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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
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Issue of 2024‒04‒22
five papers chosen by Fabio Sabatini, Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza” |
| By: | Desmond Ang; Panka Bencsik; Jesse M. Bruhn; Ellora Derenoncourt |
| Abstract: | We document a sharp rise in gunshots coupled with declining 911 call volume across thirteen major US cities in the aftermath of the murder of George Floyd. National survey data also indicate that victims of crime became less likely to report their victimization to law enforcement due to mistrust of police. Our results suggest that high-profile acts of police violence may erode community engagement with law enforcement and highlight the call-to-shot ratio as a natural measure of attitudes towards the police. |
| JEL: | K40 |
| Date: | 2024–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:32243&r=soc |
| By: | Simon Gächter (University of Nottingham); Esther Kaiser (ZHAW School of Management and Law); Manfred Königstein (University of Erfurt) |
| Abstract: | Explicit and implicit incentives and opportunities for mutually beneficial voluntary cooperation co-exist in many contractual relationships. In a series of eight laboratory gift-exchange experiments, we show that incentive contracts can lead to crowding out of voluntary cooperation even after incentives have been abolished. This crowding out occurs also in repeated relationships, which otherwise strongly increase effort compared to one-shot interactions. Using a unified econometric framework, we unpack these results as a function of positive and negative reciprocity, as well as the principals’ wage offer and the incentivecompatibility of the contract. Crowding out is mostly due to reduced wages and not a change in reciprocal wage-effort relationships. Our systematic analysis also replicates established results on gift exchange, incentives, and crowding out of voluntary cooperation while exposed to incentives. Overall, our findings show that the behavioral consequences of explicit incentives strongly depend on the features of the situation in which they are embedded. |
| Keywords: | principal-agent games; gift-exchange experiments; incomplete contracts, explicit incentives; implicit incentives; repeated games; crowding out |
| Date: | 2024–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2024-02&r=soc |
| By: | Choi, S.; Goyal, S.; Guo, F.; Moisan, F. |
| Abstract: | Social interactions shape individual behavior and public policy increasingly uses networks to improve effectiveness. It is therefore important to understand if the theoretical predictions on the relation between networks and individual choice are empirically valid. This paper tests a key result in the theory of games on networks: an individual’s action is proportional to their (Bonacich) centrality. Our experiment shows that individual efforts increase in centrality but at a rate of increase that is lower than the theoretical prediction. These departures from equilibrium are accompanied by significant departures in individual earnings from theoretical predictions. We propose a model of network based imitation decision rule to explain these deviations. |
| JEL: | C92 D83 D85 Z13 |
| Date: | 2024–01–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camjip:2401&r=soc |
| By: | Gold, Robert; Lehr, Jakob |
| Abstract: | This paper shows that regional policies can decrease populist support. We focus on the "development objective" (Objective-1) of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), meant to support lagging-behind regions. For causal inference, we exploit three sources of quasi-exogenous variation in a Regression-Discontinuity-Design (RDD), a Difference-in-Differences framework (DiD), and with matching techniques. Using NUTS3-level panel data on the outcomes of elections to the EU parliament, observed over the period 1999-2019, we consistently find that Objective-1 transfers reduces the vote share of right-fringe parties by about 2.5 pp. Left-fringe party support is not affected. Complementary analyses of individual-level survey data from the Eurobarometer show that the European Regional Policy increases trust in democratic institutions and decreases discontent with the EU. |
| Keywords: | Populism, Regional Policies, European Integration, Regression Discontinuity Design |
| JEL: | D72 H54 R11 R58 |
| Date: | 2024 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:ifwkwp:287756&r=soc |
| By: | Kazuharu Yanagimoto (CEMFI, Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros) |
| Abstract: | Japan ranks 116th out of 146 countries in the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index 2022, well below many developed countries, and has one of the largest gender pay gaps among high-income countries. On the other hand, women’s labor force participation is high in Japan. However, women are much more likely to work in non-regular jobs, which are associated with lower wages and fewer hours. Men, in contrast, have regular, higher-paid jobs with long-hours requirements. In this paper, I build and estimate a model where couples jointly decide their occupations and working hours. Occupations differ in their flexibility. Regular jobs require long working hours, and hourly wages are a convex function of hours worked. Non-regular occupations have a linear mapping between hours worked and hourly wages. The model also allows for social norms that penalize women who earn more than their husbands. Given the inflexibility of regular jobs and social norms, women are more likely to choose non-regular jobs or not to work, and allocate a larger share of their hours for home production. The model can account for all of the observed gender gaps in labor force participation, 33% in occupational choices, 74% in labor hours, and 34% in wages. Through the lens of the model, the inflexibility of regular jobs explains almost all the gaps in occupational choices and wages, while social norms that penalize women who earn more than their husbands account for all of the gap in the participation rate and half of the gap in hours worked. |
| Keywords: | Gender wage gap, social norms, job inflexibility, home production. |
| JEL: | J16 J22 J31 |
| Date: | 2024–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cmf:wpaper:wp2024_2405&r=soc |