| By: |
Benoît Le Maux (CREM-CNRS and Condorcet Center, University of Rennes 1, France);
Sarah Necker (University of Freiburg, Walter-Eucken Institute, Deutschland);
Yvon Rocaboy (CREM-CNRS and Condorcet Center, University of Rennes 1, France) |
| Abstract: |
We develop a theory of the evolution of scientific misbehavior. Our empirical
analysis of a survey of scientific misbehavior in economics suggests that
researchers’ disutility from cheating varies with the expected fraction of
colleagues who cheat. This observation is central to our theory. We develop a
one-principal multi-agent framework in which a research institution aims to
reward scientific productivity at minimum cost. As the social norm is
determined endogenously, performance-related pay may not only increase
cheating in the short run but can also make cheat-ing increasingly attractive
in the long run. The optimal contract thus depends on the dynamics of
scientific norms. The premium on scientific productivity should be higher when
the transmission of scientific norms across generations is lower (low marginal
peer pressure) or the principal cares little about the future (has a high
discount rate). Under certain conditions, a greater probability of detection
also increases the optimal productivity premium. |
| Keywords: |
Economics of Science, Contract Theory, Scientific Misbehavior, Social Norms |
| JEL: |
A11 A13 K42 |
| Date: |
2016–12 |
| URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tut:cremwp:2016-17&r=sog |