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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
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Issue of 2021‒12‒20
seven papers chosen by Fabio Sabatini Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza” |
| By: | Sihua Ding; Marcin Dziubiński; Sanjeev Goyal (Division of Social Science) |
| Abstract: | A recurring theme in the study of society is the concentration of influence and power that is driven through unequal membership of groups and associations. In some instances these bodies constitute a small world while in others they are fragmented into distinct cliques. This paper presents a new model of clubs and networks to understand the sources of individual marginalization and the origins of different club networks. In our model, individuals seek to become members of clubs while clubs wish to have members. Club value is increasing in its size and in the strength of ties with other clubs. We show that a stable membership proï¬ le exhibits marginalization of individuals and that this is generally not welfare maximizing. Our second result shows that if returns from strength of ties are convex (concave) then stable memberships support fragmented networks with strong ties (small worlds held together by weak ties). We illustrate the value of these theoretical results through case studies of inter-locking directorates, boards of editors of journals, and defence and R&D alliances. |
| Date: | 2021–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nad:wpaper:20210073&r= |
| By: | Thomas Neuber |
| Abstract: | Social norms pervade human interaction, but their demands are often in conflict. To understand behavior, it is thus crucial to know how individuals resolve normative tradeoffs. This paper proposes that sincere judgments about the relative importance of conflicting norms are shaped by personal interest. We show that people tend to follow norms from which they benefit themselves, even in contexts where their own decisions only affect others. In a (virtual) laboratory experiment, each subject makes two decisions over allocations of points within a group of two other participants. The sets of possible allocations entail different normative tradeoffs, and subjects have no personal stakes in their own decisions. However, they are affected by others’ decisions: each subject is part of a group, and the members of different groups simultaneously decide over others’ allocations along a circle. We find that subjects’ decisions are biased towards the normative principles aligned with their own interests, thereby favoring other players whenever these share those interests. Subjects’ beliefs about the choices made by others suggest a largely unconscious mechanism. Moreover, survey answers indicate that the effects are driven by self-centered reasoning: subjects who report pronounced perspective-taking are less biased. |
| Keywords: | egocentrism, experiment, social norms |
| JEL: | C91 D63 D91 |
| Date: | 2021–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:bon:boncrc:crctr224_2021_323&r= |
| By: | Samuel Bazzi; Andreas Ferrara; Martin Fiszbein; Thomas P. Pearson; Patrick A. Testa |
| Abstract: | This paper provides a novel perspective on the Great Migration out of the U.S. South. Using a shift-share identification strategy, we show how millions of Southern white migrants transformed the cultural and political landscape across America. Counties with a larger Southern white share by 1940 exhibited growing support for right-wing politics throughout the 20th century and beyond. Racial animus, religious conservatism, and localist attitudes among the Southern white diaspora hastened partisan realignment as the Republican Party found fresh support for the Southern strategy outside the South. Their congressional representatives were more likely to oppose politically liberal legislation, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and to object to the Electoral College count in 2021. These migrants helped shape institutions that reinforced racial inequity and exclusion, they shared ideology through religious organizations and popular media, and they transmitted an array of cultural norms to non-Southern populations. Together, our findings suggest that Southern white migrants may have forever changed the trajectory of American politics. |
| JEL: | D72 J15 J18 N32 P16 |
| Date: | 2021–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29506&r= |
| By: | Philippe De Donder; Humberto Llavador; Stefan Penczynski; John E. Roemer; Roberto Vélez |
| Abstract: | Whether or not to vaccinate one's child is a decision that a parent may approach in several ways. The vaccination game, in which parents must choose whether to vaccinate a child against a disease, is one with positive externalities (herd immunity). In some societies, not vaccinating is an increasingly prevalent behavior, due to deleterious side effects that parents believe may accompany vaccination. The standard game-theoretic approach assumes that parents make decisions according to the Nash behavioral protocol, which is individualistic and non-cooperative. Because of the positive externality that each child's vaccination generates for others, the Nash equilibrium suffers from a free-rider problem. However, in more solidaristic societies, parents may behave cooperatively -they may optimize according to the Kantian protocol, in which the equilibrium is efficient. We test, on a sample of six countries, whether childhood vaccination behavior conforms better to the individualistic or cooperative protocol. In order to do so, we conduct surveys of parents in these countries, to ascertain the distribution of beliefs concerning the subjective probability and severity of deleterious side effects of vaccination. We show that in all the countries of our sample the Kant model dominates the Nash model. We conjecture that, due to the free-rider problem inherent in the Nash equilibrium, a social norm has evolved, quite generally, inducing parents to vaccinate with higher probability than they would in the non-cooperative solution. Kantian equilibrium offers one precise version of such a social norm. |
| Keywords: | Kantian equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, vaccination, social norm |
| JEL: | C72 D62 D63 I12 |
| Date: | 2021–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:upf:upfgen:1808&r= |
| By: | Gil S. Epstein (Bar-Ilan University); Shirit Katav Herz |
| Abstract: | Child labor is a widespread phenomenon and therefore is of interest to both researchers and policy makers. Various reasons for the existence of child labor have been proposed with the goal of designing appropriate solutions. While household poverty is viewed as the main reason for child labor, we choose to focus on the phenomenon that parents who worked during own childhood are more likely to send their children to work. We also look at the effect of social norms on the parents’ child labor decision and analyze both these effects on the supply of labor and equilibrium in the labor market. Finally, we suggest an explanation for the phenomenon of poor societies with similar income levels that differ significantly in literacy rates and propose policy improvements. |
| Keywords: | Child Labor, Social norms, Intergenerational Transmission |
| JEL: | D13 D64 D91 J22 Z10 |
| Date: | 2021–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:biu:wpaper:2021-03&r= |
| By: | Konda, Bruhan |
| Keywords: | Agribusiness, Crop Production/Industries |
| Date: | 2021–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:iaae21:315134&r= |
| By: | Chang, Tsaiyu |
| Keywords: | Land Economics/Use |
| Date: | 2021–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:iaae21:314975&r= |