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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
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Issue of 2015‒03‒05
ten papers chosen by Fabio Sabatini Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza” |
| By: | Sabatini, Fabio; Sarracino, Francesco |
| Abstract: | We explore how participation in social networking sites (SNS) such as Facebook and Twitter affects the most economically relevant aspect of social capital, trust. We use measures of trust in strangers (or social trust), trust in neighbours and trust in the police. We address endogeneity in the use of SNS by exploiting the variation in the availability of broadband for high-speed Internet, which relates to technological characteristics of the pre-existing voice telecommunication infrastructures. We find that all the proxies of trust significantly decrease with participation in online networks. We discuss several interpretations of the results in light of the specific features of Internet-mediated social interaction. |
| Keywords: | Internet; broadband; online networks; social networking sites; Facebook; trust; social capital; hate speech |
| JEL: | D89 O33 Z1 Z13 Z19 |
| Date: | 2015–03–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:62506&r=soc |
| By: | Desmet, Klaus; Ortuño-Ortín, Ignacio; Wacziarg, Romain |
| Abstract: | We investigate the empirical relationship between ethnicity and culture, defined as a vector of traits reflecting norms, attitudes and preferences. Using surveys of individual values in 76 countries, we find that ethnic identity is a significant predictor of cultural values, yet that within-group variation in culture trumps between-group variation. Thus, in contrast to a commonly held view, ethnic and cultural diversity are unrelated. We explore the correlates of cultural diversity and of the overlap between culture and ethnicity, finding that the level of economic development is positively associated with cultural diversity and negatively associated with the overlap between culture and ethnicity. Finally, although only a small portion of a country's overall cultural heterogeneity occurs between groups, this does not imply that cultural differences between groups are irrelevant. Indeed, we find that civil conflict becomes more likely when there is greater overlap between ethnicity and culture. |
| Keywords: | between-group diversity; civil conflict; cultural fractionalization; cultural traits; culture; ethnicity; heterogeneity; identity; social norms; within-group diversity |
| JEL: | D74 J15 P48 Z10 |
| Date: | 2015–03 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10451&r=soc |
| By: | Luigi Guiso; Paola Sapienza; Luigi Zingales |
| Abstract: | While both cultural and legal norms (institutions) help foster cooperation, culture is the more primitive of the two and itself sustains formal institutions. Cultural changes are rarer and slower than changes in legal institutions, which makes it difficult to identify the role played by culture. Cultural changes and their effects are easier to identify in simpler, more controlled, environments, such as corporations. Corporate culture, thus, is not only interesting per se, but also as a laboratory to study the role of societal culture and the way it can be changed. |
| JEL: | K4 Z1 |
| Date: | 2015–02 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20967&r=soc |
| By: | Ferrante, Francesco; Ruiu, Gabiele |
| Abstract: | Although there is still no consensus on the causes of large differences in income per capita across countries, a growing literature considers culturally-based beliefs and institutions as main drivers of the latter differences (Guiso et al. 2006; Tabellini 2010). The intuition is that institutions and beliefs affect the incentive to accumulate human and physical capital. Other strands of literature stress that the supply of entrepreneurship is a fundamental ingredient of economic growth and job creation. In this paper, we argue that the two views should be reconciled on the basis of the following arguments: a) occupational choices and the decision to accumulate human capital are affected by cultural and institutional factors; b) occupational choices are the main tool to allocate human capital within societies; c) entrepreneurs govern the allocation of resources in the economy, including the human resources. Confirming our hypothesis, our empirical analysis show that cultural factors matter and fatalism exerts a particularly negative effect on opportunity perception and on opportunity driven entrepreneurship. For what regards institutional variables, three interesting and somehow non conventional results emerge from the analysis. First, low start-up cost are particular favorable for necessity driven entrepreneurship but not for the opportunity driven ones. Second, labor market flexibility yields a lower probability of being an entrepreneur and this results holds for both necessity and opportunity driven entrepreneurs. Third, the more burdensome the administrative requirement (permits, regulations, reporting) in entrepreneurial activity, the lower the probability of being an opportunity driven entrepreneur. On the whole, our results yield some policy relevant implications: a) culturally-based beliefs matter for entrepreneurship and fatalism is more important than trust in others; b) education can affect people’s fatalism; c) entrepreneurial education can be an important tool for fostering good quality entrepreneurship, i.e. opportunity driven entrepreneurship; c) institutions matter for entrepreneurship and growth but, somehow, in unconventional ways. |
| Keywords: | entrepreneurship, culture, fatalism, institutions |
| JEL: | E02 O43 L26 D83 M13 J20 |
| Date: | 2014 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:41915&r=soc |
| By: | Spada,Paolo; Mellon,Jonathan; Peixoto,Tiago Carneiro; Sjoberg,Fredrik Matias |
| Abstract: | Does online voting mobilize citizens who otherwise would not participate? During the annual participatory budgeting vote in the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul in Brazil -- the world's largest -- Internet voters were asked whether they would have participated had there not been an online voting option (i-voting). The study documents an 8.2 percent increase in total turn-out with the introduction of i-voting. In support of the mobilization hypothesis, unique survey data show that i-voting is mainly used by new participants rather than just for convenience by those who were already mobilized. The study also finds that age, gender, income, education, and social media usage are significant predictors of being online-only voters. Technology appears more likely to engage people who are younger, male, of higher income and educational attainment, and more frequent social media users. |
| Keywords: | Technology Industry,Political Systems and Analysis,National Governance,ICT Policy and Strategies,Parliamentary Government |
| Date: | 2015–02–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:7204&r=soc |
