nep-soc New Economics Papers
on Social Norms and Social Capital
Issue of 2024‒05‒20
seven papers chosen by
Fabio Sabatini, Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza”


  1. When is Trust Robust? By Luca Anderlini; Larry Samuelson; Daniele Terlizzese
  2. Domestic Violence Laws and Social Norms: Evidence from Pakistan By Selim Gulesci; Marinella Leone; Sameen Zafar
  3. Social Preferences and the Variability of Conditional Cooperation By Malte Baader; Simon Gächter; Kyeongtae Lee; Martin Sefton
  4. Building a shield together: Addressing low vaccine uptake against cancer through social norms By Stanislao Maldonado; Deborah Martinez; Lina Diaz
  5. War, International Spillovers, and Adolescents: Evidence from Russia's Invasion of Ukraine in 2022 By Siedler, Thomas; Anger, Silke; Christoph, Bernhard; Galkiewicz, Agata; Margaryan, Shushanik; Peter, Frauke; Sandner, Malte
  6. Can Crises Affect Citizen Activism? Evidence from a Pandemic By Afridi, Farzana; Basistha, Ahana; Dhillon, Amrita; Serra, Danila
  7. Large Effects of Small Cues: Priming Selfish Economic Decisions By Snir, Avichai; Levy, Dudi; Wang, Dian; Chen, Haipeng (Allan); Levy, Daniel

