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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
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Issue of 2019‒03‒04
eleven papers chosen by Fabio Sabatini Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza” |
| By: | Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Cabrales, Antonio; Mateu, Guillermo; Sánchez, Angel; Sutan, Angela |
| Abstract: | We study experimentally the impact of pre-play social interactions on negotiations. These interactions are often complex. Thus, we attempt to isolate the impact of several of its more common components: conversations, food, and beverages, which could be alcoholic or nonalcoholic. To do this, our subjects take part in a standardized negotiation (complex and simple) under six conditions: without interaction, interaction only, and interactions with water, wine, water and food and wine and food. We find that none of the treatments improve the outcomes over the treatment without interactions. We also study trust and reciprocity in the same context. For all-male groups, we find the same lack of superiority of interaction treatments over no interaction. For all-female groups, some very simple social interactions have a positive impact on trust. |
| Keywords: | business meals; negotiation; Social interactions; Trust |
| JEL: | C91 I18 M11 |
| Date: | 2018–12 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:13417&r=all |
| By: | Gupta, Bishnupriya (University of Warwick); Mookherjee, Dilip (Boston University); Munshi, Kaivan (University of Cambridge); Sanclemente, Mario (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | We argue that community networks played an important role in the emergence of Indian entrepreneurship in the early stages of the cotton textile and jute textile industries in the late 19th and early 20th century respectively, overcoming the lack of market institutions and government support. From business registers, we construct a yearly panel dataset of entrepreneurs in these two industries. We find no evidence that entry is affected by prior trading experience or price shocks in the corresponding upstream sector. Firm directors exhibited a high degree of clustering of entrepreneurs by community. The dynamics of entry is consistent with a model of network-based dynamics |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wrk:warwec:1189&r=all |
| By: | Timothy Besley; Anders Jensen; Torsten Persson |
| Abstract: | This paper studies individual and social motives in tax evasion. We build a simple dynamic model that incorporates these motives and their interaction. The social motives underpin the role of norms and is the source of the dynamics that we study. Our empirical analysis exploits the adoption in 1990 of a poll tax to fund local government in the UK, which led to widespread evasion. The evidence is consistent with the model's main predictions on the dynamics of evasion. |
| JEL: | H26 H3 |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:25575&r=all |
| By: | Roth, Felix; Jonung, Lars |
| Abstract: | This paper examines the evolution of public support for the euro since its introduction as a virtual currency in 1999, using a unique set of data not available for any other currency. We focus on the role of economic factors in determining the popularity of the euro. We find that a majority of citizens support the euro in each individual member country of the euro area (EA). The economic crisis in the EA following the Great Recession led to a slight decline in public support, but the recent economic recovery has strengthened that support, which is now approaching historically high levels after two decades of its existence. We detect a similar, but less pronounced upturn in trust in the ECB during the recovery. Our econometric work demonstrates that unemployment is a key driver of support behind the euro. Given these developments, we discuss whether the large and persistent majority support enjoyed by the euro equips the currency to weather populist challenges during its third decade. |
| Keywords: | Euro,public support,trust,unemployment,optimum currency area,monetary union,ECB |
| JEL: | E42 E52 E58 F33 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:uhhhdp:2&r=all |
| By: | Bauer, Kevin |
| Abstract: | In the current paper, I deploy a novel laboratory experiment to answer the following questions: Does people’s other-regarding behavior change with the number of group memberships they have in common with others? Can uncertainty about others’ group memberships weaken in-group favoritism and lead to more selfish behavior? There are two main findings. First, on average pro-social concerns increase monotonically with the number of joint group affiliations. On the individual level, however, I document a considerable heterogeneity. Second, in situations where participants have only in- complete information on others’ group affiliations, they do not behave more selfishly. It seems as if the awareness of one joint group affiliation in combination with ignorance about the nature of other group memberships is sufficient to elicit maximum other-regarding concerns. My results highlight the importance of carefully navigating workers perceptions on complex and overlapping group affiliations as a task of diversity management within organizations where a high degree of social diversity characterizes the workforce. |
| Keywords: | Social groups, Behavioral Heterogeneity, Moral Wiggle Room |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D03 D83 |
| Date: | 2019–01–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:92374&r=all |
| By: | Duccio Gamannossi degl’Innocenti (University of Exeter, UK); Matthew D. Rablen (University of Sheffield, UK) |
| Abstract: | We relate tax evasion behavior to a substantial literature on social comparison in judgements. Taxpayers engage in tax evasion as a means to boost their expected consumption relative to others in their social network. The unique Nash equilibrium of the model relates optimal evasion to a (Bonacich) measure of network centrality: more central taxpayers evade more. Given that tax authorities are now investing heavily in big-data tools that aim to construct social networks, we investigate the value of acquiring network information. We do this using networks that allow for celebrity taxpayers, whose consumption is widely seen, and who are systematically of higher wealth. We show that there are pronounced returns to the initial acquisition of network information, albeit targeting audits with highly incomplete knowledge of social networks may be counterproductive. |
