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on Sociology of Economics |
| By: | Pietro Battiston |
| Abstract: | Determining the extent to which citation flows, and hence bibliometric indicators based on them, reflect some intrinsic value of scientific works is an important task made very difficult by endogeneity issues. This paper presents an approach which allows to go beyond the abundant anecdotal evidence by testing whether the citation behavior is free from environmental factors. The hypothesis of independence is strongly rejected, providing causal evidence of a Matthew effect at work: namely, the publication of a new work on behalf of an author increases the flow of citations to previous works. Such result is a step towards the estimation of biases affecting bibliometric indicators, at least when interpreted as measures of scientific productivity. The study is based on a novel framework for the study of endogenous network growth subject to constraints. Constraints can be both positive and negative, and change in time depending on the actions of the agents. The framework is not limited to citation networks, and can be applied to any context in which the formation of a link inhibits or implies the formation of another one. |
| Keywords: | Bibliometric indicators, Endogenous growth, Matthew effect, Research evaluation |
| Date: | 2014–10–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ssa:lemwps:2014/19&r=sog |
| By: | Louis de Mesnard (IAE DIJON - Université de Bourgogne (CREGO)) |
| Abstract: | (VF) : La pression pour changer le système de referee des revues académiques augmente. Nous discutons deux groupes de propositions qui introduisent des mécanismes de marché. Tout d'abord, Prüfer et Zetland (2009) proposent, en se basant sur Havrilesky (1975), de créer un système de vente aux enchères : les manuscrits sont soumis et achetés aux enchères par les éditeurs des revues “dollars académiques”, tandis que les citations rapportent des crédits aux auteurs. Deuxièmement, Fox et Petchey (2010), après Riyanto et Yetkiner (2002), proposent de créer une monnaie, le “PubCred”, dans lequel les referees sont payés et peuvent ensuite payer pour leurs propres soumissions, tandis que Aarssen (2008) et Blanc et Ernest (2010) introduisent une rémunération en espèces pour leurs auteurs. Nous montrons que ces systèmes seraient susceptibles de compromettre les éditeurs, les arbitres, et aussi les auteurs, et bientôt s'avérer économiquement irréalisable. (VA)Pressure to change the academic reviewing system is growing. We discuss two groups of proposals that introducing market mechanisms. First, Prüfer and Zetland (2009), based on Havrilesky (1975), create an auction system: manuscripts are submitted and auctioned to editors in “academic dollars”, while citations earn credits for authors. Second, Fox and Petchey (2010), after Riyanto and Yetkiner (2002), create a “PubCred” currency, in which referees are paid and can then pay for their own submissions, while Aarssen (2008) and White and Ernest (2010) introduce hard cash remuneration for reviewers. These systems would adversely affect editors, referees, and authors alike, and would soon prove economically unworkable. |
| Keywords: | Referee; éditeur; auteur; publications académiques; enchères;reviewing; reviewer; referee; editor; author; academic publishing; auction |
| JEL: | A10 A11 A13 A14 |
| Date: | 2014–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dij:wpfarg:1141001&r=sog |
| By: | Fernanda L. L. de Leon (University of Kent); Ben McQuillin (University of East Anglia) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides evidence for the role of conferences in generating visibility for academic work, using a ‘natural experiment’: the last-minute cancellation – due to ‘Hurricane Isaac’ – of the 2012 American Political Science Association (APSA) Annual Meeting. We assembled a dataset containing outcomes of 15,624 articles scheduled to be presented between 2009 and 2012 at the APSA meetings or at a comparator annual conference (that of the Midwest Political Science Association). Our estimates are quantified in difference-in-difference analyses: first using the comparator meetings as a control, then exploiting heterogeneity in a measure of session attendance, within the APSA meetings. We observe significant ‘conference effects’: on average, articles gain 17-26 downloads in the 15 months after being presented in a conference. The effects are larger for papers authored by scholars affiliated to lower tier universities and scholars in the early stages of their career. Our findings are robust to several tests. |
| Keywords: | effects of conferences, diffusion of scientific knowledge |
| JEL: | O39 I23 L38 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:wcbess:14-08&r=sog |