nep-soc New Economics Papers
on Social Norms and Social Capital
Issue of 2014‒07‒21
ten papers chosen by
Fabio Sabatini
La Sapienza University of Rome

  1. Growth Strategy with Social Capital and Physical Capital- Theory and Evidence: the Case of Vietnam By Cuong Le Van; Anh Ngoc Nguyen; Ngoc-Minh Nguyen
  2. Trust and Happiness: Comparative Study Before and After the Great East Japan Earthquake By Eiji Yamamura; Yoshiro Tsutsui; Chisako Yamane; Shoko Yamane; Nattavudh Powdthavee
  3. Inherited social capital and residential mobility: A study using Japan panel data. By Eiji Yamamura; Yoshiro Tsutsui; Chisako Yamane; Shoko Yamane
  4. What Policies Increase Prosocial Behavior? An Experiment with Referees at the Journal of Public Economics By Raj Chetty; Emmanuel Saez; László Sándor
  5. Relational Warm Glow and Giving in Social Groups By Sarah Smith; Kimberley Scharf
  6. Turnout and fractionalization. By Ignacio Lago; Sandra Bermúdez; Marc Guinjoan; Pablo Simón
  7. Culture capital humain et croissance économique By Jellal, Mohamed
  8. Not in my Community: Social Pressure and the Geography of Dismissals By Brunello, Giorgio; Bassanini, Andrea; Caroli, Eve
  9. Commons without Tragedy: Sampling Dynamics and Cooperative Resource Extraction By Juan Camilo Cárdenas; César Mantilla; Rajiv Sethi
  10. Giving and promising gifts: experimental evidence on reciprocity from the field By J. Michelle Brock; Andreas Lange; Kenneth L. Leonard

