nep-sog New Economics Papers
on Sociology of Economics
Issue of 2007‒03‒24
five papers chosen by
Jonas Holmström
Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration

  1. Democratic paradox and governance mediums: the case of university boards By Biot-Paquerot, Guillaume
  2. PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: By Guillaume Biot-Paquerot; Jean-Luc Rossignol
  3. Higher Education in India: The Need for Change By Pawan Agarwal
  5. Student Performance in Traditional vs. Online Format: Evidence from an MBA Level Introductory Economics Class By Oskar R. Harmon; James Lambrinos

  1. By: Biot-Paquerot, Guillaume
    Abstract: The aims of this article is to propose a preliminary step for a university governance framework. The second step will to produce an empirical study. We will discuss about the peculiar context of the French university organizations. The contract theory framework and the organizational architecture theory could lead us in this discussion, talking about opportunistic stakeholder's behaviour. In this peculiar frame, university is just an application of the corporate governance theory. And the developpment and improvement of european higer education policies in the Lisbon declaration context makes it more topical.
    Keywords: universités; gouvernance; conseil d’administration; présidents d’université; contrôle
    JEL: G38 I23 H41
    Date: 2006–05
  2. By: Guillaume Biot-Paquerot (CEREGE - CEntre de REcherche en sciences de GEstion - [CNRS : EA1722] - [Groupe Sup de Co La Rochelle]); Jean-Luc Rossignol (CUREGE - Centre universitaire de recherche en gestion - [Université de Franche-Comté])
    Abstract: Education supply in universities of most European countries has for the last ten years become a strategic matter. At present, French universities consider education supply as an investment. But they do not utilize all incentive mechanisms in order to drive their strategies. At the beginning of the year 2006, the public sector reform will tend to impose performance measurements of research and educational activities, in order to improve organizational efficiency. The aim of this reform in the French context is to provide driving elements to increase internal efficiency, social and economic impact of higher education system and to reinforce international attractiveness of public education institutions. The substitution of resources management by result management involves an agent's performance responsibility measurement. Evaluation becomes a central factor and is articulated with incentives system. The weakening of the property right system drives project bearers to maximize their utility instead of their incomes. In such a context, the understanding of individual strategies permits to understand constraints of management within universities, and to take into account the impact of stakeholders who take part in the value generation process. The major risk is to constraint the utility function of projects bearers by increasing their burden and their motivation. The result could be the limitation of the number of projects, and as well, the decreasing of university investments.
    Keywords: performance, public sector, universities, efficiency, value generation
    Date: 2007–03–17
  3. By: Pawan Agarwal (Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations)
    Keywords: India's higher education sector, reforms in education, financing of India's Education, Quality assurance in education, funding of higher education, regulating higher education
    JEL: I20 I21 I22 I28 O32 J44
    Date: 2006–06
  4. By: Oren Gazal-Ayal (University of Haifa, Faculty of Law)
    Abstract: The academic world is wonderful. Like few other professionals, we can choose what we want to do and what questions we think are important, which in our line of work means choosing what topics we want to research. But what influences our choices? This paper examines what drives scholars to select Law and Economics (L&E) as a topic for research. It does so by implementing the methodology of many L&E papers - by assuming that regulation and incentives matter. Legal scholars face very different academic incentives in different parts of the world. In some countries, the academic standards for appointment, promotion and tenure encourage legal scholars to concentrate on L&E. In others, they strongly discourage such research. Thus, we should expect wide variation in the rate of participation of legal scholars in the L&E discourse across countries. On the other hand, economists are evaluated with similar yardsticks everywhere. Thus, participation of economists in the L&E discourse is likely to vary much less from one place to another. The hypothesis of this paper is that the academic incentives are a major factor in the level of participation in the L&E scholarship. This "incentives hypothesis" is presented and then examined empirically on data gathered from the list of authors in L&E journals and the list of participants in L&E conferences. The data generally supports the hypothesis. In the legal academia, the incentives to focus research on L&E topics are the strongest in Israel, they are weaker in North America and weakest in Europe. In fact, the data reveal that lawyers' authorship of L&E papers weighted by population is almost ten times higher in Israel than in North America; while in Europe it is almost ten times lower than in North America. By comparison, the weighted participation level of economists - who face relatively similar academic environments across countries - in L&E research is not significantly different across countries.
    Keywords: Law and Economics, Legal Education, Comparative Law,
  5. By: Oskar R. Harmon (University of Connecticut); James Lambrinos (Union University)
    Abstract: All previous studies comparing online and face-to-face format for instruction of economics compared courses that were either online or face-to-face format and regressed exam scores on selected student characteristics. This approach is subject to the econometric problems of self-selection omitted unobserved variables. Our study uses two methods to deal with these problems. First we eliminate self-selection bias by using students from a course that uses both instruction formats. Second, we use the exam questions as the unit of observation, and eliminate omitted variable bias by using an indicator variable for each student to capture the effect of differences in unobserved student characteristics on learning outcomes. We report the finding that students had a significantly greater chance of answering a question correctly if it came from a chapter covered online.
    Keywords: online, instruction, economics, face-to-face
    JEL: A2 A22
    Date: 2007–03

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