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on Sports and Economics |
| By: | Matthias Kräkel (University of Bonn and IZA Bonn) |
| Abstract: | Individuals who compete in a contest-like situation (for example, in sports, in promotion tournaments, or in an appointment contest) may have an incentive to illegally utilize resources in order to improve their relative positions. We analyze such doping or cheating within a tournament game between two heterogeneous players. Three major effects are identified which determine a player’s doping decision - a cost effect, a likelihood effect and a windfall-profit effect. Moreover, we discuss whether the favorite or the underdog is more likely to be doped, the impact of doping on overall performance, the influence of increased heterogeneity on doping, the welfare implications of doping, and possible prevention of doping. |
| Keywords: | cheating, contest, doping, fraud in research, tournament |
| JEL: | J3 K42 M5 |
| Date: | 2006–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2059&r=spo |
| By: | Akihiko Kawaura (Graduate School of Policy and Management, Doshisha University); Sumner J La Croix (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa) |
| Abstract: | Economists have debated whether and why the designated hitter (DH) rule in North American major league baseball led to an increase in hit-batsmen. We use data from Japan's professional baseball leagues, the Pacific League (DH rule) and the Central League (no DH rule), to re-examine this question. Initial empirical findings reveal increases in hit-batsmen in the Pacific League after we control for the DH’s effect on team batting performance. After controlling for interactions between pitcher quality and the DH rule, we find that the DH rule induced changes in team defensive strategies and, consequently, an increase in hit-batsmen. Subsequent rule changes reduced the effectiveness of these strategies. |
| JEL: | D81 J28 |
| Date: | 2006–04–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hai:wpaper:200607&r=spo |