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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
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Issue of 2016‒12‒04
twelve papers chosen by Fabio Sabatini Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza” |
| By: | Miriam Manchin (University College London); Sultan Orazbayev (University College London) |
| Abstract: | Using a large survey spanning several years and more than 150 countries, we examine the importance of social networks in influencing individuals’ intention to migrate domestically or internationally. We distinguish close social networks (composed of friends and family) and broad social networks (composed of same-country residents with intention to migrate), both at home and abroad. We find that social networks abroad are important driving forces of migration intentions, more important than work-related aspects or income. In addition, we find that close social networks abroad with remittances matter significantly more than those without remittances as the individuals become more educated, indicating that networks might work through different channels for individuals with different level of education. On other hand, we find that having stronger close social networks at home reduces the likelihood of migration intentions. |
| Keywords: | intention to migrate, social networks, local migration, international migration, remittances |
| JEL: | F22 F24 R23 O15 |
| Date: | 2016–12–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:csl:devewp:409&r=soc |
| By: | Giorgio Calcagnini (Department of Economics, Society & Politics, Università di Urbino "Carlo Bo"); Germana Giombini (Department of Economics, Society & Politics, Università di Urbino "Carlo Bo); Francesco Perugini (Department of Economics, Society & Politics, Università di Urbino "Carlo Bo) |
| Abstract: | The funding role of Bank Foundations in the Italian economy, especially to the non-profit sector, significantly increased over the last twenty-five years. By means of a novel measure of social capital, our paper evaluates the contribution of Bank Foundations to the economic development of Italian provinces. Our findings suggest that Bank Foundations positively affect social capital and the economic growth of provinces. |
| Keywords: | Bank Foundations; social capital; economic growth |
| JEL: | G23 O47 C13 R11 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:urb:wpaper:16_03&r=soc |
| By: | Alice Hsiaw (Brandeis University); Ing-Haw Cheng (Brandeis University) |
| Abstract: | Disagreements about substance and expert credibility often go hand-in-hand and are hard to resolve, even when people share common information, on a wide range of issues ranging from economics, climate change, to medicine. We argue that a learning bias helps explain disagreement in environments such as these where both the state of the world and the credibility of information sources (experts) are uncertain. Individuals with our learning bias overinterpret how much they can learn about two sources of uncertainty from one signal, leading them to over-infer expert quality. People who encounter information or experts in different order disagree about substance because they endogenously disagree about the credibility of each others' experts. Disagreement persists because first impressions about experts have long-lived influences on beliefs about the state. These effects arise even though agents share common priors, information, and biases, providing a theory for the origins of disagreement. |
| Date: | 2016–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:brd:wpaper:110r&r=soc |
| By: | Natalia Borzino (UEA - University of East Anglia (Norwich)); Enrique Fatas (UEA - University of East Anglia (Norwich)); Emmanuel Peterle (UBFC - Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté) |
| Abstract: | We conduct a controlled laboratory experiment to investigate trust and trustworthiness in a networked investment game in which two senders interact with a receiver. We investigate to what extent senders and receivers comply with an exogenous and non-binding recommendation. We also manipulate the level of information available to senders regarding receiver’s behavior in the network. We compare a baseline treatment in which senders are only informed about the actions and outcomes of their own investment games to two information treatments. In the reputation treatment, senders receive ex ante information regarding the average amount returned by the receiver in the previous period. In the transparency treatment, each sender receives ex post additional information regarding the returning decision of the receiver to the other sender in the network. Across all treatments and for both senders and receivers, the non-binding rule has a significant and positive impact on individual decisions. Providing senders with additional information regarding receiver’s behavior affects trust at the individual level, but leads to mixed results at the aggregate level. Our findings suggest that reputation building, as well as allowing for social comparison could be efficient ways for receivers to improve trust within networks. |
| Keywords: | Information, Taxation, Trust,Experimental economics, Investment game |
| Date: | 2016–04–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-01375081&r=soc |
| By: | Juergen Bracht (University of Aberdeen [Aberdeen] - University of Aberdeen); Adam Zylbersztejn (GATE - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - Ecole Normale Supérieure Lettres et Sciences Humaines - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) |
