nep-sog New Economics Papers
on Sociology of Economics
Issue of 2016‒12‒11
four papers chosen by
Jonas Holmström
Axventure AB

  1. A Guide and Advice for Economists on the U.S. Junior Academic Job Market: 2016–2017 Edition By Cawley, John
  2. What is Meant by 'Replication' and Why Does It Encounter Resistance in Economics? By Maren Duvendack; Richard Palmer-Jones; W. Robert Reed
  3. Cheat or Perish? A Theory of Scientific Customs By Benoît LE MAUX; Sarah NECKER; Yvon ROCABOY
  4. Accounting for Multiplicity in Inference on Economics Journal Rankings By William Horrace; Christopher Parmeter

  1. By: Cawley, John (Cornell University)
    Abstract: This guide, updated for the 2016-17 job market season, describes the U.S. academic market for new Ph.D. economists and offers advice on conducting an academic job search. It provides data, reports findings from published papers, describes practical details, and includes links to online resources. Topics addressed include: preparing to go on the market; applying for academic jobs; the JOE Network, which is the AEA's electronic clearinghouse for the job market; signaling; interviewing at the ASSA meetings; campus visits; the secondary market scramble; offers and negotiating; getting off to a good start as an assistant professor; diversity; and dual job searches.
    Keywords: salaries, market for economists, academic labor market, benefits
    JEL: A11 J0 J44 A23
    Date: 2016–12
  2. By: Maren Duvendack; Richard Palmer-Jones; W. Robert Reed (University of Canterbury)
    Abstract: This paper discusses recent trends in the use of replications in economics. We identify a number of sources of progress, including the results of recent replication studies that have attempted to identify replication rates within the discipline. These studies generally find that replication rates are relatively low, though they may be higher for laboratory experiments in economics. We also identify two web-based resources for replications, the Replication in Economics wiki and The Replication Network. We then consider obstacles to undertaking replication studies in economics. Two obstacles are the lack of publishing outlets and difficulties in obtaining data and code for published studies. We identify journals that publish replication studies and that "regularly" include data and code as supplementary files for their published research. Finally, we highlight replication initiatives in psychology and political science, behind which economics appears to lag. Whether this is because the problems that beset those disciplines are less severe in economics, or because economics is more resistant to replications, is arguable.
    Keywords: Replication, data sharing, publication bias
    JEL: A1 B4
    Date: 2016–12–02
  3. By: Benoît LE MAUX (CREM-CNRS and Condorcet Center, University of Rennes 1, France); Sarah NECKER (University of Freiburg, Walter-Eucken Institute, Deutschland); Yvon ROCABOY (CREM-CNRS and Condorcet Center, University of Rennes 1, France)
    Abstract: We develop a theory of the evolution of scientific misbehavior. Our empirical analysis of a survey of scientific misbehavior in economics suggests that researchers’ disutility from cheating varies with the expected fraction of colleagues who cheat. This observation is central to our theory. We develop a one-principal multi-agent framework in which a research institution aims to reward scientific productivity at minimum cost. As the social norm is determined endogenously, performance-related pay may not only increase cheating in the short run but can also make cheat-ing increasingly attractive in the long run. The optimal contract thus depends on the dynamics of scientific norms. The premium on scientific productivity should be higher when the transmission of scientific norms across generations is lower (low marginal peer pressure) or the principal cares little about the future (has a high discount rate). Under certain conditions, a greater probability of detection also increases the optimal productivity premium.
    Keywords: Economics of Science, Contract Theory, Scientific Misbehavior, Social Norms
    JEL: A11 A13 K42
    Date: 2016–12
  4. By: William Horrace (Syracuse University); Christopher Parmeter (University of Miami)
    Abstract: Nearly all journal rankings are constructed as deterministic, yet they are clearly stochastic. To remedy this, Stern (2013) calculates standard errors and performs inference on the ranks of economics journal based on impact factors. However, this inference is essentially a series of univariate tests that do not control for the overall error rate of the inferential exercise. Using multiple comparison and ranking procedures, we reevaluate the inference while controlling for the multiplicity (the implied multivariate inference) in the rank statistic. The results are compared and di_erences highlighted.
    Keywords: Ranking and Selection, Subset Selection, Multiple Comparisons, Journal Impact Factors Publication Status: Under Review
    JEL: A14 C12
    Date: 2016–07–15

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