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on Sociology of Economics |
| By: | Daniel Stockemer; Gabriela Galassi; Engi Abou-El-Kheir |
| Abstract: | In recent years, significant efforts have been made to attract more women into academia and to support their careers, with the goal of increasing their representation. Using novel data for economics and political science, collected through web-scraping the corresponding departments of the top 50 universities worldwide, we document three key findings: (i) female scholars, on average, publish less and receive fewer citations than their male counterparts; (ii) this gap is smaller at junior ranks in both disciplines; and (iii) the gap decreases in departments with a higher proportion of female scholars, particularly in political science, where female faculty representation is generally higher compared to economics. Gaps do not differ significantly by field in economics, where a substantial proportion of women are concentrated in microeconomic subfields. Overall, our results underscore a persistent publication and citation gap between men and women in both disciplines, primarily driven by full professors, while suggesting that this gap diminishes in departments with greater sex balance among faculty. |
| Keywords: | Labour markets |
| JEL: | J16 I23 A14 J71 J44 |
| Date: | 2025–05 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bca:bocawp:25-13 |
| By: | Anastasiya-Mariya Asanov (University of Kassel, INCHER and Institute of Economics); Igor Asanov (University of Kassel, INCHER and Institute of Economics); Guido Buenstorf (University of Kassel, INCHER and Institute of Economics); Valon Kadriu (University of Kassel, INCHER and Institute of Economics); Pia Schoch (University of Kassel, INCHER and Institute of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Doctoral dissertations provide evidence about research practices in early-stage research. We examine reporting bias by manually collecting over 94, 000 test statistics from a random sample of German dissertations and their follow-up papers worldwide. We observe selective reporting, as only a fraction of the tests in the dissertations is reported in follow-up papers. Unexpectedly, we find no increase in reporting bias in follow-up papers compared to dissertations nor, generally, reporting bias in dissertations or papers. Self-selection into higher-impact journals based on statistical significance may reconcile our finding of selective yet “unbiased†reporting with prior evidence suggesting pervasive reporting bias. |
| Keywords: | Research Transparency, Reporting Bias, Higher Education, Young Researchers |
| JEL: | A14 A23 C12 I23 |
| Date: | 2025 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:202504 |
| By: | Robin Cowan; Nicolas Jonard |
| Abstract: | Among the many changes that have affected academic life in recent decades we draw attention to two: increasing collaboration in the production of knowledge, and the rising prominence of (automated) “rankings” in evaluation of individuals and institutions. In this paper we build a model to address the effect of the latter in the presence of the former. Scientists collaborate to create new knowledge. Intradepartment collaborations dominate, but cross-department knowledge flows are present in two forms: collegial links outside a department, and a job market whereby scientists can change departments. Rankings enter the model through the job market: they are parametrized to control the extent to which they are used to evaluate job candidates on the one side, and job openings on the other side of the market. We find that when rankings are aggressively pursued aggregate knowledge output is lower, and further, knowledge production at both individual and department levels is more stratified or segregated. These effects can be mitigated by encouraging extra-department collaboration, but we observe that this strategy will erode the coherence (and purpose) of the department structures in which universities are currently organized. |
| Keywords: | Economics of science; Universities; University rankings; Academic labour market dynamics. |
| JEL: | D83 O31 O32 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2024-52 |
| By: | Hamermesh, Daniel S. (University of Texas at Austin) |
| Abstract: | This study examines publications in three leading general economics journals from the 1960s through the 2020s, considering levels and trends in the demographics of authors, methodologies of the studies, and patterns of co-authorship. The average age of authors has increased nearly steadily; there has been a sharp increase in the fraction of female authors; the number of authors per paper has risen steadily; and there has been a pronounced shift to articles using newly generated data. All but the first of these trends have been most pronounced in the most recent decade. The study also examines the relationships among these trends. |
| Keywords: | sociology of economics, co-authors, authorship |
| JEL: | A14 |
| Date: | 2025–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp17863 |
| By: | Ravi Jagadeesan; Davide Viviano |
| Abstract: | The publication process both determines which research receives the most attention, and influences the supply of research through its impact on the researcher's private incentives. We introduce a framework to study optimal publication decisions when researchers can choose (i) whether or how to conduct a study and (ii) whether or how to manipulate the research findings (e.g., via selective reporting or data manipulation). When manipulation is not possible, but research entails substantial private costs for the researchers, it may be optimal to incentivize cheaper research designs even if they are less accurate. When manipulation is possible, it is optimal to publish some manipulated results, as well as results that would have not received attention in the absence of manipulability. Even if it is possible to deter manipulation, such as by requiring pre-registered experiments instead of (potentially manipulable) observational studies, it is suboptimal to do so when experiments entail high research costs. |
| Date: | 2025–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2504.21156 |