nep-sog New Economics Papers
on Sociology of Economics
Issue of 2026–06–22
two papers chosen by
Jonas Holmström, Axventure AB


  1. Merit or networks? What decides where research is published By Ning Li
  2. Will The University Endowment Tax Slow Scientific Progress? Evidence from Elite Economics PhD Programs By Joshua Angrist; Marc Diederichs; Glenn Ellison

  1. By: Ning Li
    Abstract: Does scientific publishing reward the quality of ideas or the advantage of connections? The question is universal to prestige-driven science, yet it has resisted decades of study because a paper's quality could not be gauged ahead of its publication fate without using that fate as the yardstick. We break this constraint by measuring a paper's idea quality directly from its text, before publication, using a discipline-trained LLM evaluator that scores the idea without seeing author names or outcomes. Using economics as a case study, we combine this text-legible idea-quality score with an execution-quality rubric, a connection index, an author-ability index, and an off-the-shelf language-model text score to estimate a five-input production function for journal placement across 6, 208 economics working papers. The inputs are not rivals but a sequence along the ladder of prestige. Execution sets a meritocratic floor and is the largest input overall. Text-legible idea quality grades the rungs in between. Connections set a favoritism ceiling that bites mainly near the apex, the most selective journals. Connections work through two additive channels: connected authors write papers that score higher, and at equal scores their papers are still more likely to place better. Yet this advantage is bounded. Connections raise the odds of every rung without making the apex the typical outcome for ordinary ideas, and even the highest-scoring papers face real friction reaching the visible journal ladder. The result nests, rather than chooses between, the meritocracy and network accounts of how science is published.
    Date: 2026–06
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2606.03763
  2. By: Joshua Angrist; Marc Diederichs; Glenn Ellison
    Abstract: The 2025 university endowment tax hike and other sources of financial pressure may lead the schools that train the most prolific economics researchers to reduce graduate enrollment. Will this affect long-run research output? We use a novel sample of MIT Economics PhD program applicants to estimate the research value-added of eight elite schools. Our estimates mitigate selection bias by controlling for MIT admissions committee rankings—a remarkably strong predictor of long-run research success—and for applicant aspirations as revealed by their application portfolios. While rank controls substantially reduce estimated gaps between elite and non-elite graduates, large differences in value-added remain. Graduates of high-tax and other top-eight schools produce 60-75% more impact-adjusted publications than do comparable graduates from non-top-eight US schools. The elite-school advantage is especially pronounced for top five journal publications. Differences in research success within the elite tier, however, are relatively modest. The out-performance of elite-school PhDs does not appear to be explained by editorial connections or peer effects in elite programs.
    JEL: A23 I23 I28
    Date: 2026–05
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:35244

This nep-sog issue is ©2026 by Jonas Holmström. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at https://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the Griffith Business School of Griffith University in Australia.