nep-soc New Economics Papers
on Social Norms and Social Capital
Issue of 2016‒12‒11
nine papers chosen by
Fabio Sabatini
Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza”

  1. Immigrants and Legal Status: Do Personal Contacts Matter? By Simone Cremaschi; Carlo Devillanova
  2. Cheat or Perish? A Theory of Scientific Customs By Benoît LE MAUX; Sarah NECKER; Yvon ROCABOY
  3. The Great Recession and Charitable Giving By Jonathan Meer; David H. Miller; Elisa Wulfsberg
  4. The value of vulnerability The transformative capacity of risky trust By Luigino Bruni; Fabio Tufano
  5. “Making and Breaking” Social Trust in the Workplace: How Job Characteristics Impact the Process of Social Trust Formation among the Employed By Tamilina, Larysa; Tamilina, Natalya
  6. Race and Gender Affinities in Voting: Experimental Evidence By Jeffrey Penney; Erin Tolley; Elizabeth Goodyear-Grant
  7. Luck and Effort: Learning about Income from Friends and Neighbors By Gustavo Adolfo Caballero Orozco
  8. The impact of cultural diversity on the German housing market By Bayar, Mehmet
  9. Dynamic Incentive Effects of Team Formation: Experimental Evidence By Gall, Thomas; Hu, Xiaocheng; Vlassopoulos, Michael

