nep-soc New Economics Papers
on Social Norms and Social Capital
Issue of 2018‒07‒30
nine papers chosen by
Fabio Sabatini
Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza”

  1. Inequality, Fairness and Social Capital By Fehr, Dietmar; Rau, Hannes; Trautmann, Stefan; Xu, Yilong
  2. Immigration and the Future of the Welfare State in Europe By Alberto Alesina; Johann Harnoss; Hillel Rapoport
  3. In-migration and Dilution of Community Social Capital By Hotchkiss, Julie L.; Rupasingha, Anil
  4. Sorting or Steering: Experimental Evidence on the Economic Effects of Housing Discrimination By Peter Christensen; Christopher Timmins
  5. Refugee Admissions and Public Safety: Are Refugee Settlement Areas More Prone to Crime? By Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina; Bansak, Cynthia; Pozo, Susan
  6. Diffusion of Social Values Through the Lens of US Newspapers By Alan Manning; Paolo Masella
  7. Cultural values and behavior in dictator, ultimatum and trust games: an experimental study By Sun-Ki Chai; Dolgorsuren Dorj; Katerina Sherstyuk
  8. A community based program promotes sanitation By María Laura Alzúa; Habiba Djebbari; Amy J. Pickering
  9. The Big Robber Game By Carlos Alós-Ferrer; Jaume García-Segarra; Alexander Ritschel

