| By: |
Thierry Lallemand (DULBEA, Université libre de Bruxelles, Brussels);
Robert Plasman (DULBEA, Université libre de Bruxelles, Brussels);
François Rycx (DULBEA, Université libre de Bruxelles, Brussels) |
| Abstract: |
This paper examines how professional female tennisplayers react to: i) prize
incentives and ii) heterogeneity in ex ante players’ abilities. It is found
that a larger prize spread encourages women to increase effort, even when
controlling for many tournament and player characteristics. Further results
indicate that uneven contests lead favourites to win more games and underdogs
to be less performing. They also show that the performance differential
between players increases with the ranking differential. These findings
suggest that the outcome of a match is more linked to players’ abilities than
to players’ incentives to adjust effort according to success chances. |
| Keywords: |
sports economics, tournaments, incentives, performance, women. |
| JEL: |
J33 J41 M12 |
| Date: |
2005–11 |
| URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dul:wpaper:05-19rs&r=spo |