| By: |
Saint-Paul, Gilles (University of Toulouse I) |
| Abstract: |
When policymakers and private agents use models, the economists who design the
model have an incentive to alter it in order to influence outcomes in a
fashion consistent with their own preferences. I discuss some consequences of
the existence of such ideological bias. In particular, I analyze the role of
measurement infrastructures such as national statistical institutes, the
extent to which intellectual competition between different schools of thought
may lead to polarization of views over some parameters and at the same time to
consensus over other parameters, and finally how the attempt to preserve
influence can lead to degenerative research programs. |
| Keywords: |
ideology, macroeconomic modelling, self-confirming equilibria, polarization, autocoherent models, intellectual competition, degenerative research programs, identification |
| JEL: |
A11 E6 |
| Date: |
2012–12 |
| URL: |
https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp7120 |