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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
By: | Tomassi, Federico |
Abstract: | In city districts in Rome, social and economic inequalities between centre and peripheral belts have been increasing over the last years, in parallel to the on-going suburban sprawl. Electoral data from 2000 to 2013 highlight sharp political polarization too. Votes for left-wing (right-wing) candidates are directly (inversely) proportional to proximity to Capitoline Hill. Left-wing coalition prevails where social centrality exists, that is in dense districts with widespread social relationships and many public or collective places. Conversely, right-wing parties prevail in far-off sprawled areas, with less opportunities to meet each other, where production and consumption of relational goods are less likely. Since such goods – according to scholars of civil economics – foster individual well-being and local development, they also affect political choices, challenging the so-called traditional ‘red belt’ in working-class districts until the 1980s. |
Keywords: | City planning; commons; elections; Italy; relational goods; social capital |
JEL: | H41 R14 Z13 |
Date: | 2014–05–30 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:56227&r=soc |
By: | Semih Akçomak (TEKPOL, Science and Technology Policy Studies, Middle East Technical University); Hanna Müller-Zick (Maastricht University) |
Abstract: | This paper investigates the effect of trust on innovation. In addition to generalised trust we use a range of other indicators that could measure trust and investigate which trust related variables could explain innovation in 20 European countries divided into 135 regions. We specifically look at causal, non-linear and spatial forces. Our findings indicate that only generalised trust and non-egoistic fairness have robust effects on innovation in Europe. Using historical data on the extent and existence of universities and an instrumental variable strategy we set up a causal relationship between trust and innovation. Even after controlling for causal, spatial and non-linear forces there is a significant direct impact of trust on innovation. |
Keywords: | trust, social capital, innovation, EU |
Date: | 2013–12 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:met:stpswp:1304&r=soc |
By: | Francesco Giavazzi; Ivan Petkov; Fabio Schiantarelli |
Abstract: | This paper presents evidence on the speed of evolution (or lack thereof) of a wide range of values and beliefs of different generations of European immigrants to the US. The main result is that persistence differs greatly across cultural attitudes. Some, for instance deep personal religious values, some family and moral values, and political orientation converge very slowly to the prevailing US norm. Other, such as attitudes toward cooperation, redistribution, effort, children's independence, premarital sex, and even the frequency of religious practice or the intensity of association with one's religion, converge rather quickly. The results obtained studying higher generation immigrants differ greatly from those found when the analysis is limited to the second generation, as typically done in the literature, and they imply a lesser degree of persistence than previously thought. Finally, we show that persistence is "culture specific" in the sense that the country from which one's ancestors came matters for the pattern of generational convergence. |
JEL: | A13 F22 J00 J61 Z1 |
Date: | 2014–05 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20174&r=soc |
By: | Maria Porter |
Abstract: | This paper examines the motivation for intergenerational transfers between adult children and their parents, and the nature of preferences for such giving behaviour, in an experimental setting.� Participants in our experiment play a series of dictator games with parents and strangers, in which we vary endowments and prices for giving to each recipient.� We find that preferences for giving are typically rational.� When parents are recipients as opposed to strangers, participants display greater sensitivity to the price of giving, and a higher relative proclivity for giving.� Our findings also provide evidence of reciprocal motivations for giving, as players give more to parents who have full information regarding the context in which giving occurs. |
Keywords: | transfer motives, intergenerational, dictator games, lab experiments, altruism, reciprocity |
JEL: | C91 D12 D64 |
Date: | 2014–05–29 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:oxf:wpaper:709&r=soc |
By: | Catherine C. Eckel; David Herberich; Jonathan Meer |
Abstract: | The use of directed giving - allowing donors to target their gifts to specific organizations or functions - is pervasive in fundraising, yet little is known about its effectiveness. We conduct a field experiment at a public university in which prospective donors are presented with either an opportunity to donate to the unrestricted Annual Fund, or an opportunity of donating to the Annual Fund and directing some or all of their donation towards the academic college from which they graduated. While there is no effect on the probability of giving, donations are significantly larger when there is the option of directing. However, the value of the option does not come directly from use, as very few donors choose to direct their gift. |
JEL: | C93 D64 H41 |
Date: | 2014–05 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20180&r=soc |
By: | Jochen Kluve; Sebastian Schmitz |
