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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
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Issue of 2025–10–27
ten papers chosen by Fabio Sabatini, Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza” |
| By: | Luis Guirola (AQR-IREA, University of Barcelona); Gonzalo Rivero |
| Abstract: | We study how political polarization impacts trust in the government and independent institutions. We gather microdata from 27 countries over three decades and identify 142 government changes. For each of these events, we run a difference in differences design comparing left and right-wing supporters to identify the effect on trust caused by a particular party controlling the executive. The estimated effect ranges from 0 to 2.1 standard deviations, and is systematically larger when party polarization is stronger– this variable alone explains 72% of the variation. The effect propagates onto trust in the European Central Bank and other institutions outside government control. Examining the mechanism, we find evidence consistent with a) lack of knowledge about independence and b) that elections under high polarization are high-stakes events affecting multiple dimensions, including subjective wellbeing, and trust toward the political system as a whole. |
| Keywords: | political polarization, trust, institutions, politics JEL classification:D72, D14, D02 |
| Date: | 2025–07 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aqr:wpaper:202505 |
| By: | Paolo Buonanno; Giacomo Plevani |
| Abstract: | This paper shows how enduring agrarian institutions shaped the long-run political consequences of historical shocks. We study Italy’s sharecropping system (mezzadria) - a centuries-old fifty-fifty contract that structured rural relations across central Italy - and link its prewar prevalence to Socialist and Communist voting from 1913 to 1948. Using harmonized data for 720 agrarian zones and a combination of cross-sectional, entropy-balanced, and spatial RDD designs, we find that sharecropping was politically neutral before World War I but became a center of rural unrest and Fascist repression afterward. Areas with more sharecroppers experienced greater strike activity, targeted violence, and enduring left alignment. A daily panel of 1921 events shows repression peaking during annual contract renewals. The results reveal a “revolt-repression-realignment” mechanism through which local economic institutions converted wartime shocks into lasting partisan divides. |
| JEL: | P16 N54 N44 D72 D74 Q15 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bol:bodewp:wp1214 |
| By: | Bodo Vogt; Paul Bengart; Caroylyn Declerck; Ernst Fehr |
| Abstract: | In recent years, increasing skepticism regarding oxytocin’s (OT) influence on social behavior arose. Low power, HARKing (hypothesizing after the results are known), and replication failures have clouded the field. Here, we directly address these concerns with a high-powered, preregistered study that offers robust evidence for a causal effect of OT on trust among individuals with a low disposition to trust. We recruited 359 low-trusting individuals who participated in a trust game under strict anonymity conditions. Results show that OT administration significantly increased trusting behavior by roughly 15%, with consistent effects across regression models with and without controls for personality traits. A pooled data analysis incorporating a previous sample (n=219) of low-trusting individuals further strengthens this conclusion, yielding a statistically significant 16.9% increase in trust. Crucially, no interaction effect was found between OT and the degree of dispositional trust, suggesting OT’s effect is uniform across the low-trusting spectrum. These findings present a strong case for OT’s selective trust-enhancing role. By isolating OT’s impact within a well-defined subpopulation and experimental context, this study provides a critical pivot in the debate over neurobiological mechanisms of trust. |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:481 |
| By: | Andre Groeger; Yanos Zylberberg |
| Abstract: | This paper studies how social networks (might fail to) shape agricultural practices. We exploit (i) a unique census of agricultural production nested within delineated land parcels and (ii) social network data within four repopulated villages of rural Vietnam. In a first step, we extract exogenous variation in network formation from home locations within the few streets that compose each village (populated through staggered population resettlement), and we estimate the return to social links in the adoption of highly-productive crops. We find a large network multiplier, in apparent contradiction with low adoption rates. In a second step, we study the structure of network formation to explain this puzzle: social networks display large homophily, and valuable links between heterogeneous households are rare. Due to the clustered nature of networks and the dynamic, endogenous propagation of agricultural practices, there are decreasing returns to social links, and policies targeting “inbetweeners†are most able to mitigate this issue. |
| Date: | 2025–04–02 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bri:uobdis:25/794 |
| By: | Baranski, Andrzej (New York University, Abu Dhabi); Reuben, Ernesto (New York University, Abu Dhabi); Riedl, Arno (Maastricht University) |
| Abstract: | In a laboratory experiment, we study the role of fairness ideals as focal points in coordination problems in homogeneous and heterogeneous groups. We elicit the normatively preferred behavior about how a subsequent coordination game should be played. In homogeneous groups, people share a unique fairness ideal how to solve the coordination problem, whereas in heterogeneous groups, multiple conflicting fairness ideals prevail. In the coordination game, homogeneous groups are significantly more likely than their heterogeneous counterparts to sustain efficient coordination. The reason is that homogeneous groups coordinate on the unique fairness ideal, whereas heterogeneous groups disagree on the fairness ideal to be played. In both types of groups, equilibria consistent with fairness ideals are most stable. Hence, the difference in coordination success between homogeneous and heterogeneous groups occurs because of the normative disagreement in the latter types of group, making it much harder to reach an equilibrium at a fairness ideal. |