  1. By: Fehr, Dietmar; Rau, Hannes; Trautmann, Stefan (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research); Xu, Yilong (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)
    Abstract: We study the impact of unjust inequality on social trust and trustworthiness, and its separate effect on the economically successful and the unsuccessful, in a controlled economic experiment. We find evidence for a negative effect of unfair economic inequality on social interactions. Probing the boundaries of this effect, we document that this erosion of social capital critically depends on the context: if a well-off person is not directly responsible for the outcome of the worse-off person, then we observe no negative effects on trust and trustworthiness in the aggregate. Moreover, our data do not support the view that higher status or wealth leads to an erosion of pro-social attitudes: the successful are always more generous; groups of unsuccessful persons are least efficient and least generous in the trust game.
    Keywords: inequality; fairness; social capital
    JEL: C91 D31 D63
    Date: 2018
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tiu:tiucen:5aa2c210-4a6c-49b0-955b-713611d02043&r=soc
  2. By: Alberto Alesina (Harvard University [Cambridge], IGIER); Johann Harnoss (UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne); Hillel Rapoport (PJSE - Paris Jourdan Sciences Economiques - UP1 - Université Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École des Ponts ParisTech - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics)
    Abstract: We analyze the effect of immigration on attitudes to redistribution in Europe. Using data for 28 European countries from the European Social Survey, we .nd that native workers lower their support for redistribution if the share of immigration in their country is high. This effect is larger for individuals who hold negative views regarding immigration but is smaller when immigrants are culturally closer to natives and come from richer origin countries. The effect also varies with native workers' and immigrants' education. In particular, more educated natives (in terms of formal education but also job-specic human capital and ocupation task skill intensity) support more redistribution if immigrants are also relatively educated. To address endogeneity concerns, we restrict identification to within country and within country-occupation variation and also instrument immigration using a gravity model. Overall, our results show that the negative .First-order effect of immigration on attitudes to redistribution is relatively small and counterbalanced among skilled natives by positive second-order effects for the quality and diversity of immigration.
    Date: 2018–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01707760&r=soc
  3. By: Hotchkiss, Julie L. (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta); Rupasingha, Anil (U.S. Department of Agriculture)
    Abstract: Consistent with predictions from the literature, we find that higher levels of in-migration dilute multiple dimensions of a community's level of social capital. The analysis employs a 2SLS methodology to account for potential endogeneity of migration.
    Keywords: social capital; migration; decennial census; social capital community benchmark survey; nonpublic data; simultaneous equations; endogeneity; factor analysis
    JEL: C36 C38 D71 R23
    Date: 2018–07–23
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fip:fedawp:2018-05&r=soc
  4. By: Peter Christensen; Christopher Timmins
    Abstract: Housing discrimination is illegal. However, paired-tester audit experiments have revealed evidence of discrimination in the interactions between potential buyers and realtors, raising concern about whether certain groups are systematically excluded from the beneficial effects of healthy neighborhoods. Using data from HUD's most recent Housing Discrimination Study and micro-level data on key attributes of neighborhoods in 28 US cities, we find strong evidence of discrimination in the characteristics of neighborhoods towards which individuals are steered. Conditional upon the characteristics of the house suggested by the audit tester, minorities are significantly more likely to be steered towards neighborhoods with less economic opportunity and greater exposures to crime and local pollutants. We find that holding locational preferences or income constant, discriminatory steering alone may contribute substantially to the disproportionate number of minority house- holds found in high poverty neighborhoods in the United States. The steering effect is also large enough to fully explain the differential in proximity to Superfund sites among African American mothers. These results have important implications for studies of “neighborhood effects” and confirm an important mechanism underlying observed correlations between race and pollution in the environmental justice literature. Our results also suggest that the basic utility maximization assumptions underlying hedonic and residential sorting models may often be violated, resulting in an important distortion in the provision of local public goods.
    JEL: Q51 Q53 R31
    Date: 2018–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24826&r=soc
  5. By: Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina (San Diego State University); Bansak, Cynthia (St. Lawrence University); Pozo, Susan (Western Michigan University)
    Abstract: According to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the number of refugees worldwide rose to 21.3 million in 2015. Yet, resistance to the welcoming of refugees appears to have grown. The possibility that refugees may commit acts of terrorism or engage in criminal behavior has served as fuel for the Trump Administration’s position in 2017. Is there any basis for these fears? We exploit the variation in the geographic and temporal distribution of refugees across U.S. counties to ascertain if there is a link between refugee settlements and local crime rates or terrorist events in the United States. We fail to find any statistically significant evidence of such a connection.
    Keywords: refugees, crime, United States, terrorism
    JEL: F22 J61 J68
    Date: 2018–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp11612&r=soc
  6. By: Alan Manning; Paolo Masella
    Abstract: Changing attitudes are the result of a battle for hearts and minds in which agents for and against change try to persuade others. We know very little about this process. This paper develops a methodology for measuring sentiments for and against an idea in the media which we apply to attitudes to gay rights. We uncover several stylized facts: First, the expression of both pro- and anti-gay sentiments in U.S. newspapers follow an S-shaped pattern, characteristic of diffusion processes. Anti-gay sentiment starts its diffusion process later but it catches up with pro-gay sentiments. Second, in the year gay marriages are introduced we observe a dramatic increase in coverage of both pro- and anti-gay sentiment; the increase in the latter is larger. The rise in coverage is still present in the three years subsequent to the institutional change. Third, we document the existence of substantial spatial autocorrelation in media coverage of sentiment.
    Keywords: social attitudes, gay marriage
    Date: 2018–07
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp1559&r=soc
  7. By: Sun-Ki Chai (Department of Sociology, University of Hawaii at Manoa); Dolgorsuren Dorj (Department of Economics, National Academy of Governance); Katerina Sherstyuk (Department of Economics, University of Hawaii at Manoa)
    Abstract: Culture is a central concept broadly studied in social anthropology and sociology. It has been gaining increasing attention in economics in relation to research on discrimination in a labor market, identity, gender, and social preferences. Most experimental economics research on culture studies cross-national or cross-ethnic differences in economic behavior. These studies reveal clear behavioral differences across different ethnic groups, yet do not provide a general deductive framework for specifying the underlying preferences behind these differences. We explain laboratory behavior in the dictator, ultimatum, and trust games based on two cultural dimensions adopted from a prominent general cultural framework in contemporary social anthropology: group commitment and grid control. Group-ness measures the extent to which individual identity is incorporated into group or collective identity; grid-ness measures the extent to which social and political prescriptions intrinsically influence individual behavior. One objective of this paper is to show that the grid-group framework, despite its origins in comparative ethnography, is adaptable to an experimental setting and indeed provides a parsimonious framework for generating testable behavioral predictions across a variety of experimental games. Another is to test the predictions of the grid- group framework on a number of simple games widely employed by experimental economists. Grid-group characteristics are measured for each individual using selected items from the World Values Survey. We find that these attributes allow us to systematically predict behavior in a way that discriminates among multiple forms of social preferences using a simple, parsimonious deductive model. Based on the implications of the theory, we hypothesize that subjects with higher group scores will tend to offer more in dictator and ultimatum games and entrust more in trust games. When responding in ultimatum games, those with high grid scores are hypothesized to reject more often and divide less, and to tie acceptance and amount divided more closely to the amount offered. When responding in trust games, those with low group scores are hypothesized to return less, and those with high grid scores to tie the amount returned more closely to the amount entrusted. These theoretical predictions are confirmed overall for most experimental games, although the strength of empirical support varies across games. We conclude that grid-group cultural theory is a viable predictor of people’s economic behavior, and further discuss potential limitations of the current approach and the ways to improve it.
    Keywords: laboratory experiment, two-person games, survey, culture
    JEL: C72 C91 Z13
    Date: 2018–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hai:wpaper:201805&r=soc
  8. By: María Laura Alzúa (CEDLAS-FCE-UNLP, CONICET.); Habiba Djebbari (Aix Marseille University (Aix Marseille School of Economics) EHESS & CNRS.); Amy J. Pickering (Civil and Environmental Engineering, Tufts University.)
    Abstract: Basic sanitation facilities are still lacking in large parts of the developing world, engendering serious environmental health risks. Interventions commonly deliver in-kind or cash subsidies to promote private toilet ownership. In this paper, we assess an intervention that provides information and behavioral incentives to encourage villagers in rural Mali to build and use basic latrines. Using an experimental research design and carefully measured indicators of use, we find a sizeable impact from this intervention: latrine ownership and use almost doubled in intervention villages, and open defecation was reduced by half. Our results partially attribute these effects to increased knowledge about cheap and locally available sanitation solutions. They are also associated with shifts in the social norm governing sanitation. Taken together, our findings, unlike previous evidence from other contexts, suggest that a progressive approach that starts with ending open defecation and targets whole communities at a time can help meet the new Sustainable Development Goal of ending open defecation.
    JEL: I12
    Date: 2018–05
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dls:wpaper:0228&r=soc
  9. By: Carlos Alós-Ferrer; Jaume García-Segarra; Alexander Ritschel
    Abstract: We present a novel design measuring a correlate of social preferences in a high-stakes setting. In the Big Robber Game, a "robber" can obtain large personal gains by appropriating the gains of a large group of "victims" as seen in recent corporate scandals. We observed that more than half of all robbers take as much as possible. At the same time, participants displayed standard, prosocial behavior in the Dictator, Ultimatum, and Trust games. That is, prosocial behavior in the small is compatible with highly selfish actions in the large, and the essence of corporate scandals can be reproduced in the laboratory even with a standard student sample. We show that this apparent contradiction is actually consistent with received social-preference models. In agreement with this view, in the experiment more selfish robbers also behaved more selfishly in other games and in a donation question. We conclude that social preferences are compatible with rampant selfishness in high-impact decisions affecting a large group.
    Keywords: Big Robber Game, social preferences, corporate scandals, incentives
    JEL: C72 C92 D03
    Date: 2018–06
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:291&r=soc

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