| Abstract: |
This paper develops a dynamic theory of academic publishing in which
evaluation metrics interact with researchers’ skill formation. Building on
classic models of adverse selection and signaling, the analysis introduces
endogenous human capital dynamics: researchers’ skills evolve as a function of
their publication choices. Engagement with high-scrutiny journals enhances
skills through learning-by-doing and referee feedback, while repeated
publication in low-scrutiny outlets leads to skill depreciation. The model
shows that when governing bodies fail to differentiate between high- and
low-scrutiny publication outlets—treating all indexed outputs as
equivalent—researchers optimally exert minimal effort, triggering a decline in
aggregate research skills. Crucially, this process generates hysteresis: even
if evaluation policies are later corrected, accumulated skill depreciation may
prevent the re-emergence of a separating equilibrium. The theory is
empirically motivated by a comparison of two research funding regimes in
Kazakhstan—one imposing strict publication targets tied to indexed journals,
and another without publication requirements—which generate markedly different
publication patterns despite operating within the same academic environment.
The framework highlights a previously unexplored channel through which
metric-based evaluation systems can cause persistent damage to research
capacity. It delivers clear policy implications: delayed reforms are costly,
stronger differentiation across publication outlets may be required to restore
quality, and increasing the cost of low-scrutiny publication can be as
important as raising rewards for high-quality output. While grounded in a
specific institutional setting, the model provides a general framework for
understanding durable quality failure in research systems reliant on targeted
publication metrics. |