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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
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Issue of 2024‒04‒29
six papers chosen by Fabio Sabatini, Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza” |
| By: | Dincecco, Mark (University of Michigan); Fenske, James (University of Warwick); Gupta, Bishnupriya (University of Warwick); Menon, Anil (University of California) |
| Abstract: | We study the relationship between exposure to historical conflict involving heavy weaponry and male-favoring gender norms. We argue that the physical nature of such conflict produced cultural norms favoring males and male offspring. We focus on spatial variation in gender norms across India, a dynamic developing economy in which gender inequality persists. We show robust evidence that areas with high exposure to pre-colonial conflict are significantly more likely to exhibit malefavoring gender norms as measured by male-biased sex ratios and crimes against women. We document how conflict-related gender norms have been transmitted over time via male-favoring folkloric traditions, the gender identity of temple gods, and male-biased marriage practices, and have been transmitted across space by migrants originally from areas with high conflict exposure. |
| Keywords: | War ; Gender Norms ; Cultural Beliefs ; Development ; India, History JEL Codes: J16 ; N45 ; 011 ; P46 ; Z13 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1491&r=soc |
| By: | Cui, Chi; Dai, Ming; Schwieren, Christiane |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we experimentally investigate how sending a signal of following social norms impacts people’s cooperative behavior in a repeated public goods game, where we disentangle the effect of strategy and internalization of social norms on cooperation. We find that under the signaling mechanism, less cooperative players disguise themselves in the rule-following game, but this does not decrease cooperation overall. More importantly, the signaling mechanism has a heterogeneous effect on cooperation in rule-following and rule-breaking groups: It increases cooperation in rule-following groups but decreases cooperation in rule-breaking groups. Finally, the signaling mechanism tends to offset the decline of contributions among participants in rule-breaking groups rather than rule-following groups. Overall, this paper provides a feasible way to improve social cooperation and enriches the literature on cooperation in the public goods game. |
| Keywords: | public goods game; cooperation; signaling; internalization of social norms |
| Date: | 2024–04–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:awi:wpaper:0746&r=soc |
| By: | Bramoulle, Y.; Goyal, S.; Morelli, M. |
| Abstract: | Most societies in the world contain strong group identities and the culture supporting these groups is highly persistent. This persistence in turn gives rise to a practical problem: how do and should societies with strong group identities organize themselves for exchange and public good provision? In this paper, we develop a theoretical framework – with social structure characterized by number and size of groups as well as quality of ties between them – that allows us to study, normatively and positively, the relationship between social structure, state capacity, and economic activity. |
| Keywords: | Economic Activity, Networks, Social Networks |
| Date: | 2024–03–24 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:2416&r=soc |
| By: | Luca Anderlini; Larry Samuelson; Daniele Terlizzese |
| Abstract: | We examine an economy in which interactions are more productive if agents can trust others to refrain from cheating. Some agents are scoundrels, who always cheat, while others cheat only if the cost of cheating, a decreasing function of the proportion of cheaters, is sufficiently low. The economy exhibits multiple equilibria. As the proportion of scoundrels in the economy declines, the high-trust equilibrium can be disrupted by arbitrarily small perturbations or infusions of low-trust agents, while the low-trust equilibrium becomes impervious to perturbations and infusions of high-trust agents. The resilience of trust may thus hinge upon the prevalence of scoundrels. |
| Date: | 2024–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2403.12917&r=soc |
| By: | Carlo Perroni (University of Warwick); Kimberly Scharf (University of Nottingham); Sarah Smith (University of Bristol); Oleksandr Talavera (University of Birmingham); Linh Vi (Aston University) |
| Abstract: | Combining longitudinal postcode-level data on charitable donations made through a UK giving portal with publicly available data on local crime and neighborhood characteristics, we study the relationship between local crime and local residents' charitable giving and we investigate the possible mechanisms underlying this relationship. An increase in local crime corresponds to a sizeable increase in the overall size of unscheduled charitable donations. This effect is mainly driven by the responses of female and gender unclassified donors. Donation responses also reflect postcode variation in socio-economic characteristics, levels of mental health, and political leanings, but mainly so for female and gender-unidentified donors. |
| Keywords: | Charitable Donations, Prosocial Behavior, Crime |
| JEL: | H41 D64 D91 J15 |
| Date: | 2024–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bir:birmec:24-02&r=soc |
| By: | Choi, S.; Goyal, S.; Guo, F.; Moisan, F. |
| Abstract: | This paper presents experimental evidence on games where individuals can unilaterally decide on their links with each other. Linking decisions give rise to directed graphs. We consider two classes of situations: one, benefits flow along the direction of the network paths (one-way flow), and two, when the benefits flow on network paths without regard to the direction of links (two-way flow). Our experiments reveal that in the one-way flow model subjects create sparse networks whose distance grows and efficiency falls as group size grows; by contrast, in the two-way flow model subjects create sparse and small world networks whose efficiency remains high in both small and large groups. We show that a bounded rational model that combines myopic best response with targeting a most connected individual provides a coherent account of our experimental data. |
| Keywords: | Data, Group Size, Network Formation, Network Games, Networks |
| Date: | 2024–03–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:2417&r=soc |