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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
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Issue of 2015‒06‒20
ten papers chosen by Fabio Sabatini Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza” |
| By: | Youjin Hahn; Asadul Islam; Eleonora Patacchini; Yves Zenou |
| Abstract: | We study the relationship between network centrality and educational outcomes using a field experiment in primary schools in Bangladesh. After obtaining information on friendship networks, we randomly allocate students into groups and give them individual and group assignments. We find that the groups that perform the best are those whose members have high Katz-Bonacich and key-player centralities. Leaders are mostly responsible for this effect, while bad apples have little influence. Group members’ network centrality is also important in shaping individual performance. We show that network centrality captures non-cognitive skills, especially patience and competitiveness. |
| Keywords: | Network centrality, team work, leaders, soft skills |
| JEL: | A14 C93 D01 I20 |
| Date: | 2015–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mos:moswps:2015-35&r=soc |
| By: | Seo-Young Cho (University of Marburg) |
| Abstract: | Fairness can be an important factor that promotes social trust among people. In this paper, I investigate empirically whether fairness between men and women increases social trust. Using the data of the World Value Survey from 91 countries, I find that gender discriminatory values negatively affect the trust level of both men and women, while actual conditions on gender equality, measured by labor and educational attainments and political participation, are not a significant determinant of social trust. Furthermore, fairness towards women is an important factor of social trust in countries where gender equality is relatively high, but the effect of the fairness is minimal in countries where there is a greater disparity in equality between the genders. Contrary to the expectation, the effect of gender equality is larger for men than women in more equal societies – a finding that calls for a closer look in a future study. |
| Keywords: | trust; gender equality; fairness; value survey |
| JEL: | I30 J15 J16 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:mar:magkse:201508&r=soc |
| By: | Tor Eriksson (Department of Economics and Business, Aarhus School of Business and Social Sciences, Aarhus University. Fuglesangs Allé 4, 8210 Aarhus V, Denmark); Lei Mao (School of Insurance, Central University of Finance and Economics, Beijing, China) |
| Abstract: | Are people willing to sacrifice resources to save one’s and others’ face? In a laboratory experiment, we study whether individuals forego resources to avoid the public exposure of the least performer in their group. We show that a majority of individuals are willing to pay to preserve not only their self- but also other group members’ image. This behavior is frequent even in the absence of group identity. When group identity is more salient, individuals help regardless of whether the least performer is an in-group or an out-group. This suggests that saving others’ face is a strong social norm. |
| Keywords: | Saving face, social image, pro-social behavior, group identity, experiment |
| JEL: | C92 D03 M52 Z13 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:gat:wpaper:1515&r=soc |
| By: | Fiorillo, D.;; Nappo, N.; |
| Abstract: | The paper assesses the causal relationship between formal volunteering and individual health. The econometric analysis employs data provided by the Income and Living Conditions Survey for the United Kingdom carried out by the European Union’s Statistics (UK-SILC) in 2006. Based on 2SLS, treatment effect and recursive bivariate probit models, and religious participation as instrument variable, and controlling for social and cultural capital, our results show a positive and causal relationship between formal volunteering and self-perceived health. |
| Keywords: | individual health; formal volunteering; social capital; instrumental variable; treatment effect model; recursive bivariate probit model; UK; |
| JEL: | C31 C36 D64 I10 I18 Z10 |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:yor:hectdg:15/06&r=soc |
| By: | Giovanna D'Adda (Department of Management, Economics and Industrial Organization (DIG), Politecnico di Milano); Michalis Drouvelis (Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.); Daniele Nosenzo (Department of Economics, University of Nottingham.) |
| Abstract: | We investigate norms of corruption using the norm-elicitation procedure introduced by Krupka and Weber (2013). We use a within-subject design whereby the norms are elicited from the same subjects who are observed making choices in a bribery game. We test whether the order in which the norm-elicitation task and the bribery game are conducted affects elicited norms and behavior. We find little evidence of order effects in our experiment. |
| Keywords: | social norms; norm elicitation; order effects; within-subject design; corruption; bribe game |
| Date: | 2015–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2015-02&r=soc |
| By: | Tegawa, Mihoko; Uchida, Hirotsugu |