| By: | Brice Corgnet (Economic Science Institute, Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University); Antonio M. Espín (Economics Department, Middlesex University Business School and Granada Lab of Behavioral Economics (GLoBE), Universidad de Granada); Roberto Hernán-González (Granada Lab of Behavioral Economics (GLoBE), Universidad de Granada and Business School, University of Nottingham) |
| Abstract: | Even though human social behavior has received considerable scientific attention in the last decades, its cognitive underpinnings are still poorly understood. Applying a dual-process framework to the study of social preferences, we show in two studies that individuals with a more reflective/deliberative cognitive style, as measured by scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), are more likely to make choices consistent with “mild” altruism in simple non-strategic decisions. Such choices increase social welfare by increasing the other person’s payoff at very low or no cost for the individual. The choices of less reflective individuals (i.e. those who rely more heavily on intuition), on the other hand, are more likely to be associated with either egalitarian or spiteful motives. We also identify a negative link between reflection and choices characterized by “strong” altruism, but this result holds only in Study 2. Moreover, we provide evidence that the relationship between social preferences and CRT scores is not driven by general intelligence. We discuss how our results can reconcile some previous conflicting findings on the cognitive basis of social behavior. |
| Keywords: | dual-process; reflection; intuition; social preferences; altruism; spitefulness; prosocial behavior;antisocial behavior; inequality aversion |
| JEL: | C91 D03 D87 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:chu:wpaper:15-04&r=soc |
| By: | Atabati, Omid; Farzad, Babak |
| Abstract: | We study the dynamics of a game-theoretic network formation model that yields large-scale small-world networks. So far, mostly stochastic frameworks have been utilized to explain the emergence of these networks. On the other hand, it is natural to seek for game-theoretic network formation models in which links are formed due to strategic behaviors of individuals, rather than based on probabilities. Inspired by Even-Dar and Kearns' model [8], we consider a more realistic framework in which the cost of establishing each link is dynamically determined during the course of the game. Moreover, players are allowed to put transfer payments on the formation and maintenance of links. Also, they must pay a maintenance cost to sustain their direct links during the game. We show that there is a small diameter of at most 4 in the general set of equilibrium networks in our model. We achieved an economic mechanism and its dynamic process for individuals which firstly; unlike the earlier model, the outcomes of players' interactions or the equilibrium networks are guaranteed to exist. Furthermore, these networks coincide with the outcome of pairwise Nash equilibrium in network formation. Secondly; it generates large-scale networks that have a rational and strategic microfoundation and demonstrate the main characterization of small degree of separation in real-life social networks. Furthermore, we provide a network formation simulation that generates small-world networks. |
| Keywords: | network formation; linking game with transfer payments; pairwise stability; pairwise Nash equilibrium; small-world phenomenon |
| JEL: | C79 D85 |
| Date: | 2014–11–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:62529&r=soc |
| By: | Kamei, Kenju |
| Abstract: | A rich body of literature has proposed that pairs behave significantly differently from individuals due to a number of reasons such as group polarization. This paper experimentally compares cooperation behaviors between pairs and individuals in a finitely-repeated two-player public goods game (continuous prisoner’s dilemma game). We show that pairs contribute significantly more than individuals to their group accounts. Especially, when two pairs are matched with each other for the entire periods, they successfully build long-lasting cooperative relationships with their matched pairs. Our detailed analyses suggest that the enhanced cooperation behavior of pairs may be driven by (a) the mere fact that they have partners when they make decisions, (b) group polarization – those who initially prefer to contribute smaller amounts are more affected by the partners in their pairs, and (c) stronger conditional cooperation behavior of pairs to their matched pairs. |
| Keywords: | experiment, cooperation, dilemma, team work, public goods |
| JEL: | C91 C92 |
| Date: | 2015–02–26 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:62438&r=soc |
| By: | José María Durán-Cabré (Universidad de Barcelona & IEB); Alejandro Esteller-Moré (Universidad de Barcelona & IEB); Luca Salvadori (Universidad de Barcelona & IEB, TARC) |
| Abstract: | The literature on horizontal tax interdependence pays limited attention to interactions in administrative policies, although they can play a large role in determining the amount of tax revenues collected. We investigate the incentives for sub-central tax authority cooperation in a decentralized context, with the aim of identifying the determinants of that cooperation. Our results are congruent with standard theory; in particular, the existence of reciprocity is essential for sharing tax information, but there is sluggishness in this process, which is partly the result of the short-sighted behaviour of tax authorities influenced by budget constraints. Hence, this is good news for the functioning of a decentralized tax administration, as in the medium-long run the gains to be made from sharing tax information are achieved. |
| Keywords: | Tax information sharing, reciprocity, fiscal federalism |
| JEL: | H71 H77 H83 |
| Date: | 2015 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2013/6/doc2015-7&r=soc |
| By: | Brañas-Garza, Pablo; Coulson, Mark; Kernohan, David; Oyediran, Olusegun; Rivas, M. Fernanda |
| Abstract: | This study examined latent racial prejudice towards specified out-groups among 152 Spanish college students in a two-stage research strategy using a public goods game. When asked how generous various out-groups are, Asian, and Western groups were perceived as more generous than the in-group, whereas African and Latin American groups were perceived as less generous. When participants were incentivized, with payoff contingent on the accuracy of guesses, and accuracy quantified as performance of the relevant groups in a similar task to the one employed here, participants evidenced prejudice against African and Latin American groups, and towards Asian and Western groups. Models of racial beliefs were fitted for the four groups, however we do not find satisfactory explanations for why questionnaire response and lab behaviour did not match. Implications of the use of behavioural economic games in prejudice research are discussed. |
| Keywords: | Beliefs; Prejudice; Public Goods Game |
| JEL: | C91 H41 J15 |
| Date: | 2014–05–13 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:62377&r=soc |