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on Sociology of Economics |
| By: | A. Prasad (Audencia Business School); T. Calvard |
| Abstract: | Social science researchers, including most management academics, are increasingly encouraged to generate impact that transcends the limited parameters of the ivory towers. Given the need to address grand challenges confronting humanity today—as well as to ensure that the public interest is served—calls for more impact certainly makes sense. We wholly concur with the sentiment that social science researchers have a responsibility to engage in impact efforts beyond the traditional scholarly metrics used to evaluate research (e.g. citation counts, publications in top journals). Yet, we contend that we must also get real about the types of academic efforts that make a meaningful (and, by this we particularly mean, material) impact. |
| Keywords: | activism, politics, management learning |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05595807 |
| By: | Gertsberg, Marina (University of Melbourne) |
| Abstract: | Academic seminars are a central mechanism through which the finance profession allocates visibility, feedback, and network access. Using a new panel of 8, 744 external seminars at 74 U.S. finance departments from 2010 to 2024, I document five stylized facts. First, female representation rose from 10% to 25%, outpacing growth in the female share of the finance faculty. Second, seminar presenters are positively selected on research visibility: relative to same-institution faculty, they have substantially more publications, Top-3 publications, and citations, and this premium is no larger for women than for men. Third, seminar matching is strongly hierarchical: lower-ranked departments invite upward, whereas top departments draw from a broader range of tiers. Fourth, geographic reach is greater for elite-affiliated and senior scholars. Fifth, seminar opportunities are highly concentrated, with the top 10% of presenters accounting for 43% of all talks. The evidence shows that finance seminars have become more gender-inclusive while remaining strongly selective and hierarchical. |
| Keywords: | finance profession, academic seminars, diversity, hierarchy, geographic stratification, academic labor markets |
| JEL: | I23 J16 J44 J71 |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18603 |
| By: | Zaruhi Hakobyan |
| Abstract: | Generative AI acts as a disruptive technological shock to evaluative organizations. In academic peer review, it enters both sides of the market: authors use AI to polish submissions, and reviewers use it to generate plausible reports without exerting evaluative effort. We develop a three-sided equilibrium model to analyze this dual adoption and derive a counterintuitive managerial implication for journal policy. We show that when AI capability crosses a critical threshold, reviewer effort collapses discontinuously. This transition creates a welfare misalignment: authors benefit from a weakened ``rat race, '' while editors suffer from degraded signal informativeness. Characterizing the editor's optimal constrained response, we identify a strict policy reversal. Before the AI transition, editors should tighten acceptance standards to curb rent-dissipating author polishing. After the transition, conventional intuition fails: editors must loosen acceptance standards while investing in AI detection, because further tightening only amplifies dissipative polishing without improving sorting. We prove analytically that this sign reversal is a structural consequence of the reviewer effort collapse under log-concave quality distributions. Ultimately, addressing AI in evaluative systems requires treating monitoring and loosened selectivity as complementary design instruments. |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2604.23645 |
| By: | Agarwal, Ruchir (Harvard University); Angeli, Deivis (Global Talent Lab); Gaule, Patrick (University of Bristol) |
| Abstract: | Prestigious prizes can shape scientists' career decisions, effort allocation, and field entry, yet the structure of recognition has not kept pace with modern discovery. We screen roughly 2{, }700 international scientific prizes and rank the 99 most prestigious using an index of expert survey ratings, demand for prize information, media news mentions, prize money, and longevity. Three patterns stand out. First, half of today's top prizes were first given after 1980 and one-third after 2000, showing new awards can rise to prominence. Second, recognition is unevenly distributed across fields: physics, life sciences, and mathematics are heavily recognized relative to field size, while computer science, engineering, psychology, and the social sciences are under-served. Third, incentive design is narrow: only three of the top 99 prizes target early-career scientists, and most lack mechanisms to promote future research. These findings inform the design of recognition systems that better align with contemporary science. |
| Keywords: | scientific prizes, recognition systems, innovation policy |
| JEL: | O31 J24 |
| Date: | 2026–04 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18578 |