nep-soc New Economics Papers
on Social Norms and Social Capital
Issue of 2024‒04‒15
six papers chosen by
Fabio Sabatini, Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza”


  1. Conflict and Gender Norms By Dincecco, Mark; Fenske, James; Gupta, Bishnupriya; Menon, Anil
  2. Moving Out of the Comfort Zone: How Cultural Norms Affect Attitudes toward Immigration By Giesing, Yvonne; Kauder, Björn; Mergele, Lukas; Potrafke, Niklas; Poutvaara, Panu
  3. Experimental Evidence on the Relation Between Network Centrality and Individual Choice By Choi, S.; Goyal, S.; Guo, F.; Moisan, F.
  4. The Populist Dynamic: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Countering Populism By Vincenzo Galasso; Massimo Morelli; Tommaso Nannicini; Piero Stanig
  5. The impact of social status on the formation of collaborative ties and effort provision: An experimental study By Gergely Horvath; Mofei Jia
  6. The Cost of Coming Out By Enzo Brox; Riccardo Di Francesco

  1. By: Dincecco, Mark (University of Michigan); Fenske, James (University of Warwick); Gupta, Bishnupriya (University of Warwick); Menon, Anil (University of California, Merced)
    Abstract: We study the relationship between exposure to historical conflict involving heavy weaponry and male-favoring gender norms. We argue that the physical nature of such conflict produced cultural norms favoring males and male offspring. We focus on spatial variation in gender norms across India, a dynamic developing economy in which gender inequality persists. We show robust evidence that areas with high exposure to pre-colonial conflict are significantly more likely to exhibit male-favoring gender norms as measured by male-biased sex ratios and crimes against women. We document how conflict-related gender norms have been transmitted over time via male-favoring folkloric traditions, the gender identity of temple gods, and male-biased marriage practices, and have been transmitted across space by migrants originally from areas with high conflict exposure.
    Keywords: War, Gender Norms, Cultural Beliefs, Development, India, History JEL Classification: J16, N45, 011, P46, Z13
    Date: 2024
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cge:wacage:704&r=soc
  2. By: Giesing, Yvonne (Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Kauder, Björn (CESifo); Mergele, Lukas (Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Potrafke, Niklas (University of Konstanz); Poutvaara, Panu (University of Munich)
    Abstract: We examine how cultural norms shape attitudes toward immigration. Our causal identification relies on comparing students who moved across the East-West border after German reunification with students who moved within former East Germany. Students who moved from East to West became more positive toward immigration. Results are confirmed among students whose move was plausibly exogenous due to national study place allocation mechanisms. Evidence supports horizontal transmission as the difference between East-West movers and East-East movers increases over time and is driven by East German students who often interacted with fellow students. Effects are stronger in less xenophobic West German regions.
    Keywords: cultural transmission, migration, attitudes toward immigration, German division and unification, political socialization
    JEL: D72 D91 J15 J20 P20 P51 Z10
    Date: 2024–02
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp16833&r=soc
  3. By: Choi, S.; Goyal, S.; Guo, F.; Moisan, F.
    Abstract: Social interactions shape individual behaviour and public policy increasingly uses networks to improve effectiveness. It is therefore important to understand if the theoretical predictions on the relation between networks and individual choice are empirically valid. This paper tests a key result in the theory of games on networks: an individual’s action is proportional to their (Bonacich) centrality. Our experiment shows that individual efforts increase in centrality but at a rate of increase that is lower than the theoretical prediction. Moreover, efforts are higher than predicted in some cases and lower than predicted in other cases. These departures from equilibrium have large effects on individual earnings. We propose a model of network based imitation decision rule to explain these deviations.
    JEL: C92 D83 D85 Z13
    Date: 2024–01–16
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:2401&r=soc
  4. By: Vincenzo Galasso; Massimo Morelli; Tommaso Nannicini; Piero Stanig
    Abstract: We evaluate how traditional parties may respond to populist parties on issues aligning with populist messages. During the 2020 Italian referendum on the reduction of members of Parliament, we conducted a large-scale field experiment, exposing 200 municipalities to nearly a million impressions of programmatic advertisement. Our treatments comprised two video ads against the reform: one debunking populist rhetoric and another attributing blame to populist politicians. This anti-populist campaign proved effective through demobilization, as it reduced both turnout and the votes in favor of the reform. Notably, the effects were more pronounced in municipalities with lower rates of college graduates, higher unemployment, and a history of populist votes. This exogenous influence introduced a unique populist dynamic, observable in the 2022 national election where treated municipalities showed increased support for Brothers of Italy, a rising populist party, and decreased support for both traditional parties and the populists behind the 2020 reform. A follow-up survey further showed increased political interest and diminished trust in political institutions among the residents of municipalities targeted by the campaign.
    Date: 2024
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ces:ceswps:_10949&r=soc
  5. By: Gergely Horvath; Mofei Jia
    Abstract: We study whether competition for social status induces higher effort provision and efficiency when individuals collaborate with their network neighbors. We consider a laboratory experiment in which individuals choose a costly collaborative effort and their network neighbors. They benefit from their neighbors' effort and effort choices of direct neighbors are strategic complements. We introduce two types of social status in a 2x2 factorial design: 1) individuals receive monetary benefits for incoming links representing popularity; 2) they receive feedback on their relative payoff ranking within the group. We find that link benefits induce higher effort provision and strengthen the collaborative ties relative to the Baseline treatment without social status. In contrast, the ranking information induces lower effort as individuals start competing for higher ranking. Overall, we find that social status has no significant impact on the number of links in the network and the efficiency of collaboration in the group.
    Date: 2024–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2403.05830&r=soc
  6. By: Enzo Brox; Riccardo Di Francesco
    Abstract: The fear of social stigma and discrimination leads many individuals worldwide to hesitate in openly disclosing their sexual orientation. Due to the large costs of concealing identity, it is crucial to understand the extent of anti-LGB sentiments and reactions to coming out. However, disclosing one's sexual orientation is a personal choice, complicating data access and introducing endogeneity issues. This paper tackles these challenges by using an innovative data source from a popular online video game together with a natural experiment. We exploit exogenous variation in the identity of a playable character to identify the effects of disclosure on players' revealed preferences for that character. Leveraging detailed daily data, we monitor players' preferences for the character across diverse regions globally and employ synthetic control methods to isolate the effect of the disclosure on players' preferences. Our findings reveal a substantial and persistent negative impact of coming out. To strengthen the plausibility of social stigma as the primary explanation for the estimated effects, we systematically address and eliminate several alternative game-related channels.
    Date: 2024–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2403.03649&r=soc

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