| Keywords: | cooperation, coordination, focal points, fairness ideals, experiment |
| JEL: | H41 C92 D63 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp18200 |
| By: | Hernán Bejarano (CIDE/Chapman University); Matías Busso (IDB); Juan Francisco Santos (IDB) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies trust, reciprocity, and bargaining using a large-scale online experiment in six Latin American countries. Participants were randomly assigned to play trust and ultimatum games under conditions that either disclosed or withheld the gender of their counterpart. On average, gender disclosure did not affect behavior. However, disaggregated results show systematic differences. Men displayed higher levels of trust and reciprocity, particularly when interacting with women, and offered larger shares to women in bargaining. Women, by contrast, reciprocated more when paired with men. These findings show how gendered interactions can influence economic behavior, even when counterpart information is conveyed minimally. |
| Keywords: | Trust; Reciprocity; Bargaining; Gender; Latin America |
| JEL: | C92 D91 J16 O54 |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:aoz:wpaper:375 |
| By: | Claudia Cerrone; Francesco Feri; Anita Gantner; Paolo Pin |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates whether the decoy effect - specifically the attraction effect - can foster cooperation in social networks. In a lab experiment, we show that introducing a dominated option increases the selection of the target choice, especially in early decisions. The effect is stronger in individual settings but persists in networks despite free-riding incentives, with variation depending on the decision-maker's strategic position. |
| Date: | 2025–09 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2509.13887 |
| By: | Badalyan, Sona (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg, Germany ; CERGE-EI) |
| Abstract: | "This paper exploits a unique norm-shifting setting - a German pension reform that equalized retirement ages across genders - to examine how old-age employment propagates through workplace networks. The reform raised women’s earliest claiming age from 60 to 63 for cohorts born in 1952 onward. Using the universe of workgroups from social security records, I compare women whose peers were just above or below the reform cutoff. I find that women are more likely to remain employed at older ages when their peers do, with stronger effects in the regions of former West Germany, with its traditional gender norms. Gender-neutral pension reforms thus amplify their impact through peer influence, fostering regional convergence in late-career employment patterns." (Author's abstract, IAB-Doku) ((en)) |
| Keywords: | IAB-Open-Access-Publikation |
| JEL: | D85 H55 J14 J16 J22 J26 Z13 |
| Date: | 2025–10–13 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iab:iabdpa:202513 |
| By: | Arthur Charpentier |
| Abstract: | The usual definitions of algorithmic fairness focus on population-level statistics, such as demographic parity or equal opportunity. However, in many social or economic contexts, fairness is not perceived globally, but locally, through an individual's peer network and comparisons. We propose a theoretical model of perceived fairness networks, in which each individual's sense of discrimination depends on the local topology of interactions. We show that even if a decision rule satisfies standard criteria of fairness, perceived discrimination can persist or even increase in the presence of homophily or assortative mixing. We propose a formalism for the concept of fairness perception, linking network structure, local observation, and social perception. Analytical and simulation results highlight how network topology affects the divergence between objective fairness and perceived fairness, with implications for algorithmic governance and applications in finance and collaborative insurance. |
| Date: | 2025–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2510.12028 |
| By: | Martinez-Felip, Daniel; Schilizzi, Steven G.M.; Nguyen, Chi; Pannell, David |
| Abstract: | In analysing potential policy responses to improve outcomes in collective-action problems, economists often focus on financial disincentives to reduce the expected gains from free-riding and thereby promote within-group cooperation. In this study, we investigate the potential for groups to develop non-financial disincentives to free riding, thereby promoting convergence towards collectively beneficial actions. Using a within-subjects laboratory experiment, participants play two multi-period public-goods games sequentially: without and then with non-financial incentives activated by allowing for the endogenous formation of a social exclusion mechanism. This is operationalised by allowing participants, at a personal cost, to assign exclusion tickets to group members after observing their contributions: the member(s) having accumulated the most in their group gets excluded from a group activity not involving monetary payoffs nor linked to the main game. First, the threat of receiving exclusion tickets, then the threat of being excluded, and finally actually being excluded work as non-financial social disincentives to free ride. Results show that group members who contribute relatively less receive more exclusion tickets. By imposing expected social costs on relatively low contributors, exclusion or the threat of exclusion enables groups to operate with higher contribution levels, thereby reversing the collective decline in contributions observed in the Baseline public good game. Exclusion is experienced by individuals who consistently contribute less than other group members, and this experience amplifies the effectiveness of the subsequent exclusion threat. Willingness to incur personal costs to enhance the exclusion threat increases over time and it is shaped by more cooperative normative expectations. This effect is particularly pronounced among individuals who perceive norms as tight, especially when higher contributions become more dispersed. In the absence of financial disincentives, these patterns show how non-financial incentives, shaped by more cooperative normative expectations, can foster group coordination and higher public-good contributions. |
| Date: | 2025–10–17 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:osf:socarx:j7usg_v1 |