the Beira Interior

  1. The Role of Patriotism in Explaining TV Audience of National Team Games - Evidence from Four International Tournaments By Egon Franck; Stephan Nüesch
  2. Peer Effects in Team Sports: Empirical Evidence from NCAA Relay Teams By Craig A. Depken, II; Lisa E. Haglund
  3. Progressive Revenue Sharing in MLB: The Effect on Player Transfers By Joel G. Maxcy
  4. A Poisson Model For No-Hitters In Major League Baseball By Paul M. Sommers; David L. Campbell; Benjamin O. Hanna; Conor A. Lyons
  5. Why the NBA Bounced Their New Basketball? By Paul M. Sommers; Robert M. Marcoux; Filip Marinkovic; George A. Mayer
  6. When Do NFL Quarterbacks Pass Their Prime? By Paul M. Sommers; Stefan G. Hrdina
  7. Some Issues in the Calculation of Batting Averages: Ranking (and Re-Ranking) the Top 50 Batsmen in Test Cricket, 1877-2006 By Vani K. Borooah; John Mangan

  1. By: Egon Franck; Stephan Nüesch (Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich; Institute for Strategy and Business Economics, University of Zurich)
    Abstract: Existing studies about the determinants of the so-called couch potato audience in sports concentrate on the quality of the sporting contest which involves both the absolute playing strength of the competing teams and the relative evenness of the competition. Regarding national team competitions, however, we expect that the TV audience should also be driven by patriotism. Analyzing the couch potato audience of all matches during the FIFA World Cup 2006 in Switzerland, we find strong evidence that the TV ratings are highly affected by the size of the groups of foreign residents affiliated to the teams playing on the field. Whereas absolute playing strength impacts on the TV ratings too, the effect of evenness of the competition is insignificant.
    Keywords: TV audience, soccer, FIFA World Cup, patriotism
    JEL: L83
    Date: 2007
  2. By: Craig A. Depken, II (Department of Economics, University of North Carolina - Charlotte); Lisa E. Haglund (Department of Economics, University of Texas at Arlington)
    Abstract: This paper investigates whether disparity in team member quality impacts team production using NCAA 4x400m relay teams. The net peer effects are estimated to have both an absolute and relative negative effect on the team performance. Because NCAA relay teams are comprised of unpaid amateurs, we utilize a direct measure of team-member quality rather than indirect measures such as wages. The evidence suggests that a greater disparity in team member quality reduces team performance, that is, it increases a relay team’s running time. This suggests that net negative peer effects exist and support the “team cohesiveness hypothesis” for NCAA relay teams.
    Keywords: teamwork, shirking, track and field, sports
    JEL: J31 L20 L83
    Date: 2007–10
  3. By: Joel G. Maxcy (Department of Kinesiology, University of Georgia)
    Abstract: The 1997 collective bargaining agreement between the Major League Baseball owners and players’ union altered MLB’s system of sharing revenue sharing between clubs. The new system, a convoluted cross-subsidization scheme, by design progressively redistributed income from the highest revenue generating clubs toward the lowest revenue-producing clubs. The 2003 agreement extended this method of revenue redistribution, but with an increased the tax rate and modified process. The purpose of the revenue sharing system was to alleviate a growing disparity in revenue generation, which MLB claimed caused competitive imbalance. We examine progressive revenue sharing theoretically, within the principal-agent framework, and shows that the incentive to divest in talent is increased for lower revenue producing clubs. Empirical results are supportive. Payroll disparity and competitive imbalance increased modestly from the period immediately preceding implementation. Most striking however is the alteration in transfer rates of players, in particular the increased flow of productive talent away from the lowest revenue clubs. We show conclusively that low revenue producing clubs acted on the increased incentives to divest in talent.
    Keywords: Sport, revenue redistribution, collective bargaining
    JEL: J50 L20 L83
    Date: 2007–10
  4. By: Paul M. Sommers; David L. Campbell; Benjamin O. Hanna; Conor A. Lyons
    Date: 2007
  5. By: Paul M. Sommers; Robert M. Marcoux; Filip Marinkovic; George A. Mayer
    Date: 2007
  6. By: Paul M. Sommers; Stefan G. Hrdina
    Date: 2007
  7. By: Vani K. Borooah; John Mangan (School of Economics, The University of Queensland)
    Abstract: Batsmen in cricket are invariably ranked according to their batting average. Such a ranking suffers from two defects. First, it does not take into account the consistency of scores across innings: a batsman might have a high career average but with low scores interspersed with high scores; another might have a lower average but with much less variation in his scores. Second, it pays no attention to the “value” of the player’s runs to the team: arguably, a century, when the total score is 600, has less value compared to a half-century in an innings total of, say, 200. The purpose of this paper is to suggest new ways of computing batting averages which, by addressing these deficiencies, complement the existing method and present a more complete picture of batsmen’s performance. Based on these “new” averages, the paper offers a “new” ranking of the top 50 batsmen in the history of Test Cricket.
    Date: 2007

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