nep-sog New Economics Papers
on Sociology of Economics
Issue of 2014‒08‒28
two papers chosen by
Jonas Holmström
Axventure AB

  1. Citation-Capture Rates by Economic Journals:Do they Differ from Other Disciplines and Does it Matter? By David L. Anderson; John Tressler
  2. Publish or Perish? Incentives and Careers in Italian Academia By Daniele Checchi; Gianni De Fraja; Stefano Verzillo

  1. By: David L. Anderson (Queen's University); John Tressler (University of Waikato)
    Abstract: In this paper we compare the rate of citation-capture across the social sciences and sciences, with particular attention paid to economics and its border disciplines generally located in Schools of Business. We also explore citation time-flow differences between a number of leading journals in economics and a representative science category, and between higher and lower ranked economics journals. Our findings suggest that short-term citation counting, either directly or indirectly, for purposes of generating impact factors and the like, introduces a bias in favour of the sciences over the social sciences. This is in addition to the well-known differences in the absolute number of cites between these discipline categories over the short and long term. Our findings call into question the usefulness of citation analysis in national research assessment exercises that concentrate on recent research contributions. Furthermore, within economics, we found short-term impact factors to be systematically biased in favour of lower ranked journals.
    Keywords: research measurement; research assessment exercises; time pattern of citations
    JEL: A14 C81 I23 J24
    Date: 2014–08–01
  2. By: Daniele Checchi (University of Milan and IZA); Gianni De Fraja (DEF and CEIS, Università di Roma "Tor Vergata" and Nottingham School of Economics); Stefano Verzillo (Department of Economics, University of Milan)
    Abstract: We derive a theoretical model of effort in the presence of career concern based on the multi-unit all-pay auction, and closely inspired by the Italian academic market. In this model, the number of applicants, the number of new posts, and the relative importance of the determinants of promotion determine academics' effort. Because of the specific characteristics of Italian universities, where incentives operate only through promotion, and where all appointment panels are drawn from strictly separated and relatively narrow scientific sectors, the model fits well Italian academia, and we test it in a newly constructed dataset which collects the journal publications of all Italian academics working in universities. We find that individual researchers respond to incentives in the manner predicted by the theoretical model: more capable researchers respond to increases in the importance of the measurable determinants of promotion and in the competitiveness of the scientific sector by exerting more effort; less able researchers do the opposite.
    Keywords: Career concerns, Applied auction theory, Publications, Academic job market, Nepotism.
    JEL: D44 I23 I21 M51
    Date: 2014–08–07

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