|
on Sociology of Economics |
Issue of 2012‒10‒06
two papers chosen by Jonas Holmström Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration |
By: | Ketzler, Rolf; Zimmermann, Klaus F |
Abstract: | The citation analysis of the research output of the German economic research institutes presented here is based on publications in peer-reviewed journals listed in the Social Science Citation Index for the 2000 - 2009 period. The novel feature of the paper is that a count data model quantifies the determinants of citation success and simulates their citation potential. Among the determinants of the number of cites the quality of the publication outlet exhibits a strong positive effect. The same effect has the number of the published pages, but journals with size limits also yield more cites. Field journals get fewer citations in comparison to general journals. Controlling for journal quality, the number of co-authors of a paper has no effect, but it is positive when co-authors are located outside the own institution. We find that the potential citations predicted by our best model lead to different rankings across the institutes than current citations indicating structural change. |
Keywords: | citation analysis; economic research institutes; publication analysis; rankings; scientometrics |
JEL: | A11 C53 I23 L31 |
Date: | 2012–09 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:9110&r=sog |
By: | Julien Pénin |
Abstract: | Performance related pay is playing an increasing role in scientific research. This development, which applies the results of standard economic theories (the principal-agent model), aims at increasing incentives and thus productivity in science. The objective of this paper is then to cross the works of various economic fields, including those in economics of science and those on the theories of individual motivation, in order to explore the consequences of this development on scientists’ incentives and to focus on its possible "perverse effects". Two key elements emerge from our literature review: firstly, the motivations of researchers are complex and multiple and do not depend solely on their salary level; secondly, the literature on the theories of incentives identifies a risk that increasing monetary incentives, paradoxically, reduce the overall level of staff motivation, especially when there exist other sources of motivation (as is usually the case in science). According to this literature there may therefore exist a "hidden cost" to financially reward scientists. These teachings lead us to construct empirically testable propositions about the implications of performance related pay in science and the conditions of emergence of a motivation crowding-out effect. |
Keywords: | science, merit pay, university, "motivation crowding-out", research, incentives. |
Date: | 2012 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2012-13&r=sog |