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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
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Issue of 2024‒11‒11
six papers chosen by Fabio Sabatini, Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza” |
| By: | Eugen Dimant; Fabio Galeotti; Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - EM - EMLyon Business School - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | We investigate how individuals select sources of information about peers' behavior and normative views, and the influence of this social information on individual behavior and both empirical and normative expectations. This is explored through two experiments (N=1, 945; N=2, 414) using a lying game, with and without known political identification. Our findings reveal a self-serving bias in the selection of information sources, with a preference for lenient sources (i.e., those presenting more tolerant empirical or normative information about lying), particularly when these sources align with an individual's political identity. We observe that being exposed to information that suggests lying is more socially acceptable increases lying behavior. Additionally, while people's normative expectations are not swayed by observing their peers' actions, these expectations are influenced by information about what peers believe is the right thing to do, underscoring the role of normative information in shaping social norms. |
| Keywords: | Social norms, Information acquisition, Peer effects, Group identity, Lying, Experiment |
| Date: | 2024–08 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04740082 |
| By: | Erkut, Hande; Reuben, Ernesto |
| JEL: | D23 D91 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:vfsc24:302367 |
| By: | Lakdawala, Leah (Wake Forest University, Economics Department); Chakraborty, Judhajit (Michigan State University, Colorado State University); Nakasone, Eduardo (Michigan State University) |
| Abstract: | We examine how extreme weather affects individuals’ perceptions of government and political institutions in Peru. We match granular data on cold weather shocks to individuals using variation in interview date and location and find that extreme cold worsens perceptions of democracy. Further, extreme cold reduces civic engagement in formal democratic institutions (participation in national elections) but increases participation in local neighborhood associations. We provide evidence that these effects work through several mechanisms: economic losses, increased incidence of illness, and higher crimes. Finally, we find that higher coverage of government-provided goods and services can attenuate the adverse effects of extreme cold. |
| Keywords: | extreme temperature; climate change; democracy; political trust; voting |
| JEL: | O13 P16 Q54 |
| Date: | 2024–10–21 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ris:wfuewp:0118 |
| By: | Yulia Evsyukova; Felix Rusche; Wladislaw Mill |
| Abstract: | We assess the impact of discrimination on Black individuals’ job networks across the U.S. using a two-stage field experiment with 400+ fictitious LinkedIn profiles. In the first stage, we vary race via AI-generated images only and find that Black profiles’ connection requests are 13 percent less likely to be accepted. Based on users’ CVs, we find widespread discrimination across social groups. In the second stage, we exogenously endow Black and White profiles with the same networks and ask connected users for career advice. We find no evidence of direct discrimination in information provision. However, when taking into account differences in the composition and size of networks, Black profiles receive substantially fewer replies. Our findings suggest that gatekeeping is a key driver of Black-White disparities. |
| Keywords: | Discrimination, Job Networks, Labor Markets, Field Experiment |
| JEL: | J71 J15 C93 J46 D85 |
| Date: | 2023–12 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2023_482v2 |
| By: | Giese, Henning; Heinemann-Heile, Vanessa |
| Abstract: | This study analyzes whether and to what extent the provision of public goods and firms' trust in local governments' handling of local business tax revenues are associated with firms' willingness to pay local business tax. Using survey data on German small- and medium-sized firms, we find that the average perceived provision of public goods is not associated with the willingness to pay local business tax. Separating public goods into private- and business-related public goods, we find that the perception of public goods related to the private sphere of firms' decision-makers is associated with an increase in firms' willingness to pay local business tax by about 10%. However, public goods related to the business sphere show no similar association. Contradictory to the perceived provision of public goods, we find surprisingly no association between firms' willingness to pay local business tax and the actual provision of public goods. Trust in local governments' handling of tax revenue increases firms' willingness to pay local business tax significantly, with an effect size of about twice as large as for the perception of provided private-related public goods. These findings indicate that the handling of tax revenues exerts a more pronounced influence on firms' willingness to pay than the actual utilization of these revenues. Documenting tax revenue implications, we further show that the average willingness to pay local business tax within a local government is associated with a significant decrease in tax avoidance by about 10%. Our results inform local governments about how the provision of public goods and the building of trust can sustainably contribute to firms' willingness to pay local business tax. Thus, our results contribute to the understanding of how taxes can be efficiently collected and effectively used. |
| Keywords: | Tax Perception, Business Taxation, Tax Avoidance, Public Goods, Tax Revenue |
| JEL: | H25 H26 H41 H71 D91 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:arqudp:303521 |
| By: | Tizié Bene (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Yann Bramoullé (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Frédéric Deroïan (AMSE - Aix-Marseille Sciences Economiques - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | We study how altruism networks affect the demand for formal insurance. Agents with CARA utilities are connected through a network of altruistic relationships. Incomes are subject to a common shock and to a large individual shock, generating heterogeneous damages. Agents can buy formal insurance to cover the common shock, up to a coverage cap. We find that ex-post altruistic transfers induce interdependence in ex-ante formal insurance decisions. We characterize the Nash equilibria of the insurance game and show that agents act as if they are trying to maximize the expected utility of a representative agent with average damages. Altruism thus tends to increase demand of low-damage agents and to decrease demand of high-damage agents. Its aggregate impact depends on the interplay between demand homogenization, the zero lower bound and the coverage cap. We find that aggregate demand is higher with altruism than without altruism at low prices and lower at high prices. Nash equilibria are constrained Pareto efficient. |
| Keywords: | Formal insurance, Informal transfers, Altruism networks |
| Date: | 2024–10 |
| URL: | https://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04717990 |