| By: |
Nicola Lacetera (Department of Economics, Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western University, Cleveland, OH, USA);
Lorenzo Zirulia (Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Italy; CESPRI, Bocconi University, Milano, Italy; and Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis) |
| Abstract: |
Scientific fraud is a pervasive phenomenon with deleterious consequences, as
it leads to false scientific knowledge being published, therefore a¤ecting
major individual and public decisions. In this paper we build a game-theoretic
model of the research and publication process that ana- lyzes why scientists
commit fraud and how fraud can be detected and prevented. In the model,
authors are asymmetrically informed about the success of their projects, and
can fraudulently manipulate their results. We show four main results. First,
the types of scientific frauds that are observed are unlikely to be
representative of the overall amount of malfeasance in science; also, star
scientists are more likely to misbehave, but are less likely to be caught than
average scientists. Second, a reduction in the costs of checking for frauds
may not lead to a reduction of misconduct episodes, but rather to a change in
the type of research that is performed. Third, an increase in competition
between scientists may in fact reduce, and not increase, scientific
misconduct. Finally, a more active role of editors in checking for misconduct
does not always provide additional deterrence. |
| Keywords: |
Research and publication process, peer review, fraud. |
| JEL: |
A14 D82 K42 O31 Z13 |
| Date: |
2008–03 |
| URL: |
https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cri:cespri:wp215 |