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on Social Norms and Social Capital |
| By: | Katherine B. Coffman; Lucas C. Coffman; Keith M. Marzilli Ericson |
| Abstract: | Measuring sexual orientation, behavior, and related opinions is difficult because responses are biased towards socially acceptable answers. We test whether measurements are biased even when responses are private and anonymous and use our results to identify sexuality-related norms and how they vary. We run an experiment on 2,516 U.S. participants. Participants were randomly assigned to either a “best practices method” that was computer-based and provides privacy and anonymity, or to a “veiled elicitation method” that further conceals individual responses. Answers in the veiled method preclude inference about any particular individual, but can be used to accurately estimate statistics about the population. Comparing the two methods shows sexuality-related questions receive biased responses even under current best practices, and, for many questions, the bias is substantial. The veiled method increased self-reports of non-heterosexual identity by 65% (p |
| JEL: | C90 D10 J10 |
| Date: | 2013–10 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19508&r=soc |
| By: | Binzel, Christine; Fehr, Dietmar |
| Abstract: | Among residents of an informal housing area in Cairo, we examine how dictator giving varies by the social distance between subjects - friend versus stranger - and by the anonymity of the dictator. While giving to strangers is high under anonymity, we find - consistent with Leider et al. (2009) - that (i) a decrease in social distance increases giving, (ii) giving to a stranger and to a friend is positively correlated, and (iii) more altruistic dictators increase their giving less under non-anonymity than less altruistic dictators. However, friends are not alike in their altruistic preferences, suggesting that an individual's intrinsic preferences may not necessarily be shaped by his (or her) peers. Instead, reciprocal motives seem important, indicating that social relationships may be valued differently when individuals are financially dependent on them. -- |
| Keywords: | giving,reciprocity,social distance,networks, sorting |
| JEL: | C93 D64 L14 O12 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:wzbmbh:spii2013207&r=soc |
| By: | Thierry Pénard (CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - CNRS : UMR6211 - Université de Rennes 1 - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie); Nicolas Poussing (CEPS/INSTEAD - Centre d'Etudes de Populations, de Pauvreté et de Politiques Socio-Economiques / International Networks for Studies in Technology, Environment, Alternatives, Development - Centre d'Etudes de Populations, de Pauvreté et de Politiques Socio-Economiques / International Networks for Studies in Technology, Environment, Alternatives, Development); Raphaël Suire (CREM - Centre de Recherche en Economie et Management - CNRS : UMR6211 - Université de Rennes 1 - Université de Caen Basse-Normandie) |
| Abstract: | Given the increasingly prominent role the Internet plays in people's daily life, understanding its influence on individual well-being is crucial. Internet use yields direct utility and economic returns that may increase life satisfaction. But the Internet might also have detrimental effects (e.g. addiction, social isolation). This paper aims to examine the impact of Internet use on individual well-being. Using Luxemburgish data extracted from the European Value Survey, we find evidence that non users are less satisfied in their life than Internet users. Moreover, the positive influence of Internet use is stronger for individuals who are young or not satisfied with their income. These findings suggest that public policies aiming to reduce the digital divide by reaching out to non-Internet users are socially desirable. |
| Keywords: | Internet; Happiness; Life satisfaction; Digital divide; Social capital |
| Date: | 2013 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-00864314&r=soc |
| By: | Tumen, Semih |
| Abstract: | Estimates on the effect of job contact method -- i.e., informal versus formal search -- on wage offers vary considerably across studies, with some of them finding a positive correlation between getting help from informal connections and obtaining high-paying jobs, while others finding a negative one. In this paper, I investigate the sources of discrepancies in these empirical results. Using a formal job search framework, I derive an equilibrium wage distribution which reveals that the informal search yields for some groups higher and for some others lower wages than formal search. The key result is the existence of nonmonotonicities in wage offers. Two potential sources of these nonmonotonicities exist: (i) peer effects and (ii) unobserved worker heterogeneity in terms of the inherent cost of maintaining connections within a productive informal network. The model predicts that a greater degree of unobserved heterogeneity tilts the estimates toward producing a positive correlation between informal search and higher wages, whereas stronger peer influences tend to yield a negative correlation. This conclusion informs the empirical research in the sense that identification of the true correlation between job contact methods and wage offers requires a careful assessment of the unobserved heterogeneity and peer influences in the relevant sample. |
