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on Sociology of Economics |
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Issue of 2012‒09‒30
two papers chosen by Jonas Holmström Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration |
| By: | Ketzler, Rolf (DIW Berlin); Zimmermann, Klaus F. (IZA and University of Bonn) |
| Abstract: | The citation analysis of the research output of the German economic research institutes presented here is based on publications in peer-reviewed journals listed in the Social Science Citation Index for the 2000–2009 period. The novel feature of the paper is that a count data model quantifies the determinants of citation success and simulates their citation potential. Among the determinants of the number of cites the quality of the publication outlet exhibits a strong positive effect. The same effect has the number of the published pages, but journals with size limits also yield more cites. Field journals get fewer citations in comparison to general journals. Controlling for journal quality, the number of co-authors of a paper has no effect, but it is positive when co-authors are located outside the own institution. We find that the potential citations predicted by our best model lead to different rankings across the institutes than current citations indicating structural change. |
| Keywords: | citation analysis, rankings, scientometrics, publication analysis, economic research institutes |
| JEL: | A11 C53 I23 L31 |
| Date: | 2012–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6780&r=sog |
| By: | Natalia Zinovyeva; Manuel Bagues |
| Abstract: | This paper analyzes the role of connections in academic promotions. We exploit evidence from centralized evaluations in Spain, where evaluators are randomly as- signed to promotion committees. We nd that prior connections between candidates and evaluators have a dramatic impact on candidates' success. For instance, the presence of a co-author or an advisor in the committee is equivalent to a standard deviation increase in candidates' research output. The e ect of a weaker link, such as a member of candidate's doctoral thesis committee, is one fourth as large. The source of the premium enjoyed by connected candidates depends on the nature of their relationship with committee members. In the case of weak links, informa- tional gains tend to dominate evaluation biases. Candidates promoted by a weak link turn out to be more productive in the future relative to other promoted candi- dates. However, consistently with the potential existence of favoritism, candidates promoted by a strong connection exhibit a signi cantly worse research record both before and after the evaluation. |
| Keywords: | Academic promotion, Connections, Evaluation bias, Information asymmetries |
| JEL: | J44 M51 |
| Date: | 2012–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cte:idrepe:id-12-02&r=sog |