nep-soc New Economics Papers
on Social Norms and Social Capital
Issue of 2014‒03‒30
nine papers chosen by
Fabio Sabatini
La Sapienza University of Rome

  1. Friendship Network in the Classroom: Parents Bias and Peer Effects By Fabio Landini; Natalia Montinari; Paolo Pin; Marco Piovesan
  2. Democracy Does Cause Growth By Daron Acemoglu; Suresh Naidu; Pascual Restrepo; James A. Robinson
  3. Inputs, Gender Roles or Sharing Norms? Assessing the Gender Performance Gap Among Informal Entrepreneurs in Madagascar By Nordman, Christophe Jalil; Vaillant, Julia
  4. Why pay NGOs to involve the community? By Ronelle Burger; Indraneel Dasgupta; Trudy Owens
  5. How Placing Limitations on the Size of Personal Networks Changes the Structural Properties of Complex Networks By Somayeh Koohborfardhaghighi; Jorn Altmann
  6. On the economics of others By Stark, Oded
  7. On the Interpretation of Giving, Taking, and Destruction in Dictator Games and Joy-of-Destruction Games. By Le Zhang; Andreas Ortmann
  8. The structure of ethnic networks and exports: Evidence from Germany By Behncke, Nadine
  9. Corruption and Informality: Complements or Substitutes? Qualitative Evidence from Barranquilla, Colombia By Mehling, Maxie-Lina; Boehm, Frédéric