| Keywords: | Job search; informal networks; peer effects; heterogeneity; nonmonotonicities. |
| JEL: | D85 J31 J64 |
| Date: | 2013–10–01 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:50446&r=soc |
| By: | Timo Hiller; Timo Hiller |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a simple model of strategic network formation with local complementarities in effort levels and positive local externalities for a general class of payoff functions. Results are obtained for one-sided and two-sided link creation. In both cases (pairwise) Nash equilibrium networks are nested split graphs, which are a strict subset of core-periphery networks. The relevance of the convexity of the value function (gross payoffs as a function of neighbours' effort levels when best responding) in obtaining nested split graphs is highlighted. Under additional assumptions on payoffs, we show that the only efficient networks are the complete and the empty network. Furthermore, there exists a range of linking cost such that any (pairwise) Nash equilibrium is inefficient and for a strict subset of this range any (pairwise) Nash equilibrium network structure is different from the efficient network. These findings are relevant for a wide range of social and economic phenomena, such as educational attainment, criminal activity, labor market participation, and R&D expenditures of rms. |
| Keywords: | Strategic network formation, peer effects, strategic complements, positive externalities. |
| JEL: | D62 D85 |
| Date: | 2013–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:cep:stitep:/2013/564&r=soc |
| By: | Frédéric Schneider; Roberto A. Weber |
| Abstract: | We study how the willingness to enter long-term bilateral relationships affects cooperation even when parties have little information about each other, ex ante, and cooperation is otherwise unenforceable. We experimentally investigate a finitely-repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, allowing players to endogenously select interaction durations. Consistent with prior research, longer interactions facilitate cooperation. However, many individuals avoid long-term commitment, with uncooperative types less likely to commit than conditional cooperators. Endogenously chosen long-term commitment yields higher cooperation rates (98% in one condition) than exogenously imposed commitment. Thus, the willingness to enter into long-term relationships provides a means for fostering - and screening for - efficient cooperation. |
| Keywords: | Repeated games, cooperation, voluntary commitment |
| JEL: | C72 C92 D03 |
| Date: | 2013–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zur:econwp:130&r=soc |
| By: | Jihan Ghrairi (ERMES - Equipe de recherche sur les marches, l'emploi et la simulation - CNRS : UMR7017 - Université Paris II - Panthéon-Assas, TEPP - Travail, Emploi et Politiques Publiques - CNRS : FR3435 - Université Paris-Est Marne-la-Vallée (UPEMLV)) |
| Abstract: | This article aims to study youth employability on the job access channel that provided their entry into the labor market. We examine the determinants of the formal and informal job access channels. For this purpose, we estimate a Multinomial Logit model of access channels controlling for selection bias. We use the youth sample of the French National Labor Force Survey (Enquête "Emploi") conducted by the INSEE. Our data provide a set of relevant variables required to identify the model which allows us to study different characteristics of young individuals that affect their access to the current job through a particular channel. First, we notice that young graduates access to their current jobs more often through direct applications and social networks. We find that, in 2010, referred young workers are more likely to be less educated man immigrants, living in rural areas and hired by large firms. However, immigrants were less likely to obtain a job through public employment agencies while the origin effect was not significant in 2007. Moreover, we find that the probability of finding a job through professional contacts increases significantly with the education level for both years (stronger effects for university graduates). |
| Keywords: | job access channels; social networks ; multinomial logit ; selection bias |
| Date: | 2013–06 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00870042&r=soc |
| By: | Gilles Grolleau (Unité MIAJ - INRA - Mathématiques et Informatique Appliquées - Institut national de la recherche agronomique (INRA)); Angela Sutan (ESC Dijon Bourgogne - ESC Dijon Bourgogne); Radu Vranceanu (Economics Department - ESSEC Business School) |
| Abstract: | We investigate the dynamics of cooperation in public good games when contributions to the public good are immediately redistributed across contributors (intra-temporal transfers) and when contributions to the public good by the current group are transferred over time to a future group (inter-temporal transfers). We show that people are more cooperative in inter-temporal contexts than in intra-temporal contexts. We also find that subjects invest more on average in public goods when they know in advance their inheritance from the past. |
| Keywords: | Public goods ; Voluntary contribution mechanism ; Inter-temporal vs intra-temporal transfers ; Sustainable development |
| Date: | 2013–09 |
| URL: | http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00866970&r=soc |