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on Sociology of Economics |
| By: | Robin Cowan; Nicolas Jonard |
| Abstract: | This paper develops a simple model of academic research to analyse knowledge flows within a research system, when demand for multi-disciplinarity varies. Scientists are embedded in departments, linked to all others in the department, as well as to a small number of others outside the department. Pairs of scientists collaborate to produce ‘papers’. They can collaborate successfully with their direct links provided the distances in knowledge space between partners are within specified upper and lower bounds. By creating new knowledge, co-authors converge in their knowledge endowments, and the distance between them can fall below the lower bound. This is mitigated in two ways: extra-departmental links; and an intermittent job market in which scientists can change departments. In a simulation model we find that increasing the extent of extra-departmental links, and increasing job market activity both improve aggregate knowledge production. These two modes of knowledge diffusion are, however, substitutes rather than complements: increasing both does not improve performance over increasing only one. In addition, we find that increasing demands for multi-disciplinarity (essentially increasing the lower bound on knowledge distance for effective collaboration) generally decreases knowledge production. |
| Keywords: | economics of science; multi-disciplinarity; academic labour mobility; knowledge production. |
| JEL: | I23 I28 O39 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2024-21&r= |
| By: | Ascensión Andina-Díaz (Departamento de Teoría e Historia Económica, Universidad de Málaga); José A. García-Martínez (Dpto. Estudios Económicos y Financieros, Universidad Miguel Hernández); Nektaria Glynia (Dep. Economics, University of Cyprus) |
| Abstract: | We analyze the effect of career concerns on the refereeing process. We consider a journal editor and two referees who may differ in reputation and ability. A referee’s reputation is public information, while a referee’s ability is private information. We identify an incentive for low-ability referees to reject good papers —a phenomenon we call over-rejection— and find that this incentive increases with the referee’s reputation. We show that over-rejection decreases with competition, referee homogeneity, and the anonymity of the refereeing process. In contrast to low-ability experts, high-ability referees are truthful in equilibrium. Since a referee with a higher reputation is ex-ante more likely to be high-ability, our results suggest that the probability of rejection is inverted U-shaped in the referee’s reputation. We empirically test this result. We use data from Card and DellaVigna (2020) for submissions to four top economic journals in the period 2003-2013 and use the referee’s publication record as a proxy for the referee’s reputation. We find that the probability of sending a negative recommendation increases with the referee’s reputation in the early stages of the career and decreases thereafter, suggesting an inverted U-shape form in line with our theoretical results. |
| Keywords: | Career concerns: refereeing process; reputation; ability; endogenous transparency; competition; information transmission. |
| JEL: | C72 D83 |
| Date: | 2024–06 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mal:wpaper:2024-3&r= |