| Keywords: | Tax Evasion; Social Networks; Network centrality; Optimal Auditing; Social Comparison; Relative Consumption |
| JEL: | H26 D85 K42 |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:shf:wpaper:2019005&r=all |
| By: | Hans Degryse; Alexei Karas; Koen Schoors (-) |
| Abstract: | We exploit uncertainty regarding banks' involvement in money laundering activities as a natural experiment to study the functioning of the interbank market in uncertain times. We show that bank couples with a stronger relationship (i.e., more frequent and reciprocal interactions before the event) are more likely to continue lending to one another, and at lower interest rates. This is in line with a "helping hand" or "flight to friends" hypothesis during crisis. |
| Keywords: | banks, interbank market, trust crisis, relationship banking, helping-hand hypothesis |
| JEL: | G21 |
| Date: | 2019–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rug:rugwps:19/954&r=all |
| By: | Daske, Thomas |
| Abstract: | This study explores mechanism design for networks of interpersonal relationships. Agents' social (i.e., altruistic or spiteful) preferences and private payoffs are all subject to asymmetric information; utility is (quasi-)linear, types are independent. I show that any network of at least three agents can resolve any allocation problem with a mechanism that is Bayesian incentive-compatible, ex-interim individually rational, and ex-post Pareto-efficient (also ex-post budget-balanced). By contrast, a generalized Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem is established for two agents. The central tool to exploit the asymmetry of information about agents' social preferences is "gamification": Resolve the agents' allocation problem with an efficient social-preference robust mechanism; ensure agents' participation with the help of a mediator, some network member, who complements that mechanism with an unrelated hawk-dove like game between the others, a game that effectively rewards (sanctions) strong (poor) cooperation at the expense (to the benefit) of the mediator. Ex interim, agents (and the mediator) desire this game to be played, for it provides them with a platform to live out their propensities to cooperate or compete. - A figurative example is a fund-raiser, hosted by the "mediator", complemented with awarding the best-dressed guest. |
| Keywords: | networks,social preferences,mechanisms,gamification,Coase theorem |
| JEL: | C70 D62 D64 D82 D85 |
| Date: | 2019 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:esprep:193148&r=all |
| By: | Dossi, Gaia (Columbia University); Figlio, David N. (Northwestern University); Giuliano, Paola (University of California, Los Angeles); Sapienza, Paola (Northwestern University) |
| Abstract: | We study the correlation between parental gender attitudes and the performance in mathematics of girls using two different approaches and data. First, we identify families with a preference for boys by using fertility stopping rules in a population of households whose children attend public schools in Florida. Girls growing up in a boy-biased family score 3 percentage points lower on math tests when compared to girls raised in other families. Second, we find similar strong effects when we study the correlations between girls' performance in mathematics and maternal gender role attitudes, using evidence from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. We conclude that socialization at home can explain a non-trivial part of the observed gender disparities in mathematics performance and document that maternal gender attitudes correlate with those of their children, supporting the hypothesis that preferences transmitted through the family impact children behavior. |
| Keywords: | gender Differences, cultural transmission, math performance |
| JEL: | A13 I20 J16 Z1 |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp12156&r=all |
| By: | Lobo, José (School of Sustainability, Arizona State University); Mellander, Charlotta (Jönköping International Business School, Jönköping University & Centre of Excellence for Science and Innovation Studies (CESIS)) |
| Abstract: | We investigate if there are positive economic effects for individuals residing in ethnic neighborhoods, in particular if the likelihood of labor market participation among foreign born is affected by residentially aggregating with other people from the same region. We also examine to what extent the income level among foreign born who has a job is affected by the extent to which they congregate in ethnic enclaves. We use Swedish micro-level data for the time period 2007 to 2015 and run a Heckman estimation for the population overall, for immigrants, but also for four distinct immigration groups: those from poor and middle-income countries in Africa or Asia, from Former Yugoslavia, and from the Middle East. We control for personal and neighborhood characteristics, as well as work place characteristics. The results suggest that there may be positive effects from ethnic concentration, but only if the group makes up a significant share of the population in that neighborhood. |
| Keywords: | Labor market participation; foreign born; immigration; clustering effects; income levels |
| JEL: | J15 J31 R23 |
| Date: | 2019–02–18 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hhs:cesisp:0475&r=all |
| By: | Azam, Jean-Paul; Djemaï, Elodie |
| Abstract: | We examine how cooperation within the couple protects the partners from HIV infection using survey data from southern Africa. The respective impacts of education and cooperation on HIV risk for both wives and husbands are estimated in a joint estimation model. We fully discuss and test the conflictual approach of the couple against a cooperative framework derived from a simple matching model. Our findings suggest that the larger the number of decisions husbands and wives jointly make, the less likely it is that they are infected with HIV. This is robust to assuming that cooperation is endogenous in the wife equation. Freedom and trust are also significantly related to the likelihood of infection for both partners while the women's views about whether marital violence is acceptable are not. These effects may come from a reduced likelihood of extramarital affairs among men and women living in more cooperative partnerships. |
| Keywords: | Couples; Matching; HIV infection; Education; Africa |
| Date: | 2019–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tse:wpaper:33357&r=all |