|
on Sociology of Economics |
| By: | Jelnov, Pavel (Leibniz University of Hannover); Weiss, Yoram (Tel Aviv University) |
| Abstract: | We study the relationship between age and influence in a closed group of 1,000 leading economists. We consider, as a measurement of influence, monthly RePEc rankings. We find that the rankings are not related to age but are related to experience. The optimal level of experience is 30 years from Ph.D. graduation. Additionally, we observe no robust difference in the effect of age and experience between Nobel laureates and leading non-Nobelists. Finally, we find that labor economists enjoy an especially steep improvement in the rankings before they reach the peak; however, the rankings also peak relatively early in their careers. |
| Keywords: | aging, citations, influence, Nobel, research productivity |
| JEL: | J24 |
| Date: | 2020–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12887&r=all |
| By: | Asier Minondo |
| Abstract: | Using a large dataset of research seminars held at US economics departments in 2018, I explore the factors that determine who is invited to present at a research seminar and whether the invitation is accepted. I find that high-quality scholars have a higher probability of being invited than low-quality scholars, and researchers are more likely to accept an invitation if it is issued by a top economics department. The probability of being invited increases with the size of the host department and if the scholar belongs to it. Having a coauthor in the host department increases the probability of being invited and accepting the invitation, whereas the distance between the host department and invited scholar reduces the probability of being invited and accepting the invitation. Female scholars have a lower probability of being invited to give a research seminar than male scholars. |
| Date: | 2020–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2001.10561&r=all |
| By: | Luigi Butera; Philip Grossman; Daniel Houser; John List; Marie-Claire Villeval |
| Abstract: | Creation of empirical knowledge in economics has taken a dramatic turn in the past few decades. One feature of the new research landscape is the nature and extent to which scholars generate data. Today, in nearly every field the experimental approach plays an increasingly crucial role in testing theories and informing organizational decisions. Whereas there is much to appreciate about this revolution, recently a credibility crisis has taken hold across the social sciences, arguing that an important component of Fischer (1935)'s tripod has not been fully embraced: replication. Indeed, while the importance of replications is not debatable scientifically, current incentives are not sufficient to encourage replications from the individual researcher's perspective. We propose a novel mechanism that promotes replications by leveraging mutually beneficial gains between scholars and editors. We develop a model capturing the trade-offs involved in seeking independent replications before submission of a paper to journals. We showcase our method via an investigation of the effects of Knightian uncertainty on cooperation rates in public goods games, a pervasive and yet largely unexplored feature in the literature. |
| Date: | 2020 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:artefa:00684&r=all |