nep-soc New Economics Papers
on Social Norms and Social Capital
Issue of 2025–01–27
seven papers chosen by
Fabio Sabatini, Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza”


  1. Motivated Information Acquisition and Social Norm Formation By Eugen Dimant; Fabio Galeotti; Marie Claire Villeval
  2. Do Women Comply More than Men? Experimental Evidence from a General Population Sample By Müge Süer; Nicola Cerutti; Jana Friedrichsen; Gyula Seres
  3. Frontier History and Gender Norms in the United States By Samuel Bazzi; Abel Brodeur; Martin Fiszbein; Joanne Haddad
  4. Interactions among gender norms: Evidence from US couples By Estefanía Galván; Cecilia García‐peñalosa
  5. Civic Engagement as a Constraint on Corruption By Kenju Kamei; Louis Putterman; Katy Tabero; Jean-Robert Tyran
  6. The Causal Effects of Income on Political Attitudes and Behavior: A Randomized Field Experiment By David E. Broockman; Elizabeth Rhodes; Alexander W. Bartik; Karina Dotson; Sarah Miller; Patrick K. Krause; Eva Vivalt
  7. Revitalizing Women's Labor Force Participation in North Africa: An Exploration of Novel Empowerment Pathways By Aomar Ibourk; Zakaria Elouaourti

