nep-soc New Economics Papers
on Social Norms and Social Capital
Issue of 2023‒05‒29
six papers chosen by
Fabio Sabatini
Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza”

  1. First generation elite: the role of school networks By Sarah Cattan; Kjell G. Salvanes; Emma Tominey
  2. Social Organizations and Political Institutions: Why China and Europe Diverged By Joel Mokyr; Guido Tabellini
  3. When Crime Tears Communities Apart: Social Capital and Organised Crime By Calamunci, Francesca Maria; Frattini, Federico Fabio
  4. Cooperation and Cognition in Social Networks By Edoardo Gallo; Joseph Lee; Yohanes Eko Riyanto; Erwin Wong
  5. Polarization contaminates the link with partisan and independent institutions: evidence from 138 cabinet shifts. By Luis Guirola; Gonzalo Rivero
  6. To request or not to request: charitable giving, social information, and spillover By Valeria Fanghella; Lisette Ibanez; John Thøgersen

  1. By: Sarah Cattan (Institute for Fiscal Studies); Kjell G. Salvanes (Norwegian School of Economics); Emma Tominey (University of York)
    Abstract: High school students from non-elite backgrounds are less likely to have peers with elite educated parents than their elite counterparts in Norway. We show this difference in social capital is a key driver of the high intergenerational persistence in elite education. We identify a positive elite peer effect on enrolment in elite programmes and disentangle underlying mechanisms. Exploiting a lottery in the assessment system, a causal mediation analysis shows the overall positive peer effect reflects a positive effect on application behaviour (conditional on GPA), which dominates a negative effect on student GPA. We consider implications for income mobility finding that encouraging further mixing between elite and non-elite students in high school could improve mobility across the whole distribution.
    Keywords: Peers, Elite university, Subject choice, Social mobility, Teacher bias
    JEL: I24 J24 J62
    Date: 2023–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ucl:cepeow:23-04&r=soc
  2. By: Joel Mokyr; Guido Tabellini
    Abstract: This paper discusses the historical and social origins of the bifurcation in the political institutions of China and Western Europe. An important factor, recognized in the literature, is that China centralized state institutions very early on, while Europe remained politically fragmented for much longer. These initial differences, however, were amplified by the different social organizations (clans in China, corporate structures in Europe) that spread in these two societies at the turn of the first millennium AD. State institutions interacted with these organizations, and were shaped and influenced by this interaction. The paper discusses the many ways in which corporations contributed to the emergence of representative institutions and gave prominence to the rule of law in the early stages of state formation in Europe, and how specific features of lineage organizations contributed to the consolidation of the Imperial regime in China. JEL Codes: E42, L14, O10
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:igi:igierp:697&r=soc
  3. By: Calamunci, Francesca Maria; Frattini, Federico Fabio
    Abstract: What is the long-term effect of organised crime presence on social capital accumulation? By leveraging novel social capital and organised crime data, this study investigates this question within the Italian landscape. In an instrumental variable (IV) setting, we exploit the forced resettlement law that compelled organised crime members living in the South of Italy to resettle in the Centre-North area. Using a granular measure of tax compliance as a proxy for civic awareness, we find evidence that sustained exposure to mafia presence depresses social capital accumulation. This finding applies to other dimensions of social capital, such as civic engagement and political participation. Results are robust to a series of robustness checks, such as the alternative strategy which combines the migratory movements from the South and the allocation of Marshall Plan funds. The findings appear to be influenced by a tolerance of dishonest conduct, a decrease in institutional trust, and a general disengagement from social activities.
    Keywords: Community/Rural/Urban Development, Labor and Human Capital, Research Methods/ Statistical Methods
    Date: 2023–05–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:feemwp:334350&r=soc
  4. By: Edoardo Gallo; Joseph Lee; Yohanes Eko Riyanto; Erwin Wong
    Abstract: Social networks can sustain cooperation by amplifying the consequences of a single defection through a cascade of relationship losses. Building on Jackson et al. (2012), we introduce a novel robustness notion to characterize low cognitive complexity (LCC) networks - a subset of equilibrium networks that imposes a minimal cognitive burden to calculate and comprehend the consequences of defection. We test our theory in a laboratory experiment and find that cooperation is higher in equilibrium than in non-equilibrium networks. Within equilibrium networks, LCC networks exhibit higher levels of cooperation than non-LCC networks. Learning is essential for the emergence of equilibrium play.
    Date: 2023–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:arx:papers:2305.01209&r=soc
  5. By: Luis Guirola (Banco de España); Gonzalo Rivero (Independent researcher)
    Abstract: Increasing political polarization implies that each election expands the gap between the supporters of the losing side and the winning party. This asymmetry in how citizen’s feel about the outcome of elections could propagate to the institutions under partisan control but also to those designed to be isolated from electoral pressures – such as courts or central banks. Leveraging three decades of surveys covering European 27 countries, we exploit 138 cabinet shifts between 1991 and 2019 to estimate the effect of a growing divide between winners and losers on attitudes towards both types of institutions. We find that trust in either type institutions drops around elections but that the magnitude of the drop varies substantially across contexts. The polarization of parties explains most of this variance, suggesting that, in a polarized environment, partisan hostility can contaminate attitudes towards the political system as a whole creating the conditions for democratic backsliding.
    Keywords: institutions, trust, polarization
    JEL: D72 D73
    Date: 2022–10
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bde:wpaper:2237&r=soc
  6. By: Valeria Fanghella (EESC-GEM Grenoble Ecole de Management); Lisette Ibanez (CEE-M - Centre d'Economie de l'Environnement - Montpellier - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement - Institut Agro Montpellier - Institut Agro - Institut national d'enseignement supérieur pour l'agriculture, l'alimentation et l'environnement - UM - Université de Montpellier); John Thøgersen (Aarhus University [Aarhus])
    Abstract: Prosocial behavior is important for a well-functioning society, but many people try to avoid situations where they could act prosocially. This paper studies the avoidance of a prosocial request, how it is affected by social pressure, and whether request avoidance and social pressure generate spillover effects on following prosocial behaviors. To this aim, we conduct an incentivized online experiment (N=1400), where participants play two consecutive dictator games with a charity. In the first game, we vary the type of game and information provided in a 2 x 2 between-subject design: (i) standard dictator game or dictator game with costly opt-out; (ii) with or without social information (mean donation in a previous session). The second game is a standard dictator game for all and aims to capture spillover effects from the first decision. We find that the opt-out option leads to significantly lower donations, especially when social information is present (but this effect is not statistically significant). The negative effect of the opt-out option spills over to the second donation decision. We also observe a negative spillover effect after a standard dictator game. Social information reduces donations in a standard dictator game, but also allows to mitigate the negative spillover effect from the first to the second behavior.
    Keywords: prosocial behavior, opt-out option, social information, spillover, charitable giving, selfimage
    Date: 2023
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:gemwpa:hal-04093001&r=soc

This nep-soc issue is ©2023 by Fabio Sabatini. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.