Abstract: | Increasing mothers’ labor supply is a key policy challenge in many OECD countries. Germany recently introduced a generous parental benefit that allows for strong consumption smoothing after childbirth and, by taking into account opportunity costs of childbearing, incentivizes working women to become mothers and return to the labor force rapidly. Using a sharp regression discontinuity design, we estimate policy impacts for up to 5 years after childbirth and find significant and striking patterns. First, medium-run effects on mothers’ employment probability are positive, significant and large, for some subgroups ranging up to 10 per cent. The effects are driven by gains in part-time but not full-time employment. We also find significant increases in working hours. Second, the probability of job continuity rises significantly, i.e. mothers return to their pre-childbirth employer at higher rates. Third, employers reward this return to work by raising job quality significantly and substantially. We argue that the policy generated a profound change in social norms: the new parental benefit defines an “anchor”, i.e. a societally preferred point in time at which mothers return to work after childbirth. |
Keywords: | Parental benefits; female labor supply; regression discontinuity |
JEL: | H31 J13 J22 |
Date: | 2014–04 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:rwi:repape:0481&r=soc |
By: | Haoran He (School of Economics and Business Administration - Beijing Normal University / Beijing); Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - École Normale Supérieure (ENS) - Lyon - PRES Université de Lyon - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - Université Claude Bernard - Lyon I (UCBL)) |
Abstract: | We compare inequality aversion in individuals and teams by means of both within- and between-subject experimental designs, and we investigate how teams aggregate individual preferences. We find that team decisions reveal less inequality aversion than individual initial proposals in team decision-making. However, teams are no more selfish than individuals who decide in isolation. Individuals express strategically more inequality aversion in their initial proposals in team decision-making because they anticipate the selfishness of other members. Members with median social preferences drive team decisions. Finally, we show that social image has little influence because guilt and envy are almost similar in anonymous and non-anonymous interactions. |
Keywords: | Team; inequity aversion; preference aggregation; social image; experiment |
Date: | 2014 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00996545&r=soc |
By: | Wibral, Matthias |
Abstract: | Reputation systems aim to induce honest behavior in online trade by providing information about past conduct of users. Online reputation, however, is not directly connected to a person, but only to the virtual identity of that person. Users can therefore shed a negative reputation by creating a new account. We study the effects of such identity changes on the efficiency of reputation systems. We compare two markets in which we exogenously vary whether sellers can erase their rating profile and start over as new sellers. Buyer trust and seller trustworthiness decrease significantly when sellers can erase their ratings. With identity changes, trust is particularly low towards new sellers since buyers cannot discriminate between truly new sellers and opportunistic sellers who changed their identity. Nevertheless, we observe positive returns on buyer investment under the reputation system with identity changes, and our evidence suggests that trustworthiness is higher than in the complete absence of a reputation system. |
Keywords: | trust; reputation; identity changes |
JEL: | C91 D02 L14 |
Date: | 2014 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:trf:wpaper:465&r=soc |
By: | David Dickinson (Department of Economics - Appalachian State University); David Masclet (CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - CNRS : UMR6211 - Université de Rennes 1 - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie); Marie Claire Villeval (GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - CNRS : UMR5824 - Université Lumière - Lyon II - École Normale Supérieure (ENS) - Lyon - PRES Université de Lyon - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Etienne - Université Claude Bernard - Lyon I (UCBL)) |
Abstract: | Do individuals trained in law enforcement punish or reward differently from typical student subjects ? We analyze norm enforcement behavior of newly appointed police commissioners in both a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism game and a Common Pool Resource game. Our experimental design includes treatments where a reward or sanction institution is exogenously imposed, as well as treatments with endogenous selection of the norm enforcement institution. Compared to a standard student-subject pool, police commissioners cooperate significantly more in both games. With exogenous institutions, police commissioners bear a higher burden of punishment costs than non-police subjects. When the norm enforcement institution is endogenous, all subjects vote more in favor of rewards over sanctions, but police subjects with some work experience are more likely to vote for sanctions. Police subjects also reward and sanction more than the others when the institution results from a majority vote. |
Keywords: | Norm enforcement; Common Pool Resources; Voluntary Contribution Mechanism; Police officers; Experiment |
Date: | 2014 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00996511&r=soc |
By: | Alexander L. Brown; Jonathan Meer; J. Forrest Williams |
Abstract: | We conduct a laboratory experiment to examine how third-party ratings impact charity choice and donative behavior, particularly in regards to preferences for local charities. Subjects are given a menu of ten charities, with a mix of local and non-local organizations included. We vary whether third-party ratings are displayed on this menu. Subjects perform an effort task to earn money and can choose to donate to their selected charity. We find evidence that subjects' choice of charity is impacted by third-party evaluations but, somewhat surprisingly, there are no obvious preferences for local charities. These third-party assessments have some impact on the percent of earnings that subjects allocate to their selected charity; local charities also accrue more donations, though these results are somewhat imprecise. |
JEL: | C91 D64 H41 |
Date: | 2014–05 |
URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20182&r=soc |