nep-sog New Economics Papers
on Sociology of Economics
Issue of 2010‒01‒23
two papers chosen by
Jonas Holmström
Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration

  1. Citation Success: Evidence from Economic History Journal Publications By Gianfranco Di Vaio; Daniel Waldenström; Jacob Weisdorf
  2. Allocative Efficiency and an Incentive Scheme for Research By A Bhattacharya; H Newhouse

  1. By: Gianfranco Di Vaio (Center for Labor and Economic Growth, LUISS Guido Carli); Daniel Waldenström (Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Stockholm); Jacob Weisdorf (Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen)
    Abstract: This study analyses determinants of citation success among authors publishing in economic history journals. Bibliometric features, like article length and number of authors, are positively correlated with the citation rate up to a certain point. Remarkably, publishing in top-ranked journals hardly affects citations. In regard to author-specific characteristics, male authors, full professors and authors working economics or history departments, and authors employed in Anglo-Saxon countries, are more likely to get cited than others. As a ‘shortcut’ to citation success, we find that research diffusion, measured by number of presentations and people mentioned in acknowledgement, boosts the citation rate.
    Keywords: bibliometrics; citation analysis; citation success; economic history; scientometrics; Poisson regression
    JEL: A10 A11 A14 N10
    Date: 2009–11
  2. By: A Bhattacharya; H Newhouse
    Abstract: In this paper we examine whether an incentive scheme for improving research can have adverse effect on research itself. This work is mainly motivated by the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) and the Research Excellence Framework (REF) in UK. In a game theoretic framework we show that a scheme like RAE/REF can actually result in deterioration of the over-all research in a country though it may create a few isolated centres of excellence. The central assumption behind this result is that high ability researchers produce positive externalities to their colleagues. We assume these externalities have declining marginal benefit as the number of high ability researchers in a department increases. Because of this declining marginal benefit an incentive scheme like the RAE or REF may lead to over concentration of the high ability researchers in a few departments.
    Keywords: RAE, REF, coalitions, strong nash equilibrium
    JEL: I22 I28 C71 C72
    Date: 2010–01

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