  1. By: Luca Anderlini (Georgetown University, University of Naples Federico II and CSEF); Larry Samuelson (Yale University); Daniele Terlizzese (EIEF)
    Abstract: We examine an economy in which interactions are more productive if agents can trust others to refrain from cheating. Some agents are scoundrels, who always cheat, while others cheat only if the cost of cheating, a decreasing function of the proportion of cheaters, is sufficiently low. The economy exhibits multiple equilibria. As the proportion of scoundrels in the economy declines, the high-trust equilibrium can be disrupted by arbitrarily small perturbations or infusions of low-trust agents, while the low-trust equilibrium becomes impervious to perturbations and infusions of high-trust agents. The resilience of trust may thus hinge upon the prevalence of scoundrels.
    Keywords: Trust, Robustness, Fragility, Assimilation, Disruption.
    JEL: C72 C79 D02 D80
    Date: 2024–03–23
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sef:csefwp:710&r=soc
  2. By: Selim Gulesci (Department of Economics, Trinity College Dublin); Marinella Leone (Department of Economics, University of Pavia); Sameen Zafar (Lahore University of Management Sciences)
    Abstract: We investigate the effects of Domestic Violence (DV) laws in Pakistan on violence against women. Using both survey data and crime reports, and exploiting the staggered introduction of the laws across different provinces over time, we show that the new laws had little to no effect on DV or femicides in Punjab and Sindh, while they led to an increase in both in Balochistan. The effect in Balochistan is driven by ethnic groups with more conservative attitudes towards DV and divorce. Our findings show that introduction of laws that conflict with prevailing social norms may risk backfiring.
    Keywords: Domestic violence laws; social norms; violence against women
    JEL: J12 J16 K42
    Date: 2024–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tcd:tcduee:tep0324&r=soc
  3. By: Malte Baader (University of Zurich); Simon Gächter (University of Nottingham); Kyeongtae Lee (Bank of Korea); Martin Sefton (University of Nottingham)
    Abstract: We experimentally examine how incentives affect conditional cooperation (i.e., cooperating in response to cooperation and defecting in response to defection) in social dilemmas. In our first study, subjects play eight Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma games with varying payoffs. We elicit second mover strategies and find that most second movers conditionally cooperate in some games and free ride in others. The rate of conditional cooperation is higher when the own gain from defecting is lower and when the loss imposed on the first mover by defecting is higher. This pattern is consistent with both social preference models and stochastic choice models. In a second study subjects play 64 social dilemma games, and we jointly estimate noise and social preference parameters at the individual level. Most of our subjects place significantly positive weight on others’ payoffs, supporting the underlying role of social preferences in conditional cooperation. Our results suggest that conditional cooperation is not a fixed trait but rather a symptom of the interaction between game incentives and underlying social preferences.
    Keywords: sequential prisoner’s dilemma; conditional cooperation; social preferences
    Date: 2024–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2024-04&r=soc
  4. By: Stanislao Maldonado; Deborah Martinez; Lina Diaz
    Abstract: We present the results of a large-scale field experiment designed to measure the effect of social norms on parents' decisions to vaccinate their daughters against the human papillomavirus (HPV) in Bogota, Colombia. Because low rates of HPV vaccine adoption are an issue in developed and underdeveloped countries alike, the use of standard social norm marketing strategies to foster vaccination can have the undesirable effect of reinforcing the status quo. In our experiment, parents were exposed to text messages that incorporated variations of static and dynamic social norms. We demonstrate that dynamic social norms and injunctive norms increased the vaccination rate by 23%. Interestingly, we also find that a version of static social norms that uses a loss frame is also effective in fostering vaccination, implying that policy-makers can also benefit from them. Against a common view among academics and practitioners, we found no evidence that static norms reinforce the status quo. Our results highlight the importance of crafting social norms interventions using dynamic and injunctive elements to foster vaccination in settings where the majority has not yet adopted the desired behavior.
    Keywords: Social norms, vaccines, human papillomavirus, field experiments
    Date: 2024–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:apc:wpaper:202&r=soc
  5. By: Siedler, Thomas (University of Potsdam); Anger, Silke (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg); Christoph, Bernhard (Institute for Employment Research (IAB), Nuremberg); Galkiewicz, Agata (University of Potsdam); Margaryan, Shushanik (University of Potsdam); Peter, Frauke (DZHW-German Centre for Research on Higher Education and Science Studies); Sandner, Malte (Technische Hochschule Nürnberg)
    Abstract: Using novel longitudinal data, this paper studies the short- and medium-term effects of Russia's invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 on social trust of adolescents in Germany. Comparing adolescents who responded to our survey shortly before the start of the war with those who responded shortly after the conflict began and applying difference-in-differences (DiD) models over time, we find a significant decline in the outcome after the war started. These findings provide new evidence on how armed conflicts influence social trust and well-being among young people in a country not directly involved in the war.
    Keywords: war, trust, social capital, Russia's invasion of Ukraine
    JEL: C23 H75 I14 N44
    Date: 2024–04
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16921&r=soc
  6. By: Afridi, Farzana (Indian Statistical Institute); Basistha, Ahana (Indian Statistical Institute); Dhillon, Amrita (King's College London); Serra, Danila (Texas A&M University)
    Abstract: We consider the largely unexpected shock caused by the second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic in India to assess whether major crises that impact the well-being of a large number of individuals can be catalysts for civic activism. Exploiting state-level variation in COVID-19 peaks and quasi-randomness in subjects' participation in an online survey fielded between March and July 2021, we elicit willingness to act against fraud and corruption in the provision of health services by supporting an NGO engaged in advocacy for health-sector regulation. By comparing responses of subjects surveyed before and after the COVID-19 peak in their state of residence, we find evidence of a large and significant increase in anti-corruption activism post peak. Our data suggest that this surge in activism can be attributed to heightened perceptions of corruption in the healthcare sector, increased awareness of individuals' own rights and entitlements, a greater willingness to take risks, and a positive shift in beliefs regarding others' willingness to fight corruption in the provision of healthcare services.
    Keywords: crisis, corruption, health sector, India, COVID-19
    JEL: D73 D83 I15
    Date: 2024–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16891&r=soc
  7. By: Snir, Avichai; Levy, Dudi; Wang, Dian; Chen, Haipeng (Allan); Levy, Daniel
    Abstract: Many experimental studies report that economics students tend to act more selfishly than students of other disciplines, a finding that received widespread public and professional attention. Two main explanations that the existing literature offers for the differences found in the behavior between economists and non-economists are: (i) the selection effect, and (ii) the indoctrination effect. We offer an alternative, novel explanation: we argue that these differences can be explained by differences in the interpretation of the context. We test this hypothesis by conducting two social dilemma experiments in the US and Israel with participants from both economics and non-economics majors. In the experiments, participants face a tradeoff between profit maximization (market norm) and workers’ welfare (social norm). We use priming to manipulate the cues that the participants receive before they make their decision. We find that when participants receive cues signaling that the decision has an economic context, both economics and non-economics students tend to maximize profits. When the participants receive cues emphasizing social norms, on the other hand, both economics and non-economics students are less likely to maximize profits. We conclude that some of the differences found between the decisions of economics and non-economics students can be explained by contextual cues.
    Keywords: Self-Selection, Indoctrination, Self-Interest, Market Norms, Social Norms, Economic Man, Rational Choice, Fairness, Experimental Economics, Laboratory Experiments, Priming, Economists vs Non-Economists, Behavioral Economics
    JEL: A11 A12 A13 A20 B40 C90 C91 D01 D63 D91 P10
    Date: 2024
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:294172&r=soc

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