nep-soc New Economics Papers
on Social Norms and Social Capital
Issue of 2018‒01‒01
seven papers chosen by
Fabio Sabatini
Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza”

  1. Nudging the electorate: what works and why? By Felix Koelle; Tom Lane; Daniele Nosenzo; Chris Starmer
  2. When You Know Your Neighbour Pays Taxes: Information, Peer Effects, and Tax Compliance By Alm, James; Bloomquist, Kim M.; McKee, Michael
  3. Physical distance and cooperativeness towards strangers By Kühl, Leonie; Szech, Nora
  4. Peer effects in risky choices among adolescents By Konstanting Lucks; Melanie Lührmann; Joachim K. Winter
  5. Do social networks shape the geography of crowdfunding? By Sylvain Dejean
  6. Game-Theoretic Accounts of Social Norms. The Role of Normative Expectations By Cristina Bicchieri; Alessandro Sontuoso
  7. Peer Effects and Social Influence in Post-16 Educational Choice By Stefan Speckesser; Sophie Hedges

  1. By: Felix Koelle (Department of Economics, University of Cologne); Tom Lane (Department of Economics, University of Nottingham); Daniele Nosenzo (School of Economics, University of Nottingham); Chris Starmer (School of Economics, University of Nottingham)
    Abstract: We report two studies investigating whether, and if so how, different interventions affect voter registration rates. In a natural field experiment conducted before the 2015 UK General Election, we varied messages on a postcard sent by Oxford City Council to unregistered student voters encouraging them to register to vote. Relative to a baseline, emphasising negative monetary incentives (the possibility of being fined) significantly increased registration rates, while positive monetary incentives (chances of winning a lottery) had no significant effects. In the second study, we show that the success of the negative monetary incentive intervention and failure of the positive monetary incentive intervention can be partly explained by social norms.
    Keywords: Voter Registration; Voting; Field Experiment; Nudging; Social Norms; Fines; Rewards
    Date: 2017
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2017-16&r=soc
  2. By: Alm, James; Bloomquist, Kim M.; McKee, Michael
    Abstract: In this paper, we suggest that individuals’ tax compliance behaviours are affected by the behaviour of their “neighbours†, or those about whom they may have information, whom they may know, or with whom they may interact on a regular basis. Individuals are more likely to file and to report their taxes when they believe that other individuals are also filing and reporting their taxes; conversely, when individuals believe that others are cheating on their taxes, they may well become cheaters themselves. We use experimental methods to test the role of such information about peer effects on compliance behaviour. In one treatment setting, we inform individuals about the frequency that their neighbours submit a tax return. In a second treatment setting, we inform them about the number of their neighbours who are audited, together with the penalties that they pay. In both cases, we examine the impact of information on filing behaviour and also on subsequent reporting behaviour. We find that providing information on whether one’s neighbours are filing returns and/or reporting income has a statistically significant and economically large impact on individual filing and reporting decisions. However, this “neighbour†information does not always improve compliance, depending on the exact content of the information.
    Keywords: Tax evasion, Tax compliance, Behavioural economics, Experimental economics,
    Date: 2017
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:vuw:vuwcpf:6775&r=soc
  3. By: Kühl, Leonie; Szech, Nora
    Abstract: Cooperativeness among genetically unrelated humans remains a major puzzle in the social sciences. We explore the causal impact of physical distance on willingness to help. In a field setting, participants decide about supporting local refugees at the dispense of money to themselves. We vary physical distance only, and keep other factors such as cultural distance fixed. The data shows that an increase in local physical distance decreases willingness to donate. A laboratory experiment confirms this finding. We further explore the causal roles of exposure (in the field) and of larger distances (in the lab) with a total of 475 participants.
    Date: 2017
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:kitwps:110&r=soc
  4. By: Konstanting Lucks (Institute for Fiscal Studies); Melanie Lührmann (Institute for Fiscal Studies and Royal Holloway, University of London); Joachim K. Winter (Institute for Fiscal Studies and Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München)
