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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
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Issue of 2015‒09‒11
six papers chosen by Fabio Sabatini Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza” |
| By: | Gabriel Burdin (Universidad de la República (Uruguay). Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y de Administración. Instituto de Economía); Simon Halliday (Smith College (United States). Department of Economics); Fabio Landini (Bocconi University (Italy). Department of Political Science) |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the role of autonomy and reciprocity in explaining control averse responses in principal-agents interactions. While most of the social psychology literature emphasizes the role of autonomy, recent economic research has provided an alternative explanation based on reciprocity. We propose a simple model and an experiment to test the relative strength of these two motives. We compare two treatments: one in which control is exerted directly by the principal (second-party control); and the other in which it is exerted by a third party enjoying no residual claimancy rights (third-party control). If control aversion is driven mainly by autonomy, then it should persist in the third-party treatment. Our results, however, suggest that this is not the case. Moreover, when a third party instead of the principal exerts control, control results in a greater expected profit for the principal. The implications of these results for organizational design are discussed. |
| Keywords: | third-party, second-party, control aversion, autonomy, principal-agent game, social preferences, trust, reciprocity |
| JEL: | C72 C91 D23 M54 |
| Date: | 2015–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ulr:wpaper:dt-12-15&r=all |
| By: | George Marbuah (Department of Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences); Ing-Marie Gren (Department of Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences) |
| Abstract: | This paper addresses the issue of whether or not social capital explains per capita CO2 emissions dynamics in Swedish counties in an augmented environmental Kuznets curve framework. By accounting for issues of endogeneity in the presence of dynamic and spatial effects using geo-referenced emissions data, we show that per capita carbon emissions in a county matters for other counties and that net of economic, demographic and environmental factors, social capital has the potential to reduce carbon emissions in Sweden albeit less robustly. We test two different social capital constructs; trust in government and environmental engagement. Specifically, trust in the government inures to the reduction in CO2 emissions. Membership and engagement in environmental organisations reduces CO2 emissions only through its interaction with per capita income or trust. The implication of our estimates suggest that investment geared toward increasing the stock of social capital could inure to re ductions in CO2 emissions in addition to climate policy instruments in Sweden. |
| Keywords: | Environmental Kuznets curve, Social capital, CO2 emissions, Spatial panel analysis, Sweden |
| JEL: | C23 Q53 Q56 Z13 |
| Date: | 2015–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:fae:wpaper:2015.14&r=all |
| By: | François Cochard (CRESE EA3190, Univ. Bourgogne Franche-Comté); Hélène Couprie (Université de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA); Astrid Hopfensitz (Toulouse School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | Female specialization on household work and male specialization on labor-market work is a widely observed phenomenon across time and countries. Gender differences regarding characteristics (preferences, productivity) and context (wage rates, social norms) are generally recognized to explain this fact. We experimentally investigate work division by true co-habiting couples participating in a newly developed specialization task. Efficiency in this task comes at the cost of inequality, giving higher earnings to the “advantaged” player. We compare behavior when men (or women) are in the advantaged position, which correspond to the traditional (or power) couple case where he (or she) earns more. We show that women do not contribute more than men to the household public good whatever the situation. This result allows us to rule-out some of the standard explanations of the work division puzzle. |
| Keywords: | Experiment on couples, Time allocation, Work division |
| JEL: | D13 C99 J16 |
| Date: | 2015–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:crb:wpaper:2015-08&r=all |
| By: | Boris van Leeuwen (Toulouse School of Economics); Abhijit Ramalingam (University of East Anglia); David Rojo Arjona (University of Leicester); Arthur Schram (Amsterdam School of Economics) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the effects of power on cooperation in repeated social dilemma settings. Groups of five players play either multi-player trust games or VCM-games on a fixed network. Power stems from having the authority to allocate funds raised through voluntary contributions by all members and/or from having a pivotal position in the network (centrality). We compare environments with and without ostracism by allowing players in some treatments to exclude others from further participation in the network. Our results show that power matters but that its effects hinge strongly on the type involved. Reminiscent of the literature on leadership, players with authority often act more cooperatively than those without such power. Nevertheless, when possible, they are quickly ostracized from the group. Thus, this kind of power is not tolerated by the powerless. In stark contrast, centrality leads to less cooperative behavior and this free riding is not punished; conditional on cooperativeness, players with power from centrality are less likely to be ostracized than those without. Hence, not only is this type of power tolerated, but so is the free riding it leads to. |
| Keywords: | power, cooperation, networks, public goods |
| JEL: | C91 D02 D03 H41 |
| Date: | 2015–03–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:wcbess:15-04&r=all |
| By: | David Hugh-Jones (University of East Anglia); Carlo Perroni (University of Warwick) |
| Abstract: | We examine why heterogenous communities may fail to provide public goods. Current work characterizes sanctioning free-riders as an under-supplied public good. We argue that often free-riders can be punished by the coordinated action of a group. This punishment can be profitable, and need not be undersupplied. But the power to expropriate defectors can also be used to expropriate outgroups. Heterogenous societies may be inefficient because minorities, rather than free-riders, are expropriated. Even if this is not so, groups’ different beliefs about the reasons for expropriation may make the threat of punishment less effective at preventing free-riding. We illustrate our theory with evidence from California mining camps, contemporary India, and US schools. In a public goods experiment using minimal groups and a profitable punishment institution, outgroups were more likely to be punished, and reacted differently to punishment than in group members. |
| Keywords: | group coercion, social heterogeneity |
| JEL: | H1 H4 N4 D02 |
| Date: | 2015–04–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:wcbess:15-08&r=all |
| By: | Subhasish M. Chowdhury (University of East Anglia); Joo Young Jeon (University of East Anglia); Abhijit Ramalingam (University of East Anglia) |
| Abstract: | We experimentally investigate the effects of real and minimal identities on group conflict. In turn we provide a direct test of the hypotheses coined by Amartya Sen that the salience of a real identity escalates conflict but that of a mere classification would not do so. In a baseline treatment two groups – one of East Asians, and the other of Caucasians – engage in a group contest, but the information on racial composition is not revealed. In the minimal identity treatment each group is arbitrarily given a different color code, whereas in the real identity treatment the race information is revealed. Supporting Sen’s hypotheses, we find that compared to the baseline, free-riding declines and conflict effort increases in the real identity treatment but not in the minimal identity treatment. Moreover, this occurs due to an increase in efforts in the real identity treatment by females in both racial groups, but not by a particular racial group. |
| Keywords: | conflict, identity, race, gender |
| JEL: | C91 C92 D03 D74 J15 J16 |
| Date: | 2015–05–25 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:uea:wcbess:15-09&r=all |