  1. By: Simone Cremaschi (European University Institute); Carlo Devillanova (Università Bocconi)
    Abstract: This paper addresses the effect of personal contacts on immigrants’ legal status by focusing particularly on the contacts’ direct links to legal status and indirect associations with the labor market. The overall effect of these contacts is theoretically unsigned and likely to vary across contact type and contextual factors. Our empirical analysis, based on unique Italian survey data on both documented and undocumented immigrants, tests two hypotheses regarding native contacts: (i) that they are more likely to be associated with a higher immigrant documentation probability and (ii) that they are more likely to introduce immigrants to jobs that facilitate access to employment-based legalization initiatives. Our results indicate that contacts with both natives and family members have a direct, positive, and quantitatively large effect on immigrant documentation probability, whereas contacts with members of the same ethnic group only indirectly increase documentation probability by raising the probability of employment. Our findings also support the hypothesis that native contacts connect immigrants with better jobs.
    Keywords: Immigrant integration; legal status; personal contacts; networks; labor market outcomes
    Date: 2016–12
  2. By: Benoît LE MAUX (CREM-CNRS and Condorcet Center, University of Rennes 1, France); Sarah NECKER (University of Freiburg, Walter-Eucken Institute, Deutschland); Yvon ROCABOY (CREM-CNRS and Condorcet Center, University of Rennes 1, France)
    Abstract: We develop a theory of the evolution of scientific misbehavior. Our empirical analysis of a survey of scientific misbehavior in economics suggests that researchers’ disutility from cheating varies with the expected fraction of colleagues who cheat. This observation is central to our theory. We develop a one-principal multi-agent framework in which a research institution aims to reward scientific productivity at minimum cost. As the social norm is determined endogenously, performance-related pay may not only increase cheating in the short run but can also make cheat-ing increasingly attractive in the long run. The optimal contract thus depends on the dynamics of scientific norms. The premium on scientific productivity should be higher when the transmission of scientific norms across generations is lower (low marginal peer pressure) or the principal cares little about the future (has a high discount rate). Under certain conditions, a greater probability of detection also increases the optimal productivity premium.
    Keywords: Economics of Science, Contract Theory, Scientific Misbehavior, Social Norms
    JEL: A11 A13 K42
    Date: 2016–12
  3. By: Jonathan Meer; David H. Miller; Elisa Wulfsberg
    Abstract: We examine the impact of the Great Recession on charitable giving. We find sharp declines in overall donative behavior that is not accounted for by shocks to income or wealth. These results suggest that overall attitudes towards giving changed over this time period.
    JEL: D64 E02 H41
    Date: 2016–12
  4. By: Luigino Bruni (Department of Economics, Politics and Modern Languages, LUMSA); Fabio Tufano (Department of Economics, University of Nottingham)
    Abstract: The ‘grammar of trust’ is one of the most explored loci in behavioural and experimental economics. This experimental study aims at contributing to the understanding of new dimensions of trust by exploring how risky trust may foster a trustee’s behavioural change. It investigates trustee’s behaviour when the intentional trustor’s risk is both manifestly salient and dependent upon the trustee’s revealed type, namely trustworthy or untrustworthy. The results support the transformative nature of risky trust, which generates more trustworthy and reciprocal behaviour in untrustworthy people.
    Keywords: experiment; gift-exchange game; organization; trust; vulnerability
    Date: 2016
  5. By: Tamilina, Larysa; Tamilina, Natalya
    Abstract: This paper argues that job characteristics can influence the patterns of social trust formation. By reviewing key approaches to building trust, we outline four dimensions through which employment properties may impact trust levels among the employed: (1) networks, (2) learning, (3) contexts, and (4) emotions. We use the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC) public-use data to operationalise the four dimensions and to link them to social trust scores. Our analysis provides strong empirical evidence that the four dimensions not only relate to trust but also exhibit joint effects on trust levels among employed individuals.
    Keywords: social trust, employment, job characteristics, job tasks, multilevel analysis
    JEL: J00 J01 Z13
    Date: 2016–06–01
  6. By: Jeffrey Penney (Pontificia Universidad Javeriana); Erin Tolley (University of Toronto); Elizabeth Goodyear-Grant (Queen's University)
    Abstract: We analyze the results of a large-scale experiment wherein subjects participate in a hypothetical primary election and must choose between two fictional candidates who vary by sex and race. We find evidence of affinities along these dimensions in voting behaviour. A number of phenomena regarding these affinities and their interactions are detailed and explored. We find that they compete with each other on the basis of race and gender. Neuroeconomic metrics suggest that people who vote for own race candidates tend to rely more on heuristics than those who do not.
    Keywords: Gender, Prejudice, Race, Voting
    JEL: D72 C90 J15 J16
    Date: 2016–10
  7. By: Gustavo Adolfo Caballero Orozco
    Abstract: Can social segregation explain differences in beliefs regarding the role of effort in determining high incomes? I develop a model of lineages of agents learning about the effect of effort on the probability of receiving a high income based on their own experience (effort chosen and income received) and the experiences of agents in their networks. Simulating economies of these agents, only two conditions are needed for the existence of long-run differences in beliefs: (i) agents assume their networks are representative of the whole economy, and (ii) they are more likely to meet others with similar life experiencesâas under social segregation. For my analysis, I also consider (iii) imperfect intergenerational transmission of beliefs, in the form of partial confidence about parentâs beliefs, to account for sizable changes in beliefs due to single mobility experiences. I find a positive relationship between the degree of social segregation and the level of long-run differences in beliefs. Moreover, high levels of social segregation can lead agents to make inefficient effort choices while average beliefs drift away from real parameters. High levels of social segregation generate groups of agents who persistently exert (no) effort coexisting with agents choosing depending on their cost of effort. And, mobility experiences resulting from luck decrease the belief about the role of effort.
    JEL: D83 J24 Z18 D63
    Date: 2016–12–05
  8. By: Bayar, Mehmet
    Abstract: This paper documents a positive impact of cultural diversity and cultural similarity on rental prices of the German districts for the years between 2004 and 2013. On the one hand, an increase of the Herfindahl index as a measure for cultural diversity of 0.1 would increase rents by over 12 percent after controlling for relevant explanatory variables and city and time fixed effects. On the other hand, an increase in the share of foreign-born individuals is associated with a decrease in rents. These results suggest an economic impact that is an order of magnitude bigger than that found in labor markets. Consequently, cultural diversity can be considered as a city-specific consumption amenity. The positive impact of cultural diversity on the local housing market mirrors the fact that inhabitants are willing to pay higher rents in cities with a high level of diversity. Natives prefer to live in culturally diverse areas, but they avoid to reside in areas where the share of foreigners is too high. These findings show that amenity considerations play a role in residential location decisions.
    Abstract: Die vorliegende Studie identifiziert einen positiven Effekt der kulturellen Vielfalt und der kulturellen Nähe auf die Mietpreise der deutschen Kreise und kreisfreien Städte für die Jahre zwischen 2004 und 2013. Ein Anstieg des Herfindahl-Index, als Maß für die kulturelle Vielfalt, von 0,1 würde die Mieten um mehr als 12 Prozent erhöhen, wenn für relevante erklärende Variablen und unbeobachtete zeitinvariante Effekte kontrolliert wird. Auf der anderen Seite ist ein Anstieg des Ausländeranteils als homogene Gruppe mit einem Rückgang der Mieten verbunden. Diese Ergebnisse deuten auf eine ökonomische Auswirkung hin, die von der Größenordnung her von Effekten der Einwanderung auf den Arbeitsmärkten abweichen. Folglich kann die kulturelle Vielfalt als eine stadtspezifische Annehmlichkeit betrachtet werden. Die positive Auswirkung der kulturellen Vielfalt auf den lokalen Wohnungsmärkten spiegelt die Tatsache wider, dass die Bewohner bereit sind, höhere Mieten in Städten mit einem hohen Maß an Vielfalt zu zahlen. Die Einheimischen ziehen es vor, in kulturell diverzifizierten Gebieten zu leben, aber sie vermeiden, in Gebieten zu wohnen, in denen der Ausländeranteil zu hoch ist. Diese Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Annehmlichkeiten der Städte eine Rolle bei der Wohnortentscheidung spielen.
    Keywords: Housing market,immigration,cultural background,Germany
    JEL: F22 J61 R23
    Date: 2016
  9. By: Gall, Thomas (University of Southampton); Hu, Xiaocheng (University of Southampton); Vlassopoulos, Michael (University of Southampton)
    Abstract: Optimal team composition has been the focus of exhaustive analysis, academic and otherwise. Yet, much of this analysis has ignored possible dynamic effects: e.g., anticipating that team formation is based on prior performance will affect prior performance. We test this hypothesis in a lab experiment with two stages of a real effort task. Participants first work individually without monetary incentives and are then assigned to teams of two where compensation is based on team performance. Our results are consistent with a simple investment-cum-matching model: pairing the worst performing individuals with the best yields 20% lower first stage effort than random matching. Pairing the best with the best, however, yields 5% higher first stage effort than random matching. In line with the theory the latter result is more pronounced when the task has less scope for learning-by-doing. Moreover, pairing the best with the best achieves the same effort response as having explicit monetary incentives in the first stage.
    Keywords: matching, team formation, performance, dynamic incentives
    JEL: C78 C91 M54
    Date: 2016–11

This nep-soc issue is ©2016 by Fabio Sabatini. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
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