  1. By: Cuong Le Van (CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - CNRS : UMR8174 - Université Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris, VCREME - VanXuan Center of Research in Economics, Management and Environment - VanXuan Center of Research in Economics, Management and Environment); Anh Ngoc Nguyen (DEPOCEN - Development and Policies Research Center); Ngoc-Minh Nguyen (DEPOCEN - Development and Policies Research Center)
    Abstract: We study the impact of social capital in both simple theoretical and empirical model with the main assumption is the price of physical capital is a decreasing function of social capital. In our theoretical model, there exists a critical value such that firm will not invest in social capital if its saving is lower than the critical value and otherwise. Moreover, the output depends positively and non-linearly on the social capital. Our empirical model that captures the impact of physical capital, human capital, and social capital using the database from Survey of Small and Medium Scale Manufacturing Enterprises (SMEs) in Vietnam 2011, confirms the conclusions of the theoretical model.
    Keywords: Social capital; optimal growth
    Date: 2014–02
  2. By: Eiji Yamamura; Yoshiro Tsutsui; Chisako Yamane; Shoko Yamane; Nattavudh Powdthavee
    Abstract: The positive relationship between trust and happiness has been demonstrated by the literature. However, it is not clear how much this relationship depends on environmental conditions. The Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011 is considered one of the most catastrophic events in human history. This disaster caused not only physical damage for Japanese people, but also perceived damage. Using individual-level panel data from Japan covering the period 2009-2012, this paper attempts to probe how the relationship between trust and happiness was influenced by the Great East Japan Earthquake by comparing the same individuals before and after the earthquake. A fixed-effects estimation showed that there is a statistically well-determined positive relationship between trust and happiness and this relationship was strengthened by disaster, especially for residents in the damaged area. We argue that social trust is a substitute for formal institutions and markets, which mitigates the effect of disaster-related shock on psychological conditions such as happiness. Therefore, a trustful society is invulnerable to a gigantic disaster.
    Date: 2014–07
  3. By: Eiji Yamamura; Yoshiro Tsutsui; Chisako Yamane; Shoko Yamane
    Abstract: Empirical results based on individual-level data from Japan were studied to determine the effect of social capital on the willingness to leave onefs residential area. It was found that social capital accumulated through onefs own experience in a residential area is not the only factor that reduces willingness to leave. Social capital inherited from onefs parents also negatively influences the desire to move..
    Date: 2014–07
  4. By: Raj Chetty; Emmanuel Saez; László Sándor
    Abstract: We evaluate policies to increase prosocial behavior using a field experiment with 1,500 referees at the Journal of Public Economics. We randomly assign referees to four groups: a control group with a six week deadline to submit a referee report, a group with a four week deadline, a cash incentive group rewarded with $100 for meeting the four week deadline, and a social incentive group in which referees were told that their turnaround times would be publicly posted. We obtain four sets of results. First, shorter deadlines reduce the time referees take to submit reports substantially. Second, cash incentives significantly improve speed, especially in the week before the deadline. Cash payments do not crowd out intrinsic motivation: after the cash treatment ends, referees who received cash incentives are no slower than those in the four-week deadline group. Third, social incentives have smaller but significant effects on review times and are especially effective among tenured professors, who are less sensitive to deadlines and cash incentives. Fourth, all the treatments have little or no effect on agreement rates, quality of reports, or review times at other journals. We conclude that small changes in journals’ policies could substantially expedite peer review at little cost. More generally, price incentives, nudges, and social pressure are effective and complementary methods of increasing prosocial behavior.
    JEL: H23 H41
    Date: 2014–07
  5. By: Sarah Smith; Kimberley Scharf
    Abstract: We study charitable giving within social groups. Exploiting a unique dataset, we establish three key relationships between social group size and fundraising outcomes: (i) a positive relationship between group size and the total number of donations; (ii) a negative relationship between group size and the amount given by each donor; (iii) no relationship between group size and the total amount raised by the fundraiser. We rule out classic free-riding to explain these relationships since the number of social group members is only a subset of total contributors. Instead, the findings are consistent with the notion that giving in social groups is motivated by “relational” warm glow.
    Keywords: Online giving; Fundraising; Social groups; Donations; Charity; Warm glow
    JEL: D64 Z1 H31
    Date: 2014–06
  6. By: Ignacio Lago; Sandra Bermúdez; Marc Guinjoan; Pablo Simón
    Abstract: The literature has largely shown that social fragmentation is negatively correlated with the quality of government. Surprisingly, fragmentation has been omitted in most influential cross-sectional studies of turnout, and when it has been included evidence is, at best, mixed. Using aggregated data from 22 countries and individual data from Canada and Spain, this article examines the impact of social heterogeneity on turnout. The results show that turnout is inversely related to ethnolinguistic fractionalization, even after controlling for institutional, political and socioeconomic determinants. However, social fragmentation only affects the behavior of those individuals who lack a strong internal motivation to vote.
    Keywords: Fractionalization, Turnout, Heterogeneity, Civic Duty, Social Capital.
    JEL: Y80 Z18
    Date: 2014–07
  7. By: Jellal, Mohamed
    Abstract: In this paper , we consider an economic growth model with human capital accumulation , positive externalities and a cultural system of social norms . We show that endogenous rational emergence of this cultural belief may lead to increasing the stock of human capital and hence accelerating national growth.The mechanism of this internalization is based on the existence of endogenous social status or identity pattern that encourages the accumulation of knowledge. This cultural norm is presented as an informal mechanism or informal institution which may be an effective substitute tool to a the formal institution given by a system of income taxation.
    Keywords: Culture, Social Norms, Education, Economic Growth, Formal institutions
    JEL: H23 I21 I25 O1 O43 Z1
    Date: 2014–06–11
  8. By: Brunello, Giorgio; Bassanini, Andrea; Caroli, Eve
    Abstract: There is growing evidence that social pressure shapes firms' behavior. Given how sensitive communities are to downsizing, this suggests that firms are likely to be under strong social pressure when considering reducing employment. Using French linked employer-employee data, we show that social pressure induces firms to refrain from dismissing at short distance from their headquarters. More specifically, we find that, within firms, secondary establishments located further away from headquarters have higher dismissal rates than those located closer, taking into account the possible endogeneity of plant location. We also find that the positive effect of distance on dismissals increases with the visibility of the firm in the local community of its headquarters. This effect is also stronger the greater the degree of selfishness of the community in which the headquarters are located. This suggests that local social pressure at headquarters is a key determinant of the positive relationship between distance to headquarters and dismissals. We show that our results cannot be entirely accounted for by alternative explanations of the distance-dismissal relationship that are put forward in the literature.
    Keywords: Personnel Management; Labor Demand; employment policies; social pressure;
    JEL: M12 M51 J23 J63 R12
    Date: 2014–06
  9. By: Juan Camilo Cárdenas; César Mantilla; Rajiv Sethi
    Abstract: This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a dynamic model of sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data: monotonic frequency distributions, the persistent use of strictly dominated actions, and stable heterogeneity in choices. We argue that these patterns cannot be fully accounted for by existing theories based on other-regarding preferences and norms, and that the dynamics of sampling provide a useful complementary explanation for behavior in social dilemmas.
    Keywords: Common Pool Resources; Experiments; Sampling Equilibrium
    JEL: C73 C91 D03 H41 Q20
    Date: 2013–09–10
  10. By: J. Michelle Brock (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development); Andreas Lange (University of Hamburg, Department of Economics); Kenneth L. Leonard (University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics)
    Abstract: In this study, we consider how gift-exchange and bonus systems function in a natural field setting by measuring the effort response of participants to non-monetary gifts over time. Our field experiment tests the difference in effort response to unconditional gifts delivered immediately, promised unconditional gifts delivered later, and conditional gifts linked to reaching a specific performance target. We find important benefits from promising to give an unconditional gift later: participants respond positively to a promised gift twice by increasing effort when the gift is promised and again when it is received. A promised gift outperforms both the unconditional gift delivered immediately, which leads to a single positive response, and the conditional gift based on performance, which does not trigger any significant behavioural change after the gift is delivered. The study lends insights into the relative effectiveness of gift-exchange and bonus systems and the temporal structure of reciprocal exchange.
    Keywords: gift exchange, reciprocity, health care, field experiment, Tanzania
    JEL: C93 I1 J41 O1
    Date: 2014–01

This nep-soc issue is ©2014 by Fabio Sabatini. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
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