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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
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Issue of 2016‒04‒09
eleven papers chosen by Fabio Sabatini Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza” |
| By: | Ilse Lindenlaub; Anja Prummer; ; |
| Abstract: | This paper documents gender differences in social ties and develops a theory that links them to disparities in men’s and women’s labor market performance. Men’s networks lead to better access to information, women’s to higher peer pressure. Both affect effort in a model of teams, each beneficial in different environments. We find that information is particularly valuable under high uncertainty, whereas peer pressure is more valuable in the opposite case. We therefore expect men to outperform women in jobs that are characterized by high earnings uncertainty, such as the financial sector or film industry – in line with the evidence rationale. |
| Keywords: | Networks, Peer Pressure, Gender, Labor Market Outcomes |
| JEL: | D85 Z13 J16 |
| Date: | 2014–07–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:1461&r=soc |
| By: | Idrissa Diabata (INSTAT, Mali); Sandrine Mesplé-Somps (IRD) |
| Abstract: | In this paper, we investigate how powerful a mechanism migration is in the transmission of social norms, taking Mali and Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) as a case study. Mali has a strong FGM culture and a long-standing history of migration. We use an original household-level database coupled with census data to analyze the extent to which girls living in villages with high rates of return migrants are less prone to FGM. Malians migrate predominantly to other African countries where female circumcision is uncommon (e.g. Côte d’Ivoire) and to countries where FGM is totally banned (France and other developed countries) and where anti-FGM information campaigns frequently target African migrants. Taking a two-step instrumental variable approach to control for the endogeneity of migration decisions, we show that return migrants have a negative and significant influence on FGM. We also show that adults living in villages with return migrants are more in favor of legislation against FGM. |
| Keywords: | Mali |
| Date: | 2014–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pri:cmgdev:1501e&r=soc |
| By: | Diana Lopez-Avila (PSE - Paris-Jourdan Sciences Economiques - ENS Paris - École normale supérieure - Paris - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA) - École des Ponts ParisTech (ENPC) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | This paper aims at shedding light on the relationship between women's empowerment and domestic violence. For this, we explore different ways to measure women's empowerment and domestic violence, and analyze whether the relation depends on the definitions used. We take advantage of a rich data set collected in rural Colombia, including several measures of self-esteem, disagreement towards domestic violence, participation in household decisions and social capital; and analyze the relationship with both aggressive and controlling ways of domestic violence. The results indicate that the different measures of women's empowerment help explain much better the aggressive ways of domestic violence than the controlling ones. Our results show a positive correlation between women's empowerment and domestic violence. This goes in line with the theories that argue that men use violence as a way to leverage their power within the household. Among the different latent measures of women's empowerment we used, we found that social capital and self-esteem are significantly correlated with aggressive domestic violence. We do not find that more common proxies, such as women's participation in household decisions, are significantly correlated to domestic violence. |
| Keywords: | Gender,Domestic Violence,Household bargaining models,Social Capital,D13, I15, J12, J16, O12 |
| Date: | 2016–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:psewpa:halshs-01294565&r=soc |
| By: | Sanjeev Goyal; Stephanie Rosenkranz; Utz Weitze; Vincent Buskens |
| Abstract: | A central feature of social networks is information sharing. The Internet and related computing technologies define the relative costs of private information acquisition and forming links with others. This paper presents an experiment on the effects of changing costs.We find that a decline in relative costs of linking makes private investments more dispersed and gives rise to denser social networks. Aggregate investment falls, but individuals access to investment remains stable, due to increased networking. The overall effect is a significant increase in individual utility and aggregate welfare. |
| Date: | 2015–12–21 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:1566&r=soc |
| By: | Roberta Dessi; Edoardo Gallo; Sanjeev Goyal; |
| Abstract: | We study individual ability to memorize and recall information about friendship networks using a combination of experiments and survey-based data. In the experiment subjects are shown a network, in which their location is exogenously assigned, and they are then asked questions about the network after it disappears. We find that subjects exhibit three main cognitive biases: (i) they underestimate the mean degree compared to the actual network; (ii) they overestimate the number of rare degrees; (iii) they underestimate the number of frequent degrees. We then analyse survey data from two `real' friendship networks from a Silicon Valley firm and from a University Research Center. We find, somewhat remarkably, that individuals in these real networks also exhibit these biases. The experiments yield three further: findings: (iv) network cognition is a affected by the subject's location, (v) the accuracy of network cognition varies with the nature of the network, and (vi) network cognition has a significant effect on economic decisions. |
| Date: | 2014–08–27 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:1462&r=soc |
| By: | Syngjoo Choi; Andrea Galeotti; Sanjeev Goyal; |
| Abstract: | We propose a model of posted prices in networks. The model maps traditional concepts of market power, competition and double marginalization into networks, allowing for the study of pricing in complex structures of intermediation such as supply chains, transportation and communication networks and financial brokerage. We provide a complete characterization of equilibrium prices. Our experiments complement our theoretical work and point to node criticality as an organizing principle for understanding pricing, efficiency and the division of surplus in networked markets. |