  1. By: Fabio Landini (Department of Economics, University of Siena); Natalia Montinari (University of Lund); Paolo Pin (University of Siena); Marco Piovesan (Department of Economics, Copenhagen University)
    Abstract: We interview both parents and their children enrolled in six primary schools in the district of Treviso (Italy). We study the structural differences between the children network of friends reported by children and the one elicited asking their parents. We find that the parents’ network has a bias: parents expect peer effects on school achievement to be stronger than what they really are. Thus, parents of low-performing students report their children to be friends of high-performing students. Our numerical simulations indicate that when this bias is combined with a bias on how some children target friends, then there is a multiplier effect on the expected school achievement.
    Keywords: Social networks, primary school, friendships, parents' bias, homophily, peer effects, bonacich centrality
    JEL: D85 I21 Z13
    Date: 2014–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:kud:kuiedp:1406&r=soc
  2. By: Daron Acemoglu; Suresh Naidu; Pascual Restrepo; James A. Robinson
    Abstract: We provide evidence that democracy has a significant and robust positive effect on GDP. Our empirical strategy relies on a dichotomous measure of democracy coded from several sources to reduce measurement error and controls for country fixed effects and the rich dynamics of GDP, which otherwise confound the effect of democracy on economic growth. Our baseline results use a linear model for GDP dynamics estimated using either a standard within estimator or various different Generalized Method of Moments estimators, and show that democratizations increase GDP per capita by about 20% in the long run. These results are confirmed when we use a semiparametric propensity score matching estimator to control for GDP dynamics. We also obtain similar results using regional waves of democratizations and reversals to instrument for country democracy. Our results suggest that democracy increases future GDP by encouraging investment, increasing schooling, inducing economic reforms, improving public good provision, and reducing social unrest. We find little support for the view that democracy is a constraint on economic growth for less developed economies.
    JEL: O10 P16
    Date: 2014–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:20004&r=soc
  3. By: Nordman, Christophe Jalil (IRD, DIAL, Paris); Vaillant, Julia (World Bank)
    Abstract: We use a representative sample of informal entrepreneurs in Madagascar to add new evidence on the magnitude of the gender performance gap. After controlling for business and entrepreneur characteristics, female-owned businesses exhibit a value added 28 percent lower than their male counterparts. Correcting for endogenous selection into informal self-employment raises the gap by 5 percentage points. We then investigate the role of sharing norms and gender-differentiated allocation of time within the household in the gender performance gap, by estimating their effect on the technical inefficiency of female and male entrepreneurs. Only male entrepreneurs seem subject to pressure to redistribute from the distant network. Our findings are consistent with situations where women working at home would essentially feel negatively the burden of their own community due to intense social norms and obligations in their workplace but also of domestic chores and responsibilities. We find evidence of females self-selecting themselves into industries in which they can combine market-oriented and domestic activities.
    Keywords: gender, entrepreneurship, informal sector, sharing norms, household composition, Madagascar
    JEL: D13 D61 O12 J16
    Date: 2014–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8046&r=soc
  4. By: Ronelle Burger (Department of Economics, University of Stellenbosch); Indraneel Dasgupta (Economic Research Unit, Indian Statistical Institute); Trudy Owens (School of Economics, University of Nottingham)
    Abstract: We examine the case for donors providing financial incentives to NGOs to increase community participation. We show that, when such incentives are provided, there need not exist any meaningful relationship between beneficiary welfare and the extent of community participation implemented by an NGO. Higher community participation is consistent even with reduced beneficiary welfare. Thus, eliminating community participation from the set of conditions for funding an NGO may improve beneficiary welfare. We provide evidence from the NGO sector in Uganda consistent with our theoretical conclusions. Beneficiaries themselves do not appear to perceive community participation as generating appreciable value-addition in project output.
    Keywords: regulation of non-governmental organizations, developing countries, community participation, Uganda
    JEL: I38 L31 L38
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sza:wpaper:wpapers210&r=soc
  5. By: Somayeh Koohborfardhaghighi (College of Engineering, Seoul National University); Jorn Altmann (College of Engineering, Seoul National University)
    Abstract: People-to-people interactions in the real world and in virtual environments (e.g., Facebook) can be represented through complex networks. Changes of the structural properties of these complex networks are caused through a variety of dynamic processes. While accepting the fact that variability in individual patterns of behavior (i.e., establishment of random or FOAF-type potential links) in social environments might lead to an increase or decrease in the structural properties of a complex network, in this paper, we focus on another factor that may contribute to such changes, namely the size of personal networks. Any personal network comes with the cost of maintaining individual connections. Despite the fact that technology has shrunk our world, there is also a limit to how many close friends one can keep and count on. It is a relatively small number. In this paper, we develop a multi-agent based model to capture, compare, and explain the structural changes within a growing social network (e.g., expanding the social relations beyond one's social circles). We aim to show that, in addition to various dynamic processes of human interactions, limitations on the size of personal networks can also lead to changes in the structural properties of networks (i.e., the average shortest-path length). Our simulation result shows that the famous small world theory of interconnectivity holds true or even can be shrunk, if people manage to utilize all their existing connections to reach other parties. In addition to this, it can clearly be observed that the network¡¯s average path length has a significantly smaller value, if the size of personal networks is set to larger values in our network growth model. Therefore, limitations on the size of personal networks in network growth models lead to an increase in the network¡¯s average path length.
    Keywords: Small-World Network, Complex Networks, Average Shortest Path Length, Size of Personal Networks, Network Growth Model.
    JEL: C02 C6 C15 D85
    Date: 2014–01
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:snv:dp2009:2014110&r=soc
  6. By: Stark, Oded
    Abstract: We relate to others in two important ways: we care about others, and we care about how we fare in comparison to others. In some contexts, these two forms of relatedness interact. Caring about others can conveniently be labeled altruism. Caring about how we fare in comparison with others who fare better than ourselves can conveniently be labeled relative deprivation. I provide examples of domains in which the incorporation of altruism and relative deprivation can point to novel perspectives and suggest rethinking, and possibly revising, long-held views. And I show that there are domains in which consideration of relative deprivation can substitute for the prevalence of altruism, and vice versa. I conclude that this is a fascinating sphere for research on economics and social behavior.
    Keywords: Altruism, Relative deprivation, Economic and social behavior, Consumer/Household Economics, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, International Development, D01, D03, D13, D31, D63, D64, F22, F24, J61, O15,
    Date: 2014–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:ags:ubzefd:164965&r=soc
  7. By: Le Zhang (University of New South Wales); Andreas Ortmann (University of New South Wales)
    Abstract: The literature on dictator [D] and joy-of-destruction [JoD] games demonstrates that people can be nice and nasty. We study, by way of an experiment with between-subjects and within-subjects features, to what extent behaviors are context dependent and consistent. We find that, for one-shot D and JoD games, our participants' niceness and nastiness depend on the choice set. Contradicting the observed altruism and nastiness, participants tend to be selfish but nonetheless make choices that increase social welfare when given the opportunity.
    Keywords: Dictator game, Joy-of-Destruction game, Money burning, Altruism, Nastiness, Efficiency considerations, Mach-IV test
    JEL: A13 C79 D03 D64
    Date: 2013–11
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:swe:wpaper:2012-50a&r=soc
  8. By: Behncke, Nadine
    Abstract: This paper provides evidence of the effect of immigration-based networks on German trade. Germany presents a particular interesting case study to examine the effect of ethnic networks on exports due to its high export dependence and its reserved migration policy. According to our results, we find no trade creating effect from migrant networks on exports but on imports, highlighting the importance of the demand effect for Germany. Allowing for heterogeneous network effects shows that at least some migrant networks positively affect exports. However, the most efficient migrant networks do not originate from EU countries but from African or middle-eastern countries that do not have a large migrant network in Germany. --
    Keywords: migrants,networks,gravity
    JEL: F12 F1
    Date: 2014
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:cegedp:198&r=soc
  9. By: Mehling, Maxie-Lina; Boehm, Frédéric
    Abstract: We present results of a qualitative study based on interviews with informal vendors and experts on informality carried out in Barranquilla, Colombia, in order to investigate whether corruption and informality are complements or substitutes. It was found that it is necessary to distinguish between bureaucratic and political corruption when examining the relation with informality, as the results can be opposite. In Barranquilla, bureaucratic corruption and informality seem to be substitutes, while political corruption and informality complement each other.
    Keywords: Corruption, Informality, Colombia
    JEL: K42 O17
    Date: 2014–03
    URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:54817&r=soc

This nep-soc issue is ©2014 by Fabio Sabatini. It is provided as is without any express or implied warranty. It may be freely redistributed in whole or in part for any purpose. If distributed in part, please include this notice.
General information on the NEP project can be found at http://nep.repec.org. For comments please write to the director of NEP, Marco Novarese at <director@nep.repec.org>. Put “NEP” in the subject, otherwise your mail may be rejected.
NEP’s infrastructure is sponsored by the School of Economics and Finance of Massey University in New Zealand.