nep-spo New Economics Papers
on Sports and Economics
Issue of 2006‒05‒13
five papers chosen by
Joao Carlos Correia Leitao
Universidade da Beira Interior
  1. Production Boosting Effects of Football By Hakan Berument; Eray Yücel
  2. Job Promotion Tournaments and Imperfect Recall By Oliver Gürtler
  3. Mutual Monitoring in Teams: Theory and Experimental Evidence on the Importance of Reciprocity By Jeffrey Carpenter; Samuel Bowles; Herbert Gintis
  4. Performance of Soccer on the Stock Market:Evidence from Turkey By Hakan Berument; Esin Gözpýnar; Baþak Ceylan
  5. Success in Soccer and Economic Performance : Evidence from Besiktas-Turkey By Hakan Berument; M. Eray Yücel; Onur Ince
  1. By: Hakan Berument; Eray Yücel
    Date: 2006
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bil:bilpap:0605&r=spo
  2. By: Oliver Gürtler (Department of Economics, BWL II, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, Germany. Tel.:+49-228-739214, Fax:+49-228-739210; E-mail: oliver.guertler@uni-bonn.de)
    Abstract: In this paper, a promotion tournament is considered, where, at the beginning of the tournament, it is unknown how long the tournament lasts. Further, the promotion decision is based on the assessments of a supervisor with imperfect recall. In line with psychological research, the supervisor is assumed to either value early or recent impressions more strongly. It is shown that effort may increase or decrease, as the probability of promotion in a certain period gets higher. The single effects determining the sign of the effort change oftentimes depend on how the supervisor processes information.
    Keywords: Promotion Tournament, Promotion Probability, Imperfect Recall
    JEL: J33 M51 M52
    Date: 2006–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trf:wpaper:112&r=spo
  3. By: Jeffrey Carpenter (Middlebury College and IZA Bonn); Samuel Bowles (Santa Fe Institute and University of Siena); Herbert Gintis (Central European University and Santa Fe Institute)
    Abstract: Monitoring by peers is often an effective means of attenuating incentive problems. Most explanations of the efficacy of mutual monitoring rely either on small group size or on a version of the Folk theorem with repeated interactions which requires reasonably accurate public information concerning the behavior of each player. We provide a model of team production in which the effectiveness of mutual monitoring depends not on these factors, but rather on strong reciprocity: the willingness of some team members to engage in the costly punishment of shirkers. This alternative does not require small group size or public signals. An experimental public goods game provides evidence for the behavioral relevance of strong reciprocity in teams.
    Keywords: team production, public good, monitoring, punishment, experiment
    JEL: C92 H41 J41 J54 Z13
    Date: 2006–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2106&r=spo
  4. By: Hakan Berument; Esin Gözpýnar; Baþak Ceylan
    Date: 2006
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bil:bilpap:0606&r=spo
  5. By: Hakan Berument; M. Eray Yücel; Onur Ince
    Date: 2005
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bil:bilpap:0507&r=spo
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