| Keywords: | Intermediation, competition, market power, double marginalization. |
| JEL: | C70 C71 C91 C92 D40 |
| Date: | 2014–05–16 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:1457&r=soc |
| By: | Anja Prummer; Jan-Peter Siedlarek; ; |
| Abstract: | We offer a novel explanation for why some immigrant groups and minorities have persistent, distinctive cultural traits – the presence of a rigid institution. Such an institution is necessary for communities to not fully assimilate to the mainstream society. We distinguish between different types of institutions, such as churches, foreign-language media or ethnic business associations and ask what level of cultural distinction these institutions prefer. Any type of institution can have incentives to be extreme and select maximal cultural distinction from the mainstream society. If institutions choose positive cultural distinction, without being extremist, then a decrease in discrimination leads to reduced assimilation. |
| Date: | 2014–10–08 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cam:camdae:1465&r=soc |
| By: | Kodila-Tedika, Oasis; Asongu, Simplice; Azia-Dimbu, Florentin |
| Abstract: | This study investigates the relationship between social trust and intelligence. The extreme bound analysis of Levine and Renelt is employed to directly assess the strength of the nexus. The findings confirm the positive and robust nexus between social trust and intelligence. We have contributed to the literature by confirming that the previously established positive linkage between intelligence and trust is not statistically fragile. In fact the nexus withstands further empirical scrutiny with more robust empirical strategies. |
| Keywords: | Trust; Intelligence; Human Capital; Extreme Bound Analysis |
| JEL: | G20 I20 I29 J24 P48 Z13 |
| Date: | 2016–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:70523&r=soc |
| By: | Marco Manacorda (Queen Mary University of London, CEP (LSE), CEPR & IZA); Andrea Tesei (Queen Mary University of London & CEP (LSE);) |
| Abstract: | Can digital information and communication technology (ICT) foster mass political mobilization? We use a novel geo-referenced dataset for the entire African continent between 1998 and 2012 on the coverage of mobile phone signal together with geo-referenced data from multiple sources on the occurrence of protests and on individual participation in protests to bring this argument to empirical scrutiny. We find that mobile phones are instrumental to mass mobilization during economic downturns, when reasons for grievance emerge and the cost of participation falls. Estimated effects are if anything larger once we use an instrumental variable approach that relies on differential trends in coverage across areas with different incidence of lightning strikes. The results are in line with insights from a network model with imperfect information and strategic complementarities in protest provision. Mobile phones make individuals more responsive to both changes in economic conditions - a mechanism that we ascribe to enhanced information - and to their neighbors' participation - a mechanism that we ascribe to enhanced coordination. Empirically both effects are at play, highlighting the channels through which digital ICT can alleviate the collective action problem. |
| Keywords: | Mobile phones, Collective action, Africa, Geo-referenced data |
| JEL: | D70 O55 L96 |
| Date: | 2016–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp785&r=soc |
| By: | Gagliarducci, Stefano (University of Rome Tor Vergata); Manacorda, Marco (Queen Mary, University of London) |
| Abstract: | In this paper we investigate the effect of family connections to politicians on individuals' labor market outcomes. We combine data for Italy over almost three decades from longitudinal social security records on a random sample of around 1 million private sector employees with the universe of around 500,000 individuals ever holding political office, and we exploit information available in both datasets on a substring of each individual's last name and municipality of birth in order to identify family ties. Using a diff-in-diff analysis that follows individuals as their family members enter and leave office, and correcting for the measurement error induced by our fuzzy matching method, we estimate that the monetary return to having a politician in the family is around 3.5 percent worth of private sector earnings and that each politician is able to extract rents for his family worth between one fourth and one full private sector job per year. The effect of nepotism is long lasting, extending well beyond the period in office. Consistent with the view that this is a technology of rent appropriation on the part of politicians, the effect increases with politicians' clout and with the resources available in the administration where they serve. |
| Keywords: | Nepotism, family connections, politics, rent appropriation |
| JEL: | D72 D73 H72 J24 J30 M51 |
| Date: | 2016–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9841&r=soc |
| By: | Banerjee, Ritwik (Indian Institute of Management) |
| Abstract: | The paper studies the link between corruption and social capital (measured as trust), using data from a lab experiment. Subjects play either a harassment bribery game or a strategically identical but differently framed ultimatum game, followed by a trust game. In a second experiment, we elicit social appropriateness norm of actions in the bribery game and the ultimatum game treatments. Our experimental design allows us to examine whether subjects, who have been asked to pay a bribe, are less likely to trust than those in an isomorphic role in the ultimatum game. We also uncover the underlying mechanism behind any such behavioral spillover. Results suggest that a) there is a negative spillover effect of corruption on trust and the effect increases with decrease in social appropriateness norm of the bribe demand; b) lower trust in the bribery game treatment is explained by lower expected return on trust; c) surprisingly, for both the bribery and the ultimatum game treatments, social appropriateness norm violation engenders the decay in trust through its adverse effect on belief about trustworthiness. |
| Keywords: | corruption, social capital, social norm, trust games |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D03 |
| Date: | 2016–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp9859&r=soc |