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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
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Issue of 2026–04–13
four papers chosen by Fabio Sabatini, Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza” |
| By: | Roland Bénabou (Princeton University); Jean Tirole (TSE-R - Toulouse School of Economics - UT Capitole - Université Toulouse Capitole - Comue de Toulouse - Communauté d'universités et établissements de Toulouse - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, IAST - Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse) |
| Abstract: | We analyze how private decisions and optimal public policies are shaped by personal and societal preferences, material incentives, and social norms. We show how honor and stigma interact with incentives and derive optimal taxation. We then analyze the expressive role of law as embodying society's values and identify when it calls for a weakening or a strengthening of incentives. The law should be softened when it signals agents' general willingness to contribute to the public good and toughened when it signals social externalities. We also shed light on norms-based interventions, societies' resistance to economists' messages, and the avoidance of cruel and unusual punishments. |
| Keywords: | Expressive law, Social norms, Incentives, Motivation |
| Date: | 2026–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-05577272 |
| By: | Zenou, Yves (Monash University) |
| Abstract: | This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical foundations of peer and network effects, aiming to bridge insights from both literatures. We first analyze the microfoundations of peer effects through linear–quadratic network games, linking equilibrium behavior to network centrality and highlighting the role of key players. Then, we examine the main identification challenges in linear-in-means models—reflection, correlated effects, and sorting—and show how introducing explicit network structures can help address them. We also review reduced-form strategies based on within-school cohort composition, exposure to peers’ shocks, random assignment, and exogenous variation in network links. Finally, we discuss how structural models of network formation and individual effort choices can resolve endogeneity concerns. The paper concludes with recent advances on non-linear and multiplex interactions, where individuals respond to specific peers and operate across multiple, interdependent layers. |
| Keywords: | social interactions, identification, network games, centrality, multiplex networks, non-linearities |
| JEL: | A14 C57 D85 Z13 |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18501 |
| By: | Bjørnskov, Christian (Aarhus University, Denmark); Berggren, Niclas (Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)) |
| Abstract: | Populists typically frame politics as a conflict between a corrupt elite and a virtuous people and are skeptical of institutional constraints, including those protecting freedom of expression, as they seek to control the public narrative. We ask to what extent de jure constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression constrain such actors and when speech can be de facto curtailed despite formal protections, with a particular focus on emergency derogation clauses. We explore these questions in panel data for 75 countries with multi-party systems between 1970 and 2020. Findings show that right-wing populist representation is associated with lower de facto freedom of expression, but mainly where the constitution offers an opt-out in emergencies or fails to impose clear non-emergency limits on restrictions of expression. These findings demonstrate that constitutional design and populist influence jointly determine the extent to which constitutional promises of free expression are honored in practice. |
| Keywords: | Freedom of expression; Constitutional constraints; Constitutional compliance; Populism; Media freedom |
| JEL: | K00 P16 P50 |
| Date: | 2026–04–01 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:iuiwop:1557 |
| By: | Nicolas Camilotto (Université Côte d'Azur, CNRS, GREDEG, France) |
| Abstract: | This paper provides a life-cycle analysis of the Trust Game, using its trajectory as a lens to clarify the boundaries between experimental and behavioral economics. We first trace its 1995 creation by Berg et al. as a challenge to calculative trust paradigms. A bibliometric study then maps its diffusion, revealing two divergent paths in economics: one, rooted in experimental economics, prioritizes measurement; the other, in behavioral economics, theory-testing. These paths differ in methods and validity standards, constituting an epistemic divide that illuminates the fields’ evolving relationship. |
| Keywords: | trust; trust game; experimental economics; behavioral economics |
| JEL: | B2 B4 C9 |
| Date: | 2026–03 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gre:wpaper:2026-11 |