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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
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Issue of 2017‒09‒17
five papers chosen by Fabio Sabatini Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza” |
| By: | Adriana Alventosa (Universidad de Valencia. ERI-CES); Gonzalo Olcina (ERICES and University of Valencia) |
| Abstract: | This paper theoretically studies the emergence of a sanctioning institution in a selfish and wealth-diverse group where the provision of a public good is realized only once. In particular, we present a public goods game where players are given the opportunity to implement a sanctioning institution by hiring an external enforcer which sanctions free-riding behavior. However, the enforcer's effectiveness will not be guaranteed and will depend on the level of effort he exerts to chase these opportunistic attitudes. Whether the sanctioning institution is implemented or not is a task delegated to a government concerned in its persistence, who will represent the interests of a social class with a particular level of wealth. The emergence of the sanctioning institution will depend on a set of institutional and technological parameters, the wealth distribution in the society and the identity of the social class whose interests are represented by the government. Given these exogenous variables, the sanctioning institution will emerge more easily if the government represents the social class with the lowest opportunity cost in the provision of a public good. If implemented, the sanctioning institution can achieve a positive provision of such good if the society counts with a relatively high quality in its sanctioning institutions and high social return of the public good. The case of heterogeneous valuations of the public good will also be proved to show symmetric results. |
| Keywords: | public goods game, cooperation, wealth inequality, pool punishment, moral hazard. |
| JEL: | C72 D02 H41 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:dbe:wpaper:0417&r=soc |
| By: | Beckmann, Elisabeth; Mare, Davide Salvatore |
| Abstract: | We investigate whether trust in different financial institutions influences the choice of saving instruments. Is trust a significant determinant of household saving behavior? How does trust in different financial institutions affect the composition of household savings? Using unique survey data for ten emerging market economies in Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe, we show that trust in the financial system increases the probability of holding formal savings and the diversification among formal saving instruments. Trust in the financial system and in foreign banks are significantly associated with holding contractual and capital market saving instruments. Trust in the safety of deposit has the largest positive effect on bank savings. Trust in domestic banks increases the likelihood of holding formal savings the most and trust in foreign banks decreases holdings of informal savings the most. |
| Keywords: | Household finance; Formal savings; Informal savings; Trust in banks; Trust in the financial system. |
| JEL: | D12 D14 G11 O16 P34 |
| Date: | 2017–08–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:81141&r=soc |
| By: | Parag Mahajan; Dean Yang |
| Abstract: | How readily do potential migrants respond to increased returns to migration? Even if origin areas become less attractive vis-à-vis migration destinations, fixed costs can prevent increased migration. We examine migration responses to hurricanes, which reduce the attractiveness of origin locations. Restricted-access U.S. Census data allows precise migration measures and analysis of more migrant-origin countries. Hurricanes increase U.S. immigration, with the effect increasing in the size of prior migrant stocks. Large migrant networks reduce fixed costs by facilitating legal immigration from hurricane-affected source countries. Hurricane-induced immigration can be fully accounted for by new legal permanent residents (“green card” holders). |
| Keywords: | Immigration, migrant networks, returns to migration, natural disasters, hurricanes |
| JEL: | F22 O15 Q54 |
| Date: | 2017–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cen:wpaper:17-50&r=soc |
| By: | Calzolari, Giacomo; Felli, Leonardo; Koenen, Johannes; Spagnolo, Giancarlo; Stahl, Konrad |
| Abstract: | Using unique data from buyer-supplier relationships in the German automotive industry, we unveil a puzzle by which more trust in a relationship is associated with higher idiosyncratic investment, but also more competition. We develop a theoretical model of repeated procurement with non-contractible, buyer-specifi c investments rationalizing both observations. Against the idea that competition erodes rents needed to build trust and sustain relationships, we infer that trust and competition tend to go hand in hand. In our setting trust and rents from reduced supplier competition behave like substitutes, rather than complements as typically understood. |
| Keywords: | Competition; Hold-up Problem; Innovation; Management Practices; Procurement; Relational Contracts; Specific Investment; Supply Chains; Trust |
| JEL: | D22 D86 L22 L62 |
| Date: | 2017–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12267&r=soc |
| By: | Amira Rezgui (LUSSI - Département Logique des Usages, Sciences sociales et Sciences de l'Information - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - Télécom Bretagne - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris], MARSOUIN - Môle Armoricain de Recherche sur la SOciété de l'information et des usages d'INternet - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - UBO - Université de Brest - Télécom Bretagne - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de Analyse de l'Information - Rennes - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] - UR2 - Université Rennes 2, LEGO - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion de l'Ouest - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - UBO - Université de Brest - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] - UBL - Université Bretagne Loire - IMT Atlantique - IMT Atlantique Bretagne-Pays de la Loire); Nicolas Jullien (LUSSI - Département Logique des Usages, Sciences sociales et Sciences de l'Information - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - Télécom Bretagne - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris], MARSOUIN - Môle Armoricain de Recherche sur la SOciété de l'information et des usages d'INternet - UR1 - Université de Rennes 1 - UEB - Université européenne de Bretagne - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - UBO - Université de Brest - Télécom Bretagne - Ecole Nationale de la Statistique et de Analyse de l'Information - Rennes - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] - UR2 - Université Rennes 2, LEGO - Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion de l'Ouest - UBS - Université de Bretagne Sud - UBO - Université de Brest - Institut Mines-Télécom [Paris] - UBL - Université Bretagne Loire - IMT Atlantique - IMT Atlantique Bretagne-Pays de la Loire) |
| Abstract: | Understanding the characteristics of a "good" team and members diversity affects the outcomes group in a question of growing importance for the organizations, for their competitive advantage relies more and more on innovation, produced by virtual cooperation on knowledge production. In this study, we propose a method to forecast the future quality of an online knowledge production community or online epistemic community by studying the composition of the group who initiated them (the "core members" of, in this case, an article). First, we set a team building period which is defined as the period of 120 days after article creation in order to construct this "core members" group. Second, we explore the effects on article quality of both group and member diversity. Core members' characteristics are learned from their previous behavior. The analysis is based on the French Wikipedia project. Our results show that the most important attributes of initial core member to have a high quality article are average reputation, diversity's contribution, participation, and group size. We also find no significant effects of experience diversity and reputation during the team building period. |
| Keywords: | Epistemic community,Article quality,Characteristics of the team,Core member,Wikipedia |
| Date: | 2016–10–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01532045&r=soc |