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on Sociology of Economics |
| By: | Benedikt Fecher; Sascha Friesike; Marcel Hebing; Stephanie Linek; Armin Sauermann |
| Abstract: | Academic data sharing is a way for researchers to collaborate and thereby meet the needs of an increasingly complex research landscape. It enables researchers to verify results and to pursuit new research questions with “old†data. It is therefore not surprising that data sharing is advocated by funding agencies, journals, and researchers alike. We surveyed 2661 individual academic researchers across all disciplines on their dealings with data, their publication practices, and motives for sharing or withholding research data. The results for 1564 valid responses show that researchers across disciplines recognise the benefit of secondary research data for their own work and for scientific progress as a whole—still they only practice it in moderation. An explanation for this evidence could be an academic system that is not driven by monetary incentives, nor the desire for scientific progress, but by individual reputation—expressed in (high ranked journal) publications. We label this system a Reputation Economy. This special economy explains our findings that show that researchers have a nuanced idea how to provide adequate formal recognition for making data available to others—namely data citations. We conclude that data sharing will only be widely adopted among research professionals if sharing pays in form of reputation. Thus, policy measures that intend to foster research collaboration need to understand academia as a reputation economy. Successful measures must value intermediate products, such as research data, more highly than it is the case now. |
| Keywords: | Data sharing, research policy, reputation, science, survey research |
| JEL: | C81 D02 D23 L89 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:diw:diwwpp:dp1454&r=sog |
| By: | Besancenot, Damien (Centre d'Economie de l'Université Paris Nord (CEPN)); Vranceanu, Radu (ESSEC Business School and THEMA) |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the production of fundamental research as a coordination game played by scholars. In the model, scholars decide to adopt a new idea only if they believe that a critical mass of peers is following a similar research strategy. If researchers observe only a noisy idiosyncratic signal of the true scientiÖc potential of a new idea, we show that the game presents a single threshold equilibrium. In this environment, fundamental research proceeds with large structural breaks followed by long periods of time in which new ideas are unsuccessful. The likelihood of a new idea emerging depends on various parameters, including the rewards of working in the old paradigm, the critical mass of researchers required to create a new school of thought and scholarsí ability to properly assess the scientific value of new ideas. |
| Keywords: | Economics of science; Scientific discovery; Strategic complementarity; Strategic uncertainty; Global games |
| JEL: | A14 C72 O31 |
| Date: | 2015–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ebg:essewp:dr-15003&r=sog |