| Abstract: | We empirically examine the social effect of management systems. We focus on a particular management practice employed in self-governed coastal fisheries in Japan—revenue sharing arrangement. We hypothesize that management systems affect cooperative relationships and information network in a community; broadly termed as social capital. We quantified social capital using controlled economic experiments with fisherman subjects as well as surveys. Using wild cluster bootstrap for small sample inference, we find evidence of the positive effect of revenue sharing on information network possibly because revenue sharing arrangement provides disincentives to compete and accompanies synchronized collective fishing operation. Interestingly, revenue sharing fishers are no more likely to cooperate unconditionally (i.e., unilaterally) and furthermore they are less likely to cooperate conditionally (i.e., only if others cooperate). |
| Keywords: | social capital, information network, cooperation, partnership, fishery cooperatives |
| JEL: | Q22 Z13 |
| Date: | 2015–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:64996&r=soc |
| By: | Laure Kuhfuss (Department of Geography and Sustainable Development, University of St. Andrews); Raphaële Préget (INRA, UMR 1135 LAMETA, F-34000 Montpellier, France); Sophie Thoye (Montpellier SupAgro, UMR 1135 LAMETA, F-34000 Montpellier, France); Nick Hanley (Department of Geography and Sustainable Development, University of St. Andrews); Philippe Le Coent (Université Montpellier 1, UMR 5474 LAMETA, F-34000 Montpellier, France); Mathieu Désolé (Montpellier SupAgro, UMR 1135 LAMETA, F-34000 Montpellier, France) |
| Abstract: | The permanence of land management practices adopted under Agri-environmental schemes (AES) is often questioned. This paper investigates the drivers of farmers’ decision to maintain or not the adopted practices beyond the duration of the contract, and especially the effect of social norms and framing on this decision. Our results, based on the stated intentions of 395 farmers, show that pecuniary but also non-pecuniary motivations drive farmers’ decision, which is significantly influenced by information about the social norm. These results lead to recommendations for “nudging” farmers, by conveying information to them on other farmers’ decisions concerning pro-environmental land management practices. |
| Keywords: | Agri-environmental schemes, Permanence, Framing, Social norms |
| JEL: | Q18 Q28 |
| Date: | 2015–05 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sss:wpaper:2015-15&r=soc |
| By: | Englmaier, Florian; Kolaska, Thomas; Leider, Stephen |
| Abstract: | Recent laboratory evidence suggests that personality traits, in particular social preferences, may affect contractual outcomes under moral hazard. Using the British Workplace Employment Relations Survey 2004 we find that behaviour of employers and employees is consistent with the presence of gift-exchange motives: firms that screen applicants for personality are less likely to pay low wages and more likely to provide (non-pecuniary) benefits. Firms likewise benefit from employee screening as they can implement more team-working and are generally more successful. Other human resource management practices only poorly predict these patterns. Moreover, there is no association between dismissals and personality tests, indicating that personality tests do not merely improve the fit between applicant and employer. Hence, we conclude that motivation based on gift-exchange motives is a plausible explanation for our results. |
| Keywords: | Reciprocity; Organisational Structure; Employee Compensation |
| JEL: | D22 M52 |
| Date: | 2015–03–17 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trf:wpaper:504&r=soc |
| By: | Simplice A. Asongu (African Governance and Development Institute,Yaoundé, Cameroon); Rangan Gupta (Department of Economics, University of Pretoria) |
| Abstract: | The transition from Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has substantially shifted the policy debate from growth to inclusive growth. In this short note, we revisit the trust-growth nexus by exploiting a dataset on quality of growth (QG), recently made available to the scientific community. The empirical evidence is based on interactive contemporary and non-contemporary quantile regressions. Inequality and human development modifying variables are used as additional controls. The findings broadly support the positive role of trust in QG. In addition, relatively high thresholds of inequality are needed to change this positive trust-QG nexus in some distributions. |
| Keywords: | Trust, Inclusive Growth, Conditional Effects |
| JEL: | A13 I30 O40 Z13 |
| Date: | 2015–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pre:wpaper:201541&r=soc |
| By: | Daniele Nosenzo (Department of Economics, University of Nottingham.); Fabio Tufano (Department of Economics, University of Nottingham.) |
| Abstract: | We study the effects of voluntary participation on public good provision. Voluntary participation may foster cooperation through two mechanisms: an entry mechanism, which leads to assortative selection of interaction partners, or an exit mechanism, whereby the opportunity to leave the partnership can be used as a means to resist exploitation by free-riders. We examine the relative effectiveness of these two mechanisms in a one-shot, two-person public goods game experiment. We find that voluntary participation has a positive effect on public good provision through the exit mechanism, but we do not find evidence of a positive effect of entry. Assortative selection of interaction partners seems to play a minor role in our setting, whereas the threat of costly exit is a powerful force to discipline free-riding. |
| Keywords: | public goods; cooperation; voluntary participation; exit; entry; experiment |
| Date: | 2015–04 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:not:notcdx:2015-04&r=soc |