    Abstract: We study the effects of peers on risky decision making among adolescents in the age range of 13 to 15 years. In a field experiment, we randomly allocated school classes to two social interaction treatments. Students were allowed to discuss their choices with a natural peer – either a friend or a randomly selected classmate – before individually making choices in an incentivised lottery task. In the control group, adolescents made choices without being able to discuss them with a peer. In addition, we collected information on existing peer networks. This novel design allows us to separate two channels of peer influence, assortative matching on preferences and the effect of social interaction on choices. We find that friends and classmates are matched on socio-demographic characteristics but not on risk preferences. In contrast, social interaction strongly increases the similarity of teenagers’ risky choices. A large fraction of peers align their choices perfectly.
    Keywords: peer effects; assortative matching; social interaction; risk and loss aversion
    Date: 2017–08–25
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ifs:ifsewp:17/16&r=soc
  5. By: Sylvain Dejean (CEREGE - Centre de Recherche en sciences de Gestion - EA 1722 - La Rochelle - ULR - Université de La Rochelle)
    Abstract: Does the distance still matters in a context where digital technologies promised to eliminate distance-related costs? In crowdfunding platforms, the founder of a project and the backers mainly exchange tacit information (trustworthiness and seriousness of the founder, feasibility of a project), challenging the ability of the Internet to abolish the cost of distance. We investigate how the existence of social ties between two geographical areas, by lowering the asymmetry of information, can shape the flow of funding in a given country. We take advantage of a unique database provided by the French leader of reward-based Crowdfunding. With a dataset containing 12887 projects and 452 850 contributions representing a value of 19 million euros over the period 2012/2015, we estimate, for each pair of the 94 French regions, the number and the amount of bilateral funding as well as their determinants in a gravity-like equation model. To account for the existence of social ties between French regions we exploit information of the French national Census of 2013 about regional migration. Our mains results are first that the elasticity of distance is still important (around 0.5) in the context of reward-based crowdfunding platforms. We then show that taking into account the existence of social ties between regions strongly reduces and even annihilates (under some specifications) the impact of distance. This result suggests that if digital technology could have reduced the geographical distance, only social proximity seems able to decrease the information-related costs.
    Keywords: Crowdfunding,economic geography,gravity,social networks
    Date: 2017–11–22
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01645147&r=soc
  6. By: Cristina Bicchieri; Alessandro Sontuoso (Philosophy, Politics and Economics, University of Pennsylvania)
    Abstract: This is a draft of a chapter in a planned book on behavioral game theory. Social norms and social preferences have increasingly become an integral part of the economics discourse. After disentangling the two notions, this paper focuses on social norms, which we stipulate as group-specific solutions to strategic problems. More precisely, we define social norms as behavioral regularities emerging in mixed-motive games, as a result of preferences for conformity conditional on an endogenous set of beliefs and expectations. To that end, we review models that explicitly feature normative expectations, as well as models that account for category-specific prescriptions. We finally survey some relevant experimental evidence.
    Keywords: social norms, social preferences, social dilemmas
    JEL: C72 C92
    Date: 2017–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ppc:wpaper:0011&r=soc
  7. By: Stefan Speckesser; Sophie Hedges
    Abstract: This paper investigates whether the educational choices that young people make after the completion of their GCSEs (at age 16) are influenced by their peers. More specifically, it takes advantage of the variation in peer groups that arises when students move from primary to secondary school in order to isolate the impact of secondary school peers on the choice of educational trajectory. These trajectories are broadly classified as academic, vocational, a combination of the two, or no education at all. In order to overcome the common problems associated with the identification of peer effects, the ability of the primary school peers of secondary school peers, who are not going to the same secondary school, is used as an instrument for secondary school peer group quality. These ‘peers of peers’ did not go to the same primary or secondary school as the individual of interest and so cannot have had any direct impact on them. Our results show that higher ability peers reduce the likelihood that an individual will choose a vocational course at age 16 after controlling for the individual’s own ability. We also find a very strong effect of household income on education choices, showing that the more deprived a student’s background is, the more likely they are to opt for a vocational trajectory over an academic one.
    Date: 2017–08
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nsr:niesrd:483&r=soc

This nep-soc issue is ©2018 by Fabio Sabatini. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.