  1. By: Eugen Dimant; Fabio Galeotti; Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - EM - EMLyon Business School - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: We examine the effect of self-selected peer information on individual behavior and social norm formation via two experiments (N=1, 945; N=2, 414) using a lying game and political identification. A self-serving bias emerges in endogenous information search, wherein lenient sources (i.e., sources containing more tolerant empirical or normative information regarding dishonesty), especially those aligned with political identification, are preferred. Selecting lenient sources about peer perception of social norms boosts dishonesty, while peer behavior information chiefly influences expectations about dishonesty, with a minor impact on own behavior. Importantly, peer approval expectations stay largely unaltered by both information types. In a follow-up experiment with exogenously assigned sources, the influence of social information on behavior and expectations is diminished.
    Keywords: Social Norms, Information Acquisition, Peer Effects, Group Identity, Dishonesty, Experiment Design
    Date: 2024–08–01
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04199140
  2. By: Müge Süer; Nicola Cerutti; Jana Friedrichsen; Gyula Seres
    Abstract: Women are often perceived as more compliant than men; however, the literature provides inconclusive evidence. Using a novel experimental design comprising two complementary experiments, we test this claim in online samples representative of the German adult population. The first experiment (N=1600) features a probabilistic social dilemma game (PDG) in which participants can increase their individual payoff at the expense of exposing themselves and their group to probabilistic losses. In two treatment conditions, they receive either a recommendation on socially optimal behavior or a recommendation and information on weakly non-compliant peer behavior. We find that the recommendation strongly affects behavior but more so for women than for men. However, information on the non-compliant behavior of others does not induce significantly different responses in men and women. In the second experiment (N=522), we elicit empirical and normative expectations about behavior in the PDG with a recommendation to study the role of norms in following it. While men and women are expected to hold similar normative beliefs, men are expected to follow the recommendation less often, suggesting that compliance is a female social norm.
    Keywords: compliance, public good, social dilemma, gender, risk-taking, social norms
    JEL: J16 I12 D81 H41
    Date: 2024
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11593
  3. By: Samuel Bazzi; Abel Brodeur; Martin Fiszbein; Joanne Haddad
    Abstract: This paper explores how historical gender roles become entrenched as norms over the long run. In the historical United States, gender roles on the frontier looked starkly different from those in settled areas. Male-biased sex ratios led to higher marriage rates for women and lower for men. Land abundance favored higher fertility. The demands of childcare, compounded with isolation from extended family, markets, and social infrastructure, constrained female opportunities outside the home. Frontier women were less likely to report “gainful employment, ” but among those who did, relatively more had high-status occupations. Together, these findings integrate contrasting narratives about frontier women—some emphasizing their entrepreneurial independence, others their prevailing domesticity. The distinctive frontier gender roles, in turn, shaped norms over the long run. Counties with greater historical frontier exposure exhibit lower female labor force participation through the 21st century. Time use data suggests this does not come with additional leisure but rather with more household work. These gender inequalities are accompanied by weaker political participation among women. While the historical frontier may have been empowering for some women, its predominant domesticity reinforced inegalitarian gender norms over the long run.
    Keywords: American frontier, culture, fertility, gender norms, labor supply, marriage
    JEL: J12 J13 J22 N31 N91 O15 P16
    Date: 2024
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11598
  4. By: Estefanía Galván (UDELAR - Universidad de la República [Montevideo]); Cecilia García‐peñalosa (AMU - Aix Marseille Université, CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales, AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
    Abstract: A considerable body of work has shown that motherhood is accompanied by a reduction in labor market participation and hours of market work, while more recent findings indicate that women who earn more than their husbands tend to subsequently take actions that reduce their market income. Both patterns of behavior have been interpreted as women trying to conform to child-rearing norms and to the prescription that the husband should be the main breadwinner. In this paper, we use panel data for US couples to re-examine women's behavior when they become mothers and when they are the main breadwinner. We start by asking whether the arrival of a child affects women who are the main breadwinner and those who are not in the same way, and then turn to how mothers and childless women react when they are the main breadwinner. Our results are consistent with the breadwinner norm only affecting mothers, suggesting that the salience of gender norms may depend on the household's context, notably on whether or not children are present. Concerning the arrival of a child, we find that although the labor supply of women who earn more than their husbands initially responds to motherhood less than that of secondary earners, the two groups converge after 10 years. Moreover, women in the former category exhibit a disproportionately large increase in the share of housework they perform after becoming mothers. The latter results suggest that the presence of children pushes women to seek to compensate breaking a norm by adhering to another one.
    Keywords: children, female labor supply, gender identity norms, relativeincome
    Date: 2024–10–27
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04792769
  5. By: Kenju Kamei; Louis Putterman; Katy Tabero; Jean-Robert Tyran
    Abstract: Corruption is the great disease of government. It undermines the efficiency of the public sector in many countries around the world. We experimentally study civic engagement (CE) as a constraint on corruption when incentives are stacked against providing CE. We show that CE is powerful in curbing corruption when citizens can encourage each other to provide CE through social approval. Social approval induces strategic complementarity among conditional cooperators which counteracts the strategic substitutability (which tends to limit beneficial effects of CE) built into our design. We also show that civic engagement in the lab is correlated with civic engagement in the field, and that the effects of social approval are surprisingly robust to framing in our setting.
    Keywords: corruption, civic engagement, public sector, public goods, social approval
    JEL: C92 D73 D91 H41
    Date: 2024
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11597
  6. By: David E. Broockman; Elizabeth Rhodes; Alexander W. Bartik; Karina Dotson; Sarah Miller; Patrick K. Krause; Eva Vivalt
    Abstract: We study the causal effects of income on political attitudes and behavior with a field experiment. In the experiment, a non-profit gifted 1, 000 low-income Americans $1, 000 per month for three years tax-free, and 2, 000 control participants $50 monthly. Contrary to resource models of participation, we find no effects on political participation or engagement, and rule out effects equivalent to the observational association between turnout and income. Political preferences largely do not change, with the estimates again distinguishable from the observational relationship that economic conservatism increases with income. Dispositions such as trust in government, polarization, and support for democracy also do not change. We do find effects consistent with mood misattribution: affect towards one's own racial group, other racial groups, and some politicians slightly improves. There is also some evidence that treated participants saw work as more important for individuals, society, or even as a requirement for accessing government programs; qualitative evidence illuminates potential mechanisms. Our findings contrast with findings from other economic shocks such as government-sponsored or taxable transfers—thereby helping clarify the mechanisms likely responsible for their effects—and underscore the durability of political predispositions.
    JEL: D72
    Date: 2024–11
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:33214
  7. By: Aomar Ibourk; Zakaria Elouaourti
    Abstract: This paper was originally published on tandfonline.com This paper explores new pathways to women's empowerment, including household structure, family support, satisfaction and self-esteem, and trust in institutions and politicians, and their impact on labor market participation, with a specific focus on gender differences. Using a microeconomic database of 7, 860 individuals from North Africa and employing a Probit model, we find that gender significantly influences labor market participation. Surprisingly, our results reveal that education operates in an unexpected direction in the North African region, confirming the “MENA paradox”. Moreover, household structure's impact on labor decisions varies by gender, as gender norms prevalent in male-dominated societies hinder women's labor market participation, leading to a “marriage penalty.” In a similar vein, our estimations reveal a significant positive correlation between men's belief that “men should have greater job rights than women during scarce work periods” and their labor force participation, shedding light on the influential role of gender norms in North Africa. Our study emphasizes the critical role of networking, social capital, and how North Africans' perception of political life impedes their labor force participation. As for policy implications, our contribution illuminates new pathways for women's empowerment, advocating for comprehensive legislative reforms to promote gender equality and foster inclusive development.
    Date: 2023–07
    URL: https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ocp:rpaeco:rpnn_75

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