| Abstract: | We study questionnaire responses to moral dilemmas hypothetical situations in which sacrificing one life may save many other lives. We demonstrate gender differences in moral judgments: male participants are more supportive of the sacrifice than female participants. We investigate the importance of the previously studied source of the endorsement of the sacrfice: antisocial attitudes. First, we elicit the individual proneness to spiteful behavior using an incentivized experimental game. We demonstrate that spitefulness can be sizable but it is not associated with gender. Second, we find that gender is associated with moral judgments even when we account for individual differences in antisocial attitudes. Our results suggest that the performance of many institutions (related to the distribution of wealth or punishment, for instance) may be affected by the gender of the decision-makers. Abstract We study questionnaire responses to moral dilemmas hypothetical situations in which sacric-ing one life may save many other lives. We demonstrate gender dierences in moral judgments: male participants are more supportive of the sacrice than female participants. We investigate the importance of the previously studied source of the endorsement of the sacrice: antisocial attitudes. First, we elicit the individual proneness to spiteful behavior using an incentivized experimental game. We demonstrate that spitefulness can be sizable but it is not associated with gender. Second, we nd that gender is associated with moral judgments even when we account for individual dierences in antisocial attitudes. Our results suggest that the performance of many institutions (related to the distribution of wealth or punishment, for instance) may be aected by the gender of the decision-makers. |
| Keywords: | gender,moral dilemmas,moral judgments,spite,antisocial attitudes,experiment |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01382464&r=soc |
| By: | Furtner, Nadja C.; Kocher, Martin G.; Martinsson, Peter; Matzat, Dominik; Wollbrant, Conny |
| Abstract: | Evidence of gender differences in cooperation in social dilemmas is inconclusive. This paper experimentally elicits unconditional contributions, a contribution vector (cooperative preferences), and beliefs about the level of others’ contributions in variants of the public goods game. We show that existing inconclusive results can be understood and completely explained when controlling for beliefs and underlying cooperative preferences. Robustness checks based on data from around 450 additional independent observations around the world confirm our main empirical results: Women are significantly more often classified as conditionally cooperative than men, while men are more likely to be free riders. Beliefs play an important role in shaping unconditional contributions, and they seem to be more malleable or sensitive to subtle cues for women than for men. |
| Keywords: | Public goods; conditional cooperation; gender; experiment |
| JEL: | C91 D64 H41 |
| Date: | 2016 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lmu:muenec:30226&r=soc |
| By: | Thomas Bourveau (Hong-Kong University of Science and Technology); Renaud Coulomb (University of Melbourne); Marc Sangnier (AMSE - Aix-Marseille School of Economics - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - Ecole Centrale de Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales) |
| Abstract: | This paper investigates whether political connections affect individuals’ propensity to engage in illegal activities in financial markets. We use the 2007 French presidential election as marker of change in the value of political connections, in a difference-in-differences research design. We examine the behavior of directors of publicly listed companies who are connected to the future president through campaign donations or direct friendships, relative to that of other non-connected directors, before and after the election. We uncover indirect evidence that connected directors do more illegal insider trading after the election. More precisely, we find that purchases by connected directors trigger larger abnormal returns, and that connected directors are more likely not to comply with trading disclosure requirements and to trade closer to major corporate events. |
| Keywords: | political connections,white-collar crime,insider trading |
| Date: | 2016–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01376148&r=soc |
| By: | Catherine C. Eckel; David H. Herberich; Jonathan Meer |
| Abstract: | One of the most important outstanding questions in fundraising is whether donor premiums, or gifts to prospective donors, are effective in increasing donations. Donors may be motivated by reciprocity, making premium recipients more likely to donate and give larger donations. Or donors may dislike premiums, preferring instead to maximize the value of their donations to the charity; in this case donor premiums would be ineffective. We conduct a field experiment in conjunction with the fundraising campaign of a major university to examine these questions. Treatments include a control, an unconditional premium with two gift quality levels, and a set of conditional premium treatments. The conditional treatments include opt-out and opt-in conditions to test whether donors prefer to forego premiums. Compared with the control, donors are twice as likely to give when they receive an unconditional, high-quality gift. The low-quality unconditional and all conditional premiums have little impact on the likelihood or level of giving. Donors do not respond negatively to premiums: rates of giving do not suffer when premiums are offered. In addition, few opt out given the opportunity to do so, indicating that they like gifts, and suggesting that reciprocity rather than altruism determines the impact of premiums on giving. |
| JEL: | C93 D64 H41 |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:22867&r=soc |
| By: | Harounan Kazianga (Oklahoma State University); Zaki Wahhaj (University of Kent) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we investigate the link between intra-household resource allocation and familial ties between household members. We show that, within the same geographic, economic and social environments, households where members have ‘stronger’ familial ties (nuclear family households) achieve near Pareto efficient allocation of productive resources and Pareto efficient allocation of consumption while households with ‘weaker’ familial ties (extended family households) do not. We propose a theoretical model of the household based on the idea that altruism between household members vary with familial ties which generates predictions consistent with the observed empirical patterns. |
| Keywords: | Intra-household Allocation, Social Norms, Extended Families, Altruism, Household |
| JEL: | O12 D13 Q1 |
| Date: | 2016–11–28 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:csl:devewp:408&r=soc |
| By: | Maurizio Cisi (Department of Management, University of Torino, Italy); Francesco Devicienti (Department of Economics and Statistics (Dipartimento di Scienze Economico-Sociali e Matematico-Statistiche), University of Torino, Italy); Alessandro Manello (Department of Economics and Statistics (Dipartimento di Scienze Economico-Sociali e Matematico-Statistiche), University of Torino, Italy); Davide Vannoni (Department of Economics and Statistics (Dipartimento di Scienze Economico-Sociali e Matematico-Statistiche), University of Torino, Italy) |
| Abstract: | Using a large sample of Italian small and medium enterprises (SMEs), we investigate the effect of membership in a formal business network (“contratto di rete†) on firms’ economic performance. We find that network participation has a positive effect on value added and exports, but not on profitability. The advantages of networking are stronger in the case of: smaller SMEs, firms operating in traditional and in more turbulent markets, firms located in less developed areas and firms not already exploiting the weaker ties offered by industrial districts. Network characteristics, such as size, geographical dispersion and diversity, are also found to influence performance. |
| Keywords: | Formal Business Network, Small and Medium Firms, Economic Performance |
| JEL: | D22 L24 L25 M21 |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:tur:wpapnw:039&r=soc |
| By: | Merkel, Anna; Lohse, Johannes |
| Abstract: | Economists are increasingly interested in the cognitive basis of pro-social behavior. Using response time data, several authors have claimed that "fairness is intuitive". In light of conflicting empirical evidence, we provide theoretical arguments showing under which circumstances an increase in "fair" behavior due to time pressure provides unambiguous evidence in favor of the "fairness is intuitive" hypothesis. Drawing on recent applications of the Drift Diffusion Model (Krajbich et al., 2015a), we demonstrate how the subjective difficulty of making a choice affects choices under time pressure and time delay, thereby making an unambiguous interpretation of time pressure effects contingent on the choice situation. To explore our theoretical considerations and to retest the "fairness is intuitive" hypothesis, we analyze choices in two-person prisoner’s dilemma and binary dictator games. As in previous experiments, we exogenously manipulate response times by placing subjects under time pressure or forcing them to delay their decisions. In addition, we manipulate the subjective difficulty of choosing the fair relative to the selfish option across all choice situations. Our main finding is that time pressure does not increase the fraction of fair choices relative to time delay irrespective of the subjective difficulty of choosing the fair option. Hence, our results cast doubt on the hypothesis that "fairness is intuitive". |
| Keywords: | distributional preferences; cooperation; response times; time pressure; cognitive processes; drift diffusion models |
| Date: | 2016–11–30 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:awi:wpaper:0627&r=soc |
| By: | Mechtenberg, Lydia; Tyran, Jean-Robert |
| Abstract: | The quality of democratic choice critically depends on voter motivation, i.e. on voters' willingness to cast an informed vote. If voters are motivated, voting may result in smart choices because of information aggregation but if voters remain ignorant, delegating decision making to an expert may yield better outcomes. We experimentally study a common interest situation in which we vary voters' information cost and the competence of the expert. We find that voters are more motivated to collect information than predicted by standard theory and that voter motivation is higher when subjects demand to make choices by voting than when voting is imposed on subjects. |
| Keywords: | Experiment; Information Acquisition; information aggregation; voting |
| JEL: | C91 D71 D72 |
| Date: | 2016–11 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11622&r=soc |