| By: |
Noemí Herranz-Zarzoso (LEE and Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain);
Gerardo Sabater-Grande (LEE and Department of Economics, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón, Spain) |
| Abstract: |
This paper analyzes the effect of financial incentives on academic performance
by means of a randomized field experiment. Using two alternative payment
mechanisms we implement two experimental treatments designed to motivate
students depending on their absolute or relative academic performance.
Subjects, recruited among students from Microeconomics, were split in two
groups depending on whether they had a failed background in the aforementioned
subject (returning students) or not (new students). New students were informed
that they would receive a reward depending on their bet (the grade they
thought would achieve) and the real grade obtained. In the case of the
returning students, the reward was calculated taking into account the bet, the
obtained real grade and their improvement with respect to previous semesters.
In the first treatment students were rewarded according to a piece rate system
whereas in the second one we established two rankings (one for new students
and another one for returning students) classifying them depending on their
academic performance. In both treatments we find that the implemented
incentives are effective to increase the average of grades for both types of
students (new and returning), but the piece rate mechanism is more powerful to
motivate a higher number of students. |
| Keywords: |
Betting for grades, incentives, academic performance, piece rate mechanism, rank-order tournament |
| JEL: |
C93 D03 I21 J24 |
| Date: |
2016 |
| URL: |
http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:jau:wpaper